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Abstract 
Abstract 
Equal Pay Audits are the latest tool in the campaign for gender equality at work. I use 
two pay audits, in a bank and an insurance company, to demonstrate how they can be 
used and abused, and in the process I explore the reasons for the massive gender pay 
gap of forty three per cent in the finance sector of the United Kingdom. The conduct of 
a pay audit allows an employer to claim conformity with government approved 
procedures, but I ask how reliable those procedures are, and how the process can be 
improved. The introduction of 'nev/ payment systems such as performance related 
pay has allowed employers to claim that pay and promotion are fair because they are 
determined by 'objective' criteria. The validity of such claims is tested, and other 
elements of the pay process that contribute to unequal pay sought out. The potential 
for 'new' payment systems to be transparent is found to be offset by provision for 
management discretion, but the major contributor to the gap is found to be the 
development of a two tier workforce following recent restructuring of the industry. 
This effectively reproduces the gendered divisions that existed prior to the 
implementation of Equal Opportunities legislation. The women who occupy most of 
the lower tier are mainly employed in call centres and customer service departments, 
where they have better pay and conditions than they could expect for alternative jobs 
in the same locality, sufficient flexibility to accommodate domestic commitments, but a 
flat career structure with little opportunity for promotion. The few men who join this 
tier do so as a stepping stone to the traditional departments where promotion provides 
access to some of the highest salaries in the UK. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Aims of the research 
In this research I exan-dne the potential for Equal Pay Audits to identify the causes of 
unequal pay in individual organisations. In the process I specifically explore the extent 
to which changes to pay and grading systems have affected the level of the gender pay 
gap in the finance sector of the United Kingdom, asking whether they help to eliminate 
or perpetuate unequal pay. The choice of the finance sector was inspired by the 
extreme size of the gap compared with the remainder of the country. More than thirty 
years after the passing of the Equal Pay Act the earnings of all women in the UK are on 
average eighty two per cent of those of men. In the finance sector the equivalent figure 
is fifty seven per cent, six per cent lower than the overall UK figure in 1970 (ONS 1970; 
ONS 2003) and fifty per cent less than the current figure in any other industrial sector 
(IDS 2003b). Financial services are subject to the same employment and equality 
legislation as the rest of the UK, their workers have been educated in the same schools 
and subjected to the same range of cultural influences, and will therefore have similar 
expectations of equal treatment at work. Could there be some characteristic of the 
sector that accounts for the disproportionate size of the gap? 
For much of the twentieth century employment in the sector was characterised by high 
pay relative to similar types of occupation, and an openly declared differentiation 
between long termcareers' for men and lower level 'jobs' for women (Lockwood 1958; 
NBPI 1969; Crompton 1989; Pascall et al. 2000). Gendered pay scales were abandoned 
in 1970 (Brooks 1971; Morris 1986), job evaluation was introduced to determine the 
relative value of jobs (Waine 1985; Morris 1986), and equal opportunities policies were 
adopted in the 1980s (Pascall, Parker, & Evetts 2000). There is no longer any explicit bar 
to women having the same career opportunities and financial rewards as men. 
Crompton found evidence of increasing numbers of women obtaining the relevant 
professional qualifications to facilitate their progress to management (Crompton 1989), 
and the International Labour Office reported the proportion of female financial 
managers rising from eleven to seventeen per cent during the 1980s (Wirth 2001). 
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On the face of it reforms such as these should have resulted in a much more significant 
closing of the pay gap since 1970; however they were not the only changes affecting the 
industry at that time. During this period the sector was transformed from a group of 
highly regulated cartels, to one in which the relaxation of regulation has produced 
intense competition, not only between the established banks, building societies and 
insurance companies, but also with new entrants such as supermarkets (Ennew et al. 
1990; Storey 1995). Restructuring resulted in much flatter organisational hierarchies, 
with a larger ratio of clerical to management staff and therefore fewer opportunities for 
promotion (Crompton 1989). Increased competition prompted a much more 
aggressive management style, with the intention of refocusing employees' purpose 
from service provision to sales (Snape et al. 1993; Storey et al. 1999), and of promoting 
greater flexibility in the nature, location and time that work is performed (Atkinson 
1984; Hunter et al. 1994). A significant element of the new approach was the 
introduction of 'newj payment systems, particularly forms of performance related pay. 
The concept of pay for performance was not new to the industry, merit having 
replaced age as the basis for progression in 1971 (Morris 1986), but the version 
implemented for Nat West managers in 1988 was the first to introduce specific 
performance targets, a concept that was rapidly taken up by most finance sector 
organisations, and for all grades as a replacement for both annual increments and 
negotiated cost of living awards (Goodswen 1988; Swabe 1989; Snape et al 1993). 
In this thesis I ask two questions about the impact of new payment systems on the pay 
of women and men. First I ask whether there is any evidence that the use of 
objective criteria for assessing individual contribution /performance helps mitigate pay 
differences for jobs judged to be of equal value. Secondly, whether the introduction of 
meritocratic: payment systems facilitates the entry of women into previously male 
don-dnated grades and roles, or alternatively whether management strategies for 
flexibilisation, including the individualisation of pay, have created new working 
arrangements and a competitive culture with which the predominantly female section 
of the workforce is either unable or unwilling to comply, and these effectively continue 
to perpetuate the lifetime pay gap, albeit in new ways. 
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In theory at least, job evaluation and performance pay can provide a fair method of 
assessing compensation (NBPI 1968; Lewis 1998), although in practice the 
implementation of either system may provide opportunities for bias or discrimination 
(Mcnally & Acker 1984; Acker 1990; Dickens 1998). The potential problems have, 
however, been well documented, in practitioner as well as academic journals (IDS 
2000; Wiscombe 2001; CIPD 2001; Milsome 2003), and are also recognised. by trade 
unions (BIFU 1989; BIFU 1994). Whilst recognition of problems does not guarantee 
their resolution, why is it that the combined efforts of human resources practitioners 
and trade union negotiators have failed to achieve a significant reduction in the pay 
gap? 
The problems with job evaluation and performance related pay are as likely to occur in 
any industrial sector, but the new emphasis on competition in the finance sector may 
exacerbate one particular problem associated with performance related pay. 
Competition between employees for the relatively small number of better than average 
ratings that are available in most systems has been criticised because it can lead to 
fraud or to aggressive sales techniques that alienate customers (Pfeffer 1998). Pfeffer's 
critics point to the financial success of companies that reward performance (Zingheirn 
& Schuster 2000). Improved company performance may well result from the 
implementation of these systems, but it is unlikely that either fraud or excessive 
aggression are common. A more likely consequence is that workers contribute part of 
their own time to achieve their targets, arriving early, departing late or taking work 
home (Wharton & Blair-Loy 2002), and contributing to the establishment of a 'long 
hours culture'. Analysis of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) suggests that 
working unpaid overtime produces long term financial benefits for individual workers 
(Campbell & Green 2002), however it may also create a vicious circle, whereby targets 
exceeded one year are increased the next; and a new divide, between those workers 
who are able and willing to sacrifice their own time, and those for whom it is not an 
option. The latter group will be predon-tinantly comprised of women, who are likely to 
be deterred from seeking advancement by the perception that the pressure to improve 
performance increases with rank. 
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The thirtieth anniversary of the Equal Pay Act inspired renewed concern about 
unequal pay between women and men in the UK. A Task Force was set up, 
comprising members from industry, trade unions and government, with the remit to 
identify ways of eliminating that element of the pay gap that was the result of 
discrimination (EOC 2001b). The Task Force made several recommendations, 
requiring action by government agencies, employers and trade unions in the fields of 
legislation, policy, practice and publicity. However there was one recommendation 
that became the focal point of the Task Force's report 'Just Pay', and that was the 
creation of a "'duty on all employers to carry out an equal pay review". A further 
review, under the chairmanship of Denise Kingsmill, rejected the proposal to make 
equal pay reviews compulsory, but agreed that employers should be encouraged to 
take this action (Kingsn-dll 2001). Since then, the trade unions, both independently and 
through the TUC, have concentrated their main equal pay efforts into encouraging 
employers to conduct audits, and training representatives to assist in the process 
and/or to interpret the results; equal pay guides for employers have also prioritised the 
use of audits (see, for example CIPD 2001); and the main focus of the Equal Pay Forum 
set up by Business in the Community, Opportunity Now and the Equal Opportunities 
Commission in 2001 is to encourage and assist with the conduct of audits (BITC 2003). 
Equal Pay Audits have risen to the top of the hierarchy of tools for achieving equal pay 
that includes gender impact assessments, gender proofing of policy documents and 
gender-monitoring. As Rees points out, these tools are used "post hoc", and their 
value must therefore be as a support role to a gender mainstrearning approach in 
which equal opportunities thinking is integrated into the fabric of policy development 
(Rees 2001: 194). By using equal pay audits as my main source of data I am able to ask 
my third question: whether pay audits are capable of fulfilling the role set out for 
them: not simply whether the data is sufficiently reliable to objectively determine the 
extent of pay inequality, but also whether it can be enough to find and remedy existing 
cases of unequal pay without first ensuring that the causes of unequal pay have been 
eliminated. 
13 
Introduction 
Structure of the dissertation 
These questions form the basis of the remainder of this dissertation. The first four 
chapters contain the introduction and background to the research, and the final four 
describe the empirical research. In this introductory Chapter I describe the context of 
the research and the development of the research hypotheses, and set out a plan of the 
substantive work. 
This research was originally formulated with the principal objective of identifying the 
element of the gender pay gap that is attributable to the unique characteristics of the 
finance sector. However that gap is likely to be superimposed on the same elements of 
inequality, and subjected to the same constraints that apply in all of the other industrial 
sectors. In Chapter Two I review the empirical research that has already been 
conducted into the causes of the gap, and the actions that have been taken by 
government agencies, trade unions and employers to find solutions to those causes. 
The main data sources used in these exercises, although numerically large, are limited 
in that they represent a very small percentage of the workforce. Their results vary 
according to which data source is used, and which comparisons are applied; 
nevertheless, I find that there is a broad consensus that vertical job segregation, or the 
clustering of women in low status jobs, is a significant cause (Anker 1997, Grimshaw et 
al. 2001a; Blackburn et al. 2002; Walby & Olsen 2002). There is an impact in all types of 
job and for all levels of educational achievement, but that impact is disproportionately 
large for part-time workers, whether or not they also happen to have caring 
comn-titments, and may be slightly ameliorated by the presence of a trade union. 
Many employers have now introduced Equal Opportunities or Diversity Management 
policies that they promote as having the potential to facilitate women's progress into 
management. However research shows that these are likely to be ineffective unless 
accompanied by practical measures to ensure their implementation, and if they are not 
equally accessible to all employees may even prove to be a deterrent rather than a 
stimulus (Liff & Cameron 1997; Wajcman 1998; Ward et al. 2001; Felstead et al. 2002). 
Recent government initiatives have largely focussed on voluntary measures. Even 
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these, like the few enforceable measures to remedy unequal pay, are still chiefly aimed 
at directly discrin-tinatory pay determination rather than breaking down the 
stereotypes that contribute to the continuation of 'clustering' (Grimshaw & Rubery 
2001; Kingsn-dll 2001; EOC 2001b). 
The corollary of the thesis outlined in the first part of this chapter is that vertical 
segregation has even greater significance in this industrial sector. In Chapter Three I 
build on the concepts introduced in the exposition of that thesis, by describing the 
restructuring of the finance sector. I demonstrate how it has changed from a customer 
focussed service industry to one in which sales and profit are paramount, and review 
accounts of how that change has affected working conditions in the industry (Redman 
et al. 1997, Hudson et al. 1997; Storey et al 1999; Belt et al. 2002; Grimshaw et al. 2002). 
Among the tools used to achieve the transformation were the introduction of 'flexible' 
working practices and performance management. I review accounts of how these were 
implemented, and conclude that any flexibility available for employees is exercised at 
the expense of a career (Pinch & Storey 1992; Jany-Catrice & Lehndorff 2002), while 
pursuit of a career has increasingly become associated with long hours, stress and the 
intensification of work (Simpson 1997; Rutherford 2001; Wharton & Blair-Loy 2002; 
Campbell & Green 2002). 
Chapters Two and Three are essentially a descriptive representation of the specific 
context of this research. They describe the way in which unequal pay is delivered, but 
they do not provide an explanation of why women should be treated differently from 
men in employment. Chapter Four is a review of the literature that proposes 
explanations for unequal treatment. I look at three groups of theories, respectively 
these suggest that the responsibility lies with the individual, the social structure or the 
organisational culture. These groupings incorporate theories that range from the 
gender equivalent of institutional racism (Acker 1990) to theories of biological 
determinism (Paglin & Rufolo 1990) and the suggestion that women exercise free 
choice in making career decisions (Hakim 2002). 1 conclude that none of the theories is 
sufficient on its own, but that the structural explanations of patriarchy and capitalism 
have both influenced and been influenced by the compromises made by both women 
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and men in determining the nature and extent of their work. These compromises may 
have roots in the restrictions imposed by biology, but are continuing long after those 
restrictions were effectively lifted. It is the exercise of those compromises that accounts 
for differential representation of women and men in senior positions in the finance 
sector. 
The first four chapters locate the development of my research questions in existing 
research and knowledge; the remainder present the results of my empirical research in 
relation to those questions, starting in Chapter Five with an outline of the 
methodology. Research into pay is always problematic as it is a sensitive issue, and 
pay systems generally lack transparency. I recognised the opportunity presented by 
current government pressure on employers to conduct equal pay audits and persuaded 
two finance sector organisations to permit access to their databases for the conduct of 
an intensive audit of their pay and benefits. Much of the previous research into the 
gender pay gap in the UK has used secondary analysis of datasets such as the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), New Earnings Survey (NES), Labour Force Survey 
(LFS), General Household Survey (GHS) and various cohort studies (Anderson et al. 
2001). Even where the case study approach has been adopted the researchers have not 
had access to a complete set of pay and personnel data for the organisation researched 
(Gilbert & Secker 1995; Colling & Dickens 1998; Fagan 1998; Carroll & Rubery 1998). 1 
obtained access to details of the pay and benefits of all employees of a bank and an 
insurance company, together with performance ratings, length of service, grades and 
job titles. For the first time it has been possible to see exactly who earns what and to 
make direct comparisons both within and between all levels of employment. 
The quantitative data was supplemented with sufficient qualitative data to help put the 
numbers into context and to give them meaning. A secondary objective was to explore 
the potential value of equal pay audits as an instrument for generating transparency in 
payment systems and identifying the locus of inequality. The model Equal Pay Review 
recommended by the EOC is limited to comparing the pay of women and men doing 
equal work (EOC 2003a), but I realised it would be extremely valuable to employers, 
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trade unions and government agencies to detern-dne the full potential for analysis of 
pay data, as well as the limitations of the recommended model. By restricting the 
qualitative element of my research to data from interviews, focus groups and publicly 
available documents, I was able to produce a model of analysis that could be adopted 
for pay reviews in other companies in the sector. 
The following three chapters describe the findings in relation to the research questions. 
Chapter Six concentrates on the evidence for a horizontal pay gap, the only type of 
unequal pay specifically covered by legislation. Using the format recommended by the 
EOC in its Equal Pay Tool Kit, I was able to compare the accessibility of data from 
organisations with very different payment systems, ranging from relatively 
transparent to virtually opaque. In neither was I able to obtain all of the data necessary 
for a thorough audit, and difficulties in determining which jobs were comparable 
demonstrated how the data could be manipulated to produce a variety of results. It 
would have been possible to create a situation in which only one small group of 
workers had a pay differential that would have been classed as statistically significant 
according to the guidelines. Despite the recommendation in the Tool Kit that 
differences of five per cent or more should be considered significant, I investigated all 
differences, disaggregating the available data where possible by job type and location 
as well as by sex and grade, and controlling for age, length of service and performance 
rating in order to identify the likelihood of legally acceptable justifications for any gaps 
found. The result shows that women tend to earn more than men in the lower, clerical 
grades, and that that situation is reversed in higher grades. Although the criteria of 
experience and performance provide justification for what would otherwise be illegal 
pay differences, they are also evidence that highly skilled and experienced women are 
remaining in low paid clerical grades long after their male counterparts have moved 
into more senior roles. 
In Chapter Seven I use the pay audit data to move beyond the remit of the Equal Pay 
Toolkit and investigate the extent to which audits can help to explain the vertical pay 
gap. I find evidence of differential treatment in both recruitment and promotion, and 
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with the aid of focus group data show that issues such as geographical mobility and 
flexibility are seen still to have different impacts on the working lives of women and 
men. There is overwhelming evidence that although the barriers to women's 
advancement are no longer explicit, most employees still behave as though they were 
in place. In particular I show that a decision to work part-time while children are 
young can effectively end a woman's likelihood of a career, as part time opportunities 
in management are almost non-existent. There are examples of women moving into 
areas that were traditionally male don-tinated, but like part-time managers, most of 
these are exceptions to the general trend; where women have broken into previously 
male dominated roles their status and remuneration has generally decreased soon 
after. 
In the final chapter, these findings are discussed in relation to the current knowledge, 
in particular the theories of Joan Acker and Catherine Hakim. I find that there is a 
positive impact of performance pay on the size of the horizontal pay gap, but that its 
effectiveness is in inverse proportion to the subjectivity and flexibility of the 
measurement criteria. The movement of women into management is hampered by the 
perception of the need to participate in the 'long hours culture', but it is continuing to 
accelerate. However I could find no evidence that meritocratic payment systems have 
contributed to this acceleration. In fact I find that flexibility and discretion still 
predominate over consistency and clarity, at best decreasing the transparency of the 
payment systems and at worst contributing to the perpetuation of the pay gap. 
I conclude that the excessively large gap in the finance sector is largely due to the 
segregation of women into the lowest paid jobs in an industry that has the greatest 
range of salaries. At the lowest levels pay compares well with the average for similarly 
skilled women in other industries, but there are better paying alternatives for young 
male school leavers. Job segregation in these organisations conforms to the ideal 
'choice" of the employers rather than of the employees, whose decisions may well be 
rational and pragmatic, but not necessarily preferences. For women, comn-titment to a 
career in the clerical grades of a financial services company is usually better than the 
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alternatives, in terms of pay, hours and working conditions. For many men, however, 
the sacrifice of early earning power is only justified by the realisation that promotion 
will give access to some of the highest salaries in the UK. 
In order to produce these conclusions, my analysis went beyond that recommended by 
the EOC, and included the manipulation of the data to make direct comparisons as 
well as to test the reliability of the results. The range of results I was able to produce 
convinced me that despite the value of pay audits when used as support for a gender 
mainstreaming approach, they also have the potential to disguise or distort the results, 
and induce unwarranted complacency. In addition to practical measures to enable 
women and men to compete for the higher paid jobs on equal terms, I therefore 
recommend that the conduct of pay audits should iiot be made mandatory, but that 
employers should be encouraged to use them to their full extent as tools for monitoring 
all aspects of equality. 
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Chapter 2. Unequal Pay 
The Gender Pay Gap 
The gender pay gap across all industries in the UK in 2003 was eighteen per cent, 
exactly half of what it had been before the passing of the Equal Pay Act in 1970. The 
Office of National Statistics base their calculation of an eighteen per cent pay gap 
between the earnings of women and men on the hourly pay of full time employees in 
the NES, a one per cent sample of all adults in employment in the UK during one week 
in April. The sample does not include the self-employed, the unemployed or those 
earning less than the National Insurance limit, and the pay data does not include 
overtime or bonus payments (ONS 2003). As it does not reflect time out of the labour 
market, the data is not sufficient to extrapolate a lifetime earnings gap; however it is 
the most comprehensive survey of earnings available on a national scale. With the 
exception of a comparison between part time women and part time men, eighteen per 
cent is the smallest pay gap that derives from the data. When overtime and bonus 
payments are included the gap is twenty four point seven per cent on weekly earnings 
and twenty seven point six per cent on annual earnings, and the inclusion of part-time 
workers brings the gap on weekly earnings to forty point five per cent. This partly 
reflects the high proportion of women working part-time (forty three per cent), even 
though the lowest paid part-timers are excluded from the survey as they are not 
eligible for national insurance contributions (IDS 2003b). Not only do men work more 
basic hours than women, they are also more likely to work paid overtime. In 2003, 
twenty nine per cent of men worked paid overtime, and earned three and a half times 
as much as the fifteen per cent of women who did so. 
The size of the gender pay gap varies across regions and industries, and both within 
and between occupations. Based on the hourly calculation, it ranges from twelve point 
five per cent in Wales to twenty three point five per cent in London, and from five 
point two per cent in the transport industry to forty two point five per cent in financial 
intermediation. Men earn more than women in two hundred and thirty six of the two 
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hundred and fifty seven occupational classifications, and hold the largest proportion of 
jobs in nine out of the ten highest paying occupations; eight of the ten lowest paid jobs 
are filled mainly by women (ONS 2003; IDS 2003b). Generally speaking, the higher the 
earnings the larger the pay gap. This is true not only in the occupations and regions, 
but across the whole of the sample. The lowest paid ten per cent of women earn ten 
per cent less than the equivalent group of men, but the highest paid ten per cent earn 
twenty per cent less than the highest paid ten per cent of men. In some typical finance 
sector occupations the difference in the average hourly rate can be as little as three 
pence per hour for Call Centre Agents, where the average pay is less than E8 per hour, 
and as high as E4.72 per hour for Financial Institution Managers, where the average 
male rate is E20.20 (ONS 2003). 
The New Earnings Survey is just one of a number of datasets that have been used by 
researchers to decompose the gender pay gap. Others are the BHPS, LFS, GHS, MRC 
National Survey of Health and Development (MRC), 1964 Birth Cohort Study, National 
Child Development Study (NCDS), International Social Survey Programme and Cohort 
Study of 1980 Graduates. Although this is the most common research method (Joshi & 
Paci 1998; Swaffield 2000; IDS 2003b) there have also been comparative analyses 
(Harkness 1996; Grimshaw et al. 2001b), case studies (Colling & Dickens 1998; Fagan 
1998; Carroll & Rubery 1998), econometric analyses (Manning 1996) and organisational 
analyses (Millward & Woodland 1995). Anderson et al (2001) produced a 
comprehensive review of the research up to 2000, in which they categorised and 
evaluated the relative importance of the factors contributing to the gender pay gap that 
have been identified in the research. These are individual characteristics, job 
characteristics, unionisation and wage setting, and recruitment, promotion and 
payment systems. In the next four sections of this chapter, I use these categories to 
describe the most significant of those causes. 
Individual characteristics 
The individual characteristics that have been identified as contributing to the gender 
pay gap are human capital, motivation and the impact of motherhood and caring 
responsibilities (Anderson et al 2001: 39). Human capital theory treats the acquisition 
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of education, skills and work experience as an investment that will produce dividends 
in the form of income from employment. For example, female students are presumed 
to anticipate a limited degree of participation in the labour market (Mincer 1993), and 
have less incentive to invest in a 'market oriented' formal education (Blau 1998: 16). 
Sin-dlarly the theory assumes that working women will not make the necessary human 
capital investments to progress to higher paying managerial and professional 
employment, whether because they prioritize their domestic obligations or because 
employers are unwilling to invest in training for which they may not reap the benefit 
(Becker 1985; Broadbridge 1997). 
Women do still tend to have less work experience than men, not only from taking time 
out of the labour market for child rearing, but also because of their earlier retirement 
age. Studies by Swaffield (2000) and Lissenburgh (2000) indicate that the negative 
effect on earnings of time out of the labour market varies in intensity according to the 
stage in the individual's career at which the time out occurs, the purpose for which it is 
taken, and the sex of the individual. For example, the first nine years experience are 
more valuable to men than to women (Lissenburgh 2000), and time out for education 
in excess of four years reduces womens earnings, but not men's (Swaffield 2000). 
Overall, Anderson et al calculate that experience accounts for two to three per cent of 
the full time pay gap, and five to nine per cent of the part-time pay gap (Anderson et al 
2001). 
These studies only measure time, but the quality of work experience is also likely to 
affect future earnings. Part-time work is almost entirely confined to the lowest levels 
of occupational hierarchies (Crompton & Birkelund 2000; Walby & Olsen 2002; O'Reilly 
& Bothfield 2002). However, as sixty eight per cent of all women of working age have 
at least a GCSE A*ý-C level qualification, thirty per cent are outside the labour market 
and forty three per cent of employed women work part time (EOC 2003b), a reasonable 
proportion of those low level jobs must be held by relatively well qualified women. In 
their analysis of the 1991 sweep of the NCDS, Dex et al (1996) found that women 
returning to work after a break for childcare frequently accept a downgrading. Using 
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BHPS data for 1991 and 1995, O'Reilly and Bothfeld (2002) found part-time women 
who had previously worked full-time were twice as likely as other part time women to 
move back into full-time work, but according to Burchell et al (1997), that transition 
was most likely to be made by women with skills or professional qualifications. 
Neither of these studies was able to establish whether these women moved back into 
full time jobs of an equivalent status to those they held before going part-time. 
However, if they were with different employers, they would suffer a further penalty to 
their earnings by having to revert to the entry level salary (Manning & Robinson 1998). 
The 'qualifications gap' between women and men is closing; in 2002 forty one per cent 
of women and fifty four per cent of men had at least a GCE A level qualification (EOC 
2003b). However, Paci and joshi found that part time women are less well qualified 
than full timers, and suffer a two per cent wage penalty as a result with a further two 
per cent due to differential access to training (Paci & joshi 1996). The evidence 
regarding the relative proportions of women and men receiving work related training 
is contradictory. Surveys of individual organisations show women being less likely 
than men to participate in work related training or to obtain high level vocational 
qualifications (Felstead 1995; Arulampalarn & Booth 1997; Knoke & Ishio 1998). Soon 
after these results were published, national statistics indicated that in 1998 thirteen 
point eight per cent of employed women received training compared with only twelve 
point six per cent of men (Walby & Olsen 2003), and by 2001 that ratio had increased to 
nineteen per cent women to fourteen per cent men (Clarke 2002). This apparent 
paradox is clarified by findings from the finance sector, indicating that the focus of 
formal training is on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and 
interpersonal skills (Webster 2001), reflecting recent changes in the type of work 
performed in the lowest, female dominated grades. If this is indicative of a longer 
term trend, the cost to the employer of providing the learning facilities could result in 
an increased interest in retaining the trained workers, encouraging employers to 
provide incentives to remain in employment following cl-dld-birth (Hatt 1997). 
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The lower level of qualifications, and the consequential pay penalty, of most part-time 
women contributes to the greater benefit gained by women than men as a result of 
acquiring degree level qualifications (Purcell 2002). The advantage is in relation to the 
earnings of lower qualified women, as female graduates still earn less than their male 
colleagues. There is a difference even between women and men with identical 
qualifications, made even greater because the subjects women tend to study are 
attributed with less value in the labour market than those studied mainly by men. In 
particular from the point of view of this dissertation, women are under represented on 
the economics and business studies courses favoured by financial institutions (EOC 
2001a). Banking, Building Societies and Insurance all have professional qualifications, 
for which study is normally part-time by serving employees. At one time women were 
discouraged from acquiring these qualifications (Crompton & Jones 1984), but this 
policy was reversed in the 1970s, and Crompton and Sanderson (1986) were optimistic 
that the significant increase in the number of women studying for these qualifications 
between 1979 and 1983 would result in a similar increase in the number of women 
managers in the industry. The increase seems to have been short lived, a list of Fellows 
of the Chartered Institute of Bankers published in January 2004 has sixty two pages 
with fifty four names on each page, but on no page are there more than three women's 
names UFS 2004). 
If women genuinely have the opportunities for work related training and professional 
study, why are they not taking advantage of them? One suggestion is that they lack 
the motivation, prioritising their domestic responsibilities over paid employment. 
Swaffield (2000) attempted to gauge the level of women workers' motivation by using 
their mothers' work history, on the assumption that daughters of working mothers 
would be most likely to reject the 'woman as homemaker' stereotype. She did find a 
positive relationship between earnings and having had a working mother, although 
she also found that 'motivated' women suffered a greater penalty than "homemakers' 
did for periods of unemployment. 
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The use of mothers' work history as a proxy for motivation does not allow for the 
many other influences on the development of womens attitudes to work, but it is an 
objective and verifiable criterion, unlike the self reporting relied upon in surveys that 
show pay is more important to men than to women (Wajcman 1996; Clark 1997). These 
responses will at best convey the respondents' attitudes to employment at the time of 
the survey, may well reflect expectations rather than aspirations, and are likely to be 
influenced by other life style circumstances, which may be of a temporary nature. 
The circumstance that has the greatest impact on most people's lives is the birth of a 
child, an event that brings with it major lifestyle changes for both parents, but usually 
significantly greater for women than for men. Motherhood has been found to have a 
negative effect on lifetime earnings, even for mothers who continue to work full-time 
(Harkness 1996; Waldfogel 1998; Joshi et al. 1999), but fatherhood carries a small 
earnings premium (Harkness 1996). Although there is no evidence that mothers are 
less motivated or have less energy than other female workers, many of them do find 
themselves constrained in the hours and locations that they are able to work. 
The majority of part time workers are parents as well as women, but Joshi and Paci 
found that their low wages were more likely to be attributable to being part-time than 
to being mothers (Joshi & Paci 1998). They also identified an earnings pren-durn 
associated with the amount of time spent travelling to work that Anderson et al 
confirmed, in an analysis of the LFS, benefits men more than women (Anderson et al 
2001). Most of the explanations they propose for women's shorter travelling times 
emphasise the time restrictions imposed by domestic responsibilities, an exception is 
"the type of work undertaken by women is more likely to be located closer to 
residential areas" (Anderson et al 2001: 104). The "type of work, fon-ns the basis of the 
second category of causes of the gender pay gap. 
job Characteristics 
Average earnings of women and men are different both within and between 
occupations. This is largely due to the tendency for each sex to be concentrated in 
different occupations (horizontal segregation) or at different levels witl-dn the same 
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occupation (vertical segregation). In recent years there have been significant changes 
in the degree and nature of occupational segregation, (Reskin & Roos 1990; Walby 
1997; Millward et al. 2000; Wirth 2001). Using the Workplace IndustriallEmployee 
Relations Surveys Nfillward et al (2000) show that the proportion of workplaces where 
women are under represented in management has fallen from ninety two per cent in 
1984 to sixty eight per cent in 1998. However Reskin and Roos (1990) found that the 
entry of women into previously male dominated roles tends to be accompanied by a 
devaluation of the jobs. This finding is complementary to the thesis that horizontal 
segregation contributes to the pay gap because women's skills are undervalued by 
society (Crompton & Sanderson 1990). 
A case study of an American bank observed the restructuring, dismantling and 
recreation of jobs in one of its divisions. Despite the fact that women oversaw the 
whole operation, the effect was to create a new class of managerial positions, filled 
mainly by women, but with lower status and salaries than those they replaced. A new 
sales role, with higher status and salary than the previous equivalent, proved to be 
predominantly occupied by men (Skuratowicz & Hunter 2004). 
In the UK, in their analysis of the 1998 WERS Cully et al (2000) found that at least a 
quarter of non-managerial employees earned less than E3.50 per hour in twenty one 
per cent of workplaces where at least half the employees were women, and thirty three 
per cent of those where more than half worked part-time. Low pay tends to be 
particularly associated with the smallest firms, where both Swaffied (2000) and Paci 
and joshi (1996) identified a gap of between one and two per cent directly attributable 
to the size of the firm. This association between low pay and unequal pay receives 
further support from studies showing the gap is smaller in the public sector, where 
Cully et al (2000) were only able to identify seven per cent of workplaces with any low 
paid employees (Paci et al. 1995). However the finance sector provides an exception to 
this rule, having both the largest pay gap and the highest average salaries of all UK 
industrial sectors (ONS 2004b). 
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Unionisation and Wage Setting 
Historical explanations for segregation include the deliberate policy of male dominated 
trade unions to exclude or limit the employment of women (Fawcett 1918; Cockburn 
1983). More recently a case has been made for unions having an influence on the 
decrease in the pay gap (Black et al. 1999), based on the greater size of the gap in the 
UK compared with those Northern European countries where collective bargaining is 
the norm and pay negotiation is still centralised (Anderson et al 2001). A recent study 
in the USA also found a potential advantage from unionisation, but restricted to female 
'blue-collar' staff in male dominated industries, rather than those women working in 
industries where they were in the majority (Elvira & Saporta 2001). The results of UK 
studies do not differentiate by industry; an analysis of the most recent WERS, which 
was not disaggregated by gender, suggests that pay settlements in the private sector 
are no higher in unionised organisations than elsewhere (Millward et al. 2001). 
However in earlier studies there was evidence of wages being higher in unionised 
companies, and of the influence of pay levels being greater for women than for men, 
and greatest of all for part-time women (Harkness 1996; Paci & Joshi 1996; Swaffield 
2000; Hardy 2001). On the other hand, women are less likely to be unionized than men 
(Green 1995; Sinclair 1995), and collective agreements are less likely to apply to the jobs 
they perform (Rubery & Fagan 1995). 
Although there is a TUC affiliated trade union in the finance sector (Unifi), it has less 
than a tenth of the employees in the industry as members. Eighty per cent of its 
members work in the four major high street banks, and the vast majority of City 
Institutions do not recognise it for any purpose. Nevertheless, where Unifi does 
operate it has the same membership density among women and part timers as it does 
among men, and consequently most of its members are women. Elvira and Saporta 
suggest that their finding that women in female don-tinated employment do not benefit 
from unionisation indicates that female dominated unions are relatively weak. The 
example of Unison, with a membership ratio of three women to one man, suggests that 
this is not necessarily the case in the UK (Colgan & Ledwith 2002), and Unifi became 
more militant during the same period that it was increasing its representation of 
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women (Kelly 1996). Unifi is, however, a highly centralised union. Pay bargaining is 
the responsibility of a single full time official for each employer, even though most of 
the employers have devolved responsibility to divisions. An IRS report (IRS 1992) 
suggested that decentralisation of pay bargaining results in the side-lining of equal pay 
because of the increased use of inexperienced officials. The same effect may result 
from the increased workload of the single experienced official. 
Recruitment, payment systems and promotion 
Direct discrin-tination in job advertisements and during the interview process is illegal 
(EOC 2000) and many employers have developed formal procedures to ensure 
compliance with the legislation (Dickens 1998). However, no amount of formality can 
remove subjectivity from the process (Webb 1991), and the sophistication of the 
procedures may even disguise underlying bias and discrimination (Dickens 1998), and 
"entrench existing patterns of disadvantage" Gewson & Mason 1986b: 59). 
Interviewers can be trained not to ask inappropriate questions (Rubin 1997), but there 
is no way of knowing how much their assumptions and prejudices influence their 
decisions. 
Unfounded assumptions may also influence decisions about the level of qualification 
required for particular jobs. The majority of new recruits to Investment Banking have 
mathematics or science based degrees (McDowell 1997; Jones 1998), and new entrants 
to the Bank of England are generally expected to have an econon-dcs degree (Brawley 
2002 
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personal communication), qualifications that are more likely to be obtained by 
men than women (EOC 2001c). Even in the lower status jobs where women are in the 
majority, there is evidence that women are recruited with lower qualifications than 
men, so weakening their prospects for promotion (Crompton & Jones 1984; Crompton 
1989). 
Even if employers have pay scales that indicate an entry-level salary, they also need 
sufficient flexibility to offer salaries that reflect relevant previous experience. Early 
reports from EOC assessments of Equal Pay Reviews indicate that inconsistencies in 
starting salaries are among the key issues identified (Neathey et al. 2003). This may be 
28 
Unequal Pay 
because employers give undue weight to men's experience, but similar findings for 
young, recently qualified graduates with no relevant experience (Purcell 2002) suggest 
that the problem is more fundamental. Flexibility facilitates negotiation, but women 
have been found to both underestimate their own ability (Rosenthal et al. 1996) and to 
be satisfied with their pay (Clark 1997), so that they are more likely than men to accept 
what is initially on offer. 
Pay scales and grading systems in the UK tend to be firm specific, making comparison 
between jobs difficult, even when they are in the same industry (Rubery 1997). Most 
medium and large scale employers use some form of job evaluation to determine their 
systems (Morrell et al. 2001). The use of a job evaluation scheme can provide an 
employer with an effective defence against a claim for equal value brought under the 
Equal Pay Act 1970, so long as it is analytical and non-discrin-dnatory (IDS 1996), yet 
comparative research shows smaller gender pay gaps in countries where job evaluation 
is less common (Rubery 1995). 
Some companies develop job evaluation systems specifically for their own workforce; 
others purchase generic systems from specialist providers. In both cases researchers 
have identified potential for the systems to reproduce or even exacerbate inequalities, 
rather than eliminate them. In a study of the systems provided by one of the largest 
international organisations, Steinberg (1992) found examples of evaluation systems 
introduced specifically to restore the status quo ante, for example, where market forces 
had driven up the salaries of nurses relative to managerial jobs in a Toronto hospital. 
More commonly, problems include the valuation of male dominated management 
functions above those more likely to be performed by women (Mcnally & Acker 1984; 
Milsome 2003), the deliberate manipulation of the process in order to inflate job values 
(Milsome 2003; Steinberg 1992), and the failure of schemes to keep pace with changing 
work practices (Hastings 2000). 
The hierarchical structures produced by early job evaluation schemes have largely 
given way to flatter structures that are considerably wider at the bottom than the top, 
with even fewer opportunities for promotion than in the traditional hierarchical 
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system. Grimshaw et al (2002) found that those opportunities also tend to be 
accompanied by a significant intensification of work, including long hours and 
excessive targets. They found that many staff have rejected that route and chosen to 
make their way between the "finely divided increments within the grades" (Grimshaw 
et al 2002: p 111), effectively making a separate career ladder of the clerical grade. 
Although Grimshaw et al do not differentiate between women and men in this study; 
long hours are most likely to deter women (Kodz et al. 1998), as a result of which broad 
banded structures will contribute to the pay gap resulting from vertical segregation. 
The theory of job evaluation is that it measures and values the components of a job. 
Contingent payment systems measure and value the attributes of the workers, 
typically their performance against pre-detern-tined objectives and their acquisition of 
job related skills. Pay systems that relate earnings to performance have been credited 
with being fairer and more transparent than those they replaced, especially as women's 
employment patterns mean that they are less likely to benefit from seniority payments, 
and may often be over-qualified for the jobs they perform (Kessler 1994; Dickens 1999; 
Rankin 2000). Rubery (1995) points out that an essential prerequisite for their 
successful implementation is an environment where equality is treated as a priority, 
citing the work of Knudsen and Pedersen (1992) which shows women faring much 
better in Denmark where there is a "commitment to equality" (Rubery 1995: 651). 
Even though the appraisal process has been shown to be liable to gender bias (Strebler 
et al. 1997), a number of studies have found that women tend to receive a 
disproportionate amount of higher ratings than men in equivalent roles (Bevan & 
Thompson 1992; IDS 2000). However, Bevan and Thompson also found that when it 
comes to placing a value on performance, men received more money out of the process 
than women did, especially in those systems that give managers discretion to 
determine pay awards, within the limits of a centrally detern-dned 'pay pot'. Not only 
is this more likely to discriminate in favour of men, but it also reduces the 
opportunities to monitor pay trends (Rubery 1995). Rubery also shows that 
performance pay may discrin-dnate if pressure to perform encourages employees to 
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work additional hours in order to meet deadlines or exceed targets; behaviour that is 
particularly difficult for many women (Rubery 1995). 
Performance related pay rewards the output from work; competency pay is a way of 
recognising the input. It was developed in the USA as a fairer and more efficient 
alternative to the use of academic qualifications for employee selection (Spencer & 
Spencer 1993; Lawler 1994). In the USA, it works in much the same way as National 
Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) in the UK, but in the UK the skills are primarily 
detern-dned by company specific criteria. 
Opportunities for bias exist in the design, interpretation and assessment stages of 
competence based systems (Adams 1996). If their development reflects the skills of the 
existing workforce, they will simply perpetuate existing imbalances (Rankin 2000), and 
if there are any inequalities in access to training, these will be reflected in inequalities 
in the acquisition of skills (Strebler et al 1997). 
The measurement of performance and competency provides specific criteria that 
should help women prove they have the necessary qualities for promotion. According 
to an analysis of the BHPS, women are at least as likely as men to be promoted (Booth 
et al. 1998). Booth et al controlled for, inter alia, 'effort', which included hours of 
overtime worked, number of children in the household and marital status. They 
concluded that occupation was the only variable with a significant effect on promotion 
prospects, and a subsequent analysis of the Australian and British banking sectors 
produced comparable results for full time employees (Buttigieg & Walsh 2000). 
Nevertheless, women still occupy sixty nine per cent of adn-dnistrative and equivalent 
occupations, while men fill at least sixty nine per cent of the managerial and 
professional positions (EOC 2003b). The findings of Booth and of Buttigieg almost 
certainly reflect the fact that married women with children are unlikely to be able to 
work overtime, and if they work part-time they are restricted in their choice of 
occupation, to those from which promotion prospects are most limited. 
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The structure of most organisations means that there are only enough promotion 
opportunities for a small proportion of workers, so employers have been found to 
nurture those they consider to have 'career potential' and discourage the rest (Cassirer 
& Reskin 2000). Researchers have identified several characteristics that are used to 
identify career potential, including length of experience (Halford & Leonard 2001), 
'comn-dtment' (Dickens 1998; Blackburn et al 2002) and geographical mobility 
(Grimshaw & Rubery 1995; Anderson et al 2001; Halford & Leonard 2001). The 
implication of requirements such as these, that women are less likely to be able to fulfil, 
may be sufficient to deter some women from seeking promotion. Those who are not 
deterred need to convince their managers that they are suitable for promotion. A 
study in the UK retail sector found that women are considered to have only one of the 
three most sought after characteristics for managers (co-operation), but two of the three 
least valued (emotionalism and manipulativeness) (Traves et al. 1997). A detailed 
comparison of women and men's actual leadersl-dp styles confirmed some 
assumptions, such as women's higher rating on 'people skills', but also challenged 
some of the stereotypes, such as women having a weak orientation towards production 
(Claes 1999). Studies from Australia, Britain and Canada, show that women have to 
produce evidence of their potential to succeed, whereas a man's ability is more likely to 
be taken on trust (CHRC 1996; Buttigieg & Walsh 2000). 
Once women have achieved promotion, Booth et al (1999) found there was little 
difference in the pay of recent promotees, but subsequently mews pay increased at a 
greater rate than women's. Some of this difference may be due to discrin-tination in 
performance assessment, but it may also reflect the far greater likelihood of men being 
able to accept outside offers, which are likely to involve moving house or longer 
commuting time. The perception that men are mobile but women are not means that 
men can attract retention payments even if they do not intend to change their 
employment. 
A key issue in most of these is that, for a short period during their working lives, 
women with children or other care responsibilities have restrictions in the time they 
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can comn-dt to paid employment. The restriction may be to a strict thirty five hour 
week or to part-time work or to total withdrawal from the labour market for a period. 
In every case, it limits the occupations and opportunities that are open to them, not just 
at the time, or when they are ready to return to full participation, but also beforehand, 
in anticipation of a future period of restriction. There is no obvious explanation for 
why those occupations and opportunities attract lower pay than those from which 
women are effectively excluded, or for why the exclusion outlasts the period of 
restriction. 
Legislation, policies and campaigns 
Legislation and policy developments over the last thirty years have sought to address 
these issues and to bring women's earnings closer to men's. Anticipation of the 1975 
implementation of the Equal Pay Act 1970 produced a rapid decrease in the gender pay 
gap, from thirty six per cent to thirty per cent between 1973 and 1975, with a further 
four per cent decrease in the first year after implementation, but in the subsequent 
twenty eight years it has only decreased by a further eight per cent. Most large 
employers, including the major banks, had replaced their separate pay scales with a 
combined, job evaluated, grading structure that covered the majority of their 
employees. Most women were in the lowest grade, and paid at an equally low rate of 
pay as their male colleagues (Egan 1980). However, in addition to basic pay, there was 
a requirement for all other financial benefits, apart from pension provision, to be 
available equally to women and men. The Act prohibited employers from reducing 
pay in order to achieve equality, but they managed to avoid the full potential costs of 
compliance. Preferential oans for house purchase had generally been available only 
to married male members of staff, and in some banks, other preferential loans were 
either denied to married women or needed the husband's undertaking to share the 
responsibility for repayment. In order to grant equal access to these benefits, the banks 
increased interest rates, and introduced qualifications such as age, grade or length of 
service. They also withdrew marriage gratuities, the only benefit that had been 
available for women (Mills 1976). 
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Although the union considered that actions of this type were not "in accordance with 
the spirit of the new legislation" (Mills 1976), there were no legal grounds for 
challenging them. That was also the case for the typists and secretaries who remained 
on separate scales. Most of them were unaffected by job evaluation, as its application 
was considered unnecessary where the majority of the workforce was female (Daniel & 
Millward 1983). Their work was different from anything done by men in the 
organisation, so they had no grounds for an equal pay claim under the Act. Even 
though the National Union of Bank Employees (NUBE) had succeeded in negotiating 
job evaluation schemes for secretaries and typists in Midland and Barclays Banks in 
1975, there were a further four thousand women working in the finance sector for 
whom neither the equalised pay scales nor the Act had any significance (Snell et al. 
1981). 
Worringharn v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1981]1 was a successful challenge in the European 
Court of Justice brought by one of these secretaries, in which it was held that the 
criteria should include "'work of equal value" (Rubenstein 2000). Largely because of 
this case, an amendment to the 1970 Act incorporated the concept of Equal Value, and 
the use of an unbiased, analytical scheme became a defence to an Equal Value claim. 
The Equal Pay Act did not specifically cover every element of the pay and benefits 
package. Redundancy payments were among those benefits not expressly included, 
and that employers therefore continued to administer differently for women than for 
men. It was the referral of another finance sector case to the European Court of justice, 
Barber v Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance Group [1990]2that eventually delivered 
a clear ruling that redundancy payments are covered by the Equal Pay legislation 
(Rubenstein 2000). 
The Equal Pay Act specifically excluded pensions, as they were in the remit of the 
Social Security Pensions Act (1975). This pron-tised equal access to pension schemes, 
but employers interpreted it as applying only to full-time employees. A series of 
decisions in the European Court of justice, between 1986 and 1992, eventually 
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established that part-time employees should have the same access to pension schemes 
as full timers, but it was not until 1995 that legislation gave women an entitlement to 
the same treatment as men in occupational pension schemes. 
Even with the Equal Value amendment, the Equal Pay Act could only address 
inequalities between jobs on the same level, but the main reason for unequal pay in the 
finance sector even at that time was the concentration of women in the lower grades 
(Egan 1980). Their opportunities for advancement were limited by the "... kindly 
protective attitudes held by senior executives concerning the "real" interests and 
abilities of women and the kind of work to which they are most suited" (Livy 1980: 
254). The Sex Discrin-tination Act 1975 facilitated some improvements in equal 
opportunities, by making it unlawful for employers to discriminate directly or 
indirectly in either recruitment or treatment at work. However discrimination is 
difficult to prove, and the Act only succeeded in eliminating the most overtly 
discriminatory practices (Snell et al 1981; Hardy 2001). 
Employer led policies and actions 
A defence to a claim under the Sex Discrin-driation Act is that the employer "took 
reasonable steps" to prevent the discrin-driation happening. In the EAT case Balgobin 
and Francis v London Borough of Tower Han-dets [1995]3 a majority decision suggested 
that reasonable steps to prevent harassment are the provision of adequate staff 
supervision and the publication of an Equal Opportunities Policy. Most employers 
now have an equal opportunities, or diversity management, policy (Povall 1986; Liff 
1995), but how effective are they? A study on gender equality in Lloyds Bank suggests 
that these policies have very little effect (Truss 1999), and the views of women 
interviewees reflect experiences that contradict the stated policy aims. Any 
improvements to women's working lives as a result of equal opportunities policies, 
appear to have come about because of the need to remain within the confines of the 
legislation (Rubin 1997), or as a means of optimising organisational resources by 
making the most cost effective use of employees' time (Dickens 1998), rather than out 
of a genuine desire for equality. 
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The UK approach to equal opportunities has been criticised as 'liberal' Gewson & 
Mason 1986a) orthe short agenda' (Cockburn 1989), because it focuses on fairness of 
procedures rather than outcomes. The Sex Discrin-tination Act outlawed positive 
discrimination, although subsequent amendments have permitted a limited amount of 
positive action. Employers are now permitted to train and encourage members of one 
sex to apply for jobs where they are under-represented (ACAS 2003), but if they are to 
be favoured over the other sex in the selection process their qualifications for the post 
must be at least as good as those of the other candidates (Hardy 2001). 
The evolution of Equal Opportunities Policies into Diversity Management moved the 
equality agenda on from treating all women as the same, to recognising all of the 
human differences that are likely to exist in the workforce. In practice, it is proving to 
be another short-term solution, with the emphasis on dealing with everyone equally, 
and failing to deal with the prejudice that causes much gender inequality (Liff & 
Cameron 1997; Hardy 2001). There is a danger that placing the emphasis on womenýs 
differences from men will simply reinforce the stereotypes (Wajcman 1998). Diversity 
management goes no further than equal opportunities in promoting the long-term 
agenda that n-dght eventually transform organisational culture (Cockburn 1989). 
However there is some evidence that the fact of having a policy, seems to alert 
organisations to the possibility of unfair practices existing in their organisation. In a 
survey conducted for the EOC, organisations with Equal Pay Policies were most likely 
to recognise the existence of inequality (Morrell et al 2001). 
Government Initiatives on Equal Pay 
In 1999 the EOC set up a Task Force to identify ways in which the pay gap could be 
elin-dnated (EOC 2001b). The Task Force identified the need to raise awareness, 
reform the legislation, provide practical guidance to employers and trade unions on 
the implementation of equal pay, publish the outcomes of equal pay reviews, and 
amend social and labour market policy to complement equal pay measures. 
Raising Awareness 
The EOC responded by developing a campaign with the National Union of Students, 
to extend publicity into schools and colleges. A survey by the Chartered Institute for 
36 
Unequal Pay 
Personnel and Development (CIPD) confirmed that few employers were aware of the 
problem (CIPD 2001). Their most recent survey includes a summary of the results of 
equal pay audits (CIPD 2003b), and their website points to more detailed information 
sources (CIPD 2004). The websites of the Confederation for British Industry (CBI), 
British Chambers of Commerce (BCC) and the Federation of Small Businesses (FSB) 
have no references to the current statistics, no links to sites that would provide that 
information, and no advice on combating unequal pay (FSB 2004; BCC 2004; CBI 2004). 
The example of Unifi is probably typical of the efforts made by trade unions with a 
majority female membership; publicity for the issues includes a dedicated web-site 
(Unifi 2004), and articles on different aspects of the pay gap in each issue of the Union 
journal since the campaign began in early 2003. 
Legislative reforin 
The shortcon-tings of the legislation have long been highlighted (Hepple et A 1997; 
Hepple & Coussey 2000), including that it is outdated, that it does not conform to 
international standards and that it does not oblige employers to monitor the 
composition of their workforces. The EOC Task Force specifically identified the need 
for mandatory equal pay reviews, thus monitoring pay as well as the composition. 
Following this the government initiated a further review, chaired by Denise Kingsn-dll, 
that recommended pay reviews should be voluntary, with private sector employers 
only encouraged to conduct reviews, although public sector bodies would be expected 
to lead by example (Kingsn-dll 2001). Implementation of this recommendation 
included targets for fifty per cent of large employers and twenty five per cent of 
medium and small employers to have performed reviews by the end of 2003. A 
telephone survey during 2003 established that a third of large employers had either 
conducted a pay review, or had plans to do so by the end of the year, but the majority 
of all employers have no such plans (Neathey et al 2003). 
Practical Guidance 
A revised Code of Practice on Equal Pay accompanied the Equal Pay Review Kit when 
it was launched by the EOC in 2003. The documents provide detailed guidance on the 
technicalities for ensuring that pay conforms to the requirements of the Equal Pay Act, 
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and advice on producing an effective policy on pay. The conclusion of the Review Kit 
acknowledges that the exercise may identify other issues that contribute to the overall 
pay gap, and suggests that it may prompt a review of recruitment and training policies, 
but no detailed advice is given in relation to this element of unequal pay (EOC 2003a). 
Guidance for trade unions also concentrates on equal pay for work of equal value. A 
substantial grant to the TUC from the Union Lean-dng Fund enabled the production 
and dissen-tination of training of a network of 'equal pay representatives' to work with 
the employers to conduct equal pay reviews. 
ne outcomes ofpay reviews 
The recommendations for publicising the findings of pay reviews formed part of a 
second enquiry by Denise Kingsmill, into the possibility of requiring organisations to 
include information on their Human Capital Management in their annual reports 
(Kingsn-dll 2003). The enquiry recommended that information on 'remuneration and 
fair employment policies' should be included in 'Operating and Financial Reviews' 
(OFRs). The production of OFRs is to be compulsory for all public sector employers, 
and private sector companies over a certain size (Kingsmill 2003). Although this is an 
improvement on the current situation, it falls a long way short of the recommendations 
of the Equal Pay Task Force, which sought specific reference to the conduct of an equal 
pay review in companies' annual reports. 
Amending Social and Labour Market Policy 
Although the terms of reference of the Task Force were limited to the element of 
unequal pay covered by the Equal Pay Act, they also considered the wider issues that 
contribute to the overall pay gap. Their recommendations in relation to social and 
labour market issues included a broadening of the National Skills Agenda, the 
promotion of training and development opportunities for part time workers and the 
promotion of patterns of work that facilitate womeWs employment in the higher paid 
jobs (EOC 2001b). 
The current government has made a significant investment in the first two of these 
areas, broadening the range of access points for learners through initiatives such as the 
Employer Training Pilot, Learn Direct and the Union Learning Fund, which enable 
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trade unions to recruit and train'Union Learning Reps' to source and promote learning 
opportunities through the workplace (DfES 2003). However, one of the major 
obstacles for part-time workers is time, and currently there is no right to paid time off 
for learning (Blakely 2003). 
The recommendation for more flexible working patterns emphasises that flexible and 
part-time work should be available to both women and men in the higher paid 
occupations. Kingsmill agreed, and added that the opportunities need to be taken up 
by both sexes as well, in order that "... alternative ways of working are fully 
destigmatised and that we have not generated a two-tier workforce to the detriment of 
the further advancement of women's careers" (Kingsmill 2001: 74). 
A significant proportion of fathers claim they would like to have the option of flexible 
working (OBrien & Shen-dlt 2003). Some legal rights have been introduced, including 
paid paternity leave, unpaid parental leave, and the right to request flexible working. 
It is too early yet to know who will take up the rights, but it is overwhelmingly low 
graded women who have taken advantage of opportunities provided by their 
employers (Kodz et al. 2002; Bond et al. 2002; Clutterbuck 2003). 
In this chapter I have shown that the gender pay gap is far more complex than the 
payment of different wages for the work of the same value. That element of the gap 
was addressed and largely remedied by the Equal Pay Act 1970. Even so, employees 
and trade unions have had to be vigilant to prevent employers circumventing the 
intentions of the Act, and it has taken longer than necessary to remedy the omissions of 
the original, especially as many were not resolved until the cases went to the European 
Court of justice. 
just a few years after the implementation of the Equal Pay Act one commentator noted 
that the extent and rate of career progression [had become] the basis of 
differentiation within the labour force" (Morris 1986: 49). Horizontal and vertical 
segregation were recognized as being the major cause of unequal pay, yet when a task 
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force was appointed to find ways of closing the gap, its terms of reference limited it to I- 
looking at equal pay for work of equal value. Nevertheless the Task Force drew 
attention to the need to tailor work to fit the workers, as well as providing the workers 
with the skills to move into better-paid work. 
Many employers, as well as the State, have adopted formal policies that promote the 
type of working environment in which it is believed women are more likely to prosper. 
Yet, instead of an increase in fan-tily compatible working hours, most British 
workplaces, especially in the finance sector, are characterized by a 'long hours culture' 
(Coyle 1995; Simpson 1997, Cully et al. 2000; Kodz et al 2002; Hatter et al. 2003) 
exacerbated by the use of paid overtime to compensate for low pay and the expectation 
that working additional unpaid hours will boost performance and enhance 
performance related pay. It is a culture that has developed at the same time as the 
industry has undergone a major restructuring exercise. In Chapter Three, I examine 
the nature of that restructuring and its impact on the working conditions of finance 
workers. 
1 [1981] ECR 0767 
2 [19901 IRLR 240 
3 [1995] IRLR 401 
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Chapter 3. The Changing Finance Sector 
"The financial services sector is about halfway through one of the most 
dramatic periods of restructuring ever undergone by a major industry 
-a 
reconfiguration whose impact has carried well beyond shareholders of the 
firms involved into the domain of regulation and public policy as well as global 
competitive performance and economic growth. " 
(Walter 2004: vi) 
Until the 1980s, the structure of the UK finance sector had changed very little for many 
years. Despite government efforts in 1971 to increase competition (TUC 1986; RBS 
2004), clearing banks, merchant banks, building societies, insurance companies and 
finance houses each operated in a distinct market, with clear lines of demarcation 
between them (Taylor 1980; TUC 1986; Ashburner 1988). Eighty per cent of the eight 
hundred thousand employees in the sector in 1983 were employed in clearing banks, 
insurance companies and building societies; the largest concentration, approximately 
one hundred and eighty thousand, were in the 'big four' banks 
- 
Barclays, Lloyds, 
Midland and National Westrninster. Although they were always commercial 
organisations, there was also an element of public responsibility in the conduct of 
business, allowing branch managers to give advice without necessarily trying to 
maximise the banks' financial interests (Morris 1986). Part of this social role was 
fulfilled by having branch networks that provided access for the majority of the 
population. Between them thebig fourhad over ten thousand branches, dealing with 
all the banking requirements of both commercial and personal customers in the locality 
(Ashburner 1988; Storey et al 1999). Although the number of branches had decreased 
to under nine thousand by 1990, employment in these four banks had increased to over 
two hundred and fifty thousand (Storey et al 1999). The one hundred and sixty seven 
building societies that existed in 1985 employed another sixty five thousand staff 
(Ashburner 1988). They were all still owned by their members, and building society 
legislation limited their objects to raising funds from those members for the express 
purpose of financing house purchase (TUC 1986; Cook & Waters 1998). As not for 
profit organisations they were able to offer only limited competition to one another 
and even operated an interest rate cartel (Cook et al. 2001). The business and structure 
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of the insurance sector was also essentially the same as it had been for a century, 
although most companies had cut both staff and branches following the 1973 oil crisis. 
The don-dnance of a profit motive is clear from the reluctance of 19th century companies 
to accept high risk working class customers (Prudential 2002), and the resolution of this 
risk by instituting a home collection service to coincide with pay days (Pearson 2002). 
In 1983 there were eight hundred and seventy insurance companies in the UK, 
employing approximately two hundred and seventeen thousand staff, twenty seven 
per cent of the total in the sector (Ashbumer 1988). 
The organisation of work in the individual institutions was also still much as it had 
been for more than a century. A certain amount of mechanisation had been 
introduced into the back offices of all types of institution; since the 1960s most account 
information had been held centrally on main frame computers, ATMs had started to 
appear in bank branches, and the cheque clearing system had been automated (Morris 
1986). Nevertheless branches still performed all of the clerical and adn-dnistrative 
functions relating to the business conducted in that branch, and life insurance 
companies still maintained a 'home service' for the doorstep collection of premia and 
generation of new business. In this chapter I show how the changes that have taken 
place to both the structure of the industry and the organisation of work in the twenty 
years since 1983 have impacted on the nature of employment in the industry. 
The finance sector in 2004 
Mergers and acquisitions characterise the development of most of the world's financial 
institutions in the last two decades, and have contributed to the breakdown of the 
traditional boundaries between banks, building societies, insurance companies and 
finance houses (Storey et al 1999; Onno Ruding 2002; Walter 2004). The period has also 
seen an influx of new organisations; in the sector, including existing UK businesses 
diversifying into financial services, and foreign corporations expanding into the UK 
markets. The City of London is regarded as "'the pre-en-dnent international financial 
centre", rivalled only by New York and Tokyo (Clark 2002), and employing over one 
n-dllion people (ONS 2004a). Nevertheless it is still possible to identify banks, building 
societies and insurance companies as the major employers in the sector. 
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The banks 
Of the three hundred and eighty five banks in the UK in 2001, one hundred and eighty 
four are incorporated in the UK, eighty nine are from other European states and the 
remainder are branches of banks from the rest of the world (BBA 2004c), There are still 
four major clearing banks, but Barclays is the only one that retains the same identity 
that it had in 1979. Midland was taken over by the Honk Kong and Shanghai Banking 
Corporation in 1992; Lloyds Bank merged with the Trustee Savings Banks in 1997 and 
has also taken over the Cheltenham and Gloucester Building Society, United 
Don-dnions Trust finance house and the Scottish Widows insurance company; the 
Royal Bank of Scotland acquired Nat West Bank in 2001 (BBA 2004b). Despite the 
overall increase in financial services employment, the 'big four' now have little more 
than two hundred thousand staff and approximately seven thousand branches (BBA 
2004a). Competition from de-mutualised building societies has introduced five new 
banks to the top ten banking groups as defined by the British Bankers' Association 
(BBA 2004b). In the ten years from 1989 to 1999 the total number of branches of all 
banks in the UK, including the converted building societies, fell by thirty two per cent, 
contributing to a ten per cent reduction in operating costs (Willis & Marshall 2001). 
The variety of work performed by branch based staff has diminished, first of all by the 
removal of corporate business to specialist regional centres, and the clustering of 
branches in a locality under a single manager (Ennew et al 1990). This was followed by 
the centralisation of routine tasks to regional, then national and, more recently, 
international data processing centres. The locus of customer service has also been 
removed from the branch counter, to telephone call centres that can be anywhere in the 
world. Several new entrants to the banking sector are operating successfully without 
any branches at all (Willis & Marshall 2001). At the same time as the branch network 
has been decreasing, the ATM network has increased; in 2001 the major British banking 
groups had more than twenty five thousand throughout the UK, eight thousand five 
hundred of which were located away from the branches (BBA 2004a). The new 
technology that has facilitated the removal of banking functions from the physical 
branches has also enabled the development of new products and services/ including 
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credit cards, debit cards, e-commerce and online banking. Together with the products 
of those building societies and insurance companies that have been taken over by the 
banks,, the sale of these new products has become a principal function of branch based 
bank employees (Storey et al 1999). 
Building societies 
In 2002 there were just sixty five building societies left in the UK, employing thirty 
eight thousand two hundred staff in two thousand one hundred and three branches. 
Ten of the largest societies used the provision of the 1986 Building Societies Act to 
either convert to public liability companies (plcs), or transfer their undertakings to 
existing plcs, three were removed from the building societies register, and the 
remainder had amalgamated with other building societies (BSA: 2004). Even though 
the whole sector lost six hundred and ninety branches between 1989 and 1999, the 
average of thirty two point three branches per society has hardly changed, (Willis & 
Marshall 2001). Centralisation and computerisation of administration and processing 
has been just as extensive as in the banks, but the branches have been retained, and all 
but eleven societies have refrained from installing ATMs, in order to maximise 
customer contact and the opportunities for cross-selling (Willis & Marshall 2001; 
Marshall et al. 2001). Forty six of the societies are authorised by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA) to sell regulated savings products, and as a result thirty six per cent of 
cash ISAs are sold by building societies. Instead of closing branches, the larger 
societies have developed a range of different types of branch, including "full service', 
mortgage shops and automated branches. 
Insurance companies 
Despite the incursions of banks into their traditional area of business, by 2003 
employment in the UK Insurance industry has risen to three hundred and fifty three 
thousand people in eight hundred and six companies. The majority of these companies 
are still specialists 
- 
six hundred selling general insurance, one hundred and sixty 
dealing in life insurance and pensions, and only fifty four able to issue all types of 
policy; the majority are also very small 
- 
eighty nine per cent of the long term business 
and eighty six per cent of the general business is conducted by just forty companies 
(ABI 2004). The major banks all feature in this group of forty, as do several 
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representatives of the 'international mega-corporations' that are con-dng to dominate 
the global insurance business (Pearson 2002). The AXA group, for example, is 
registered in France, has over one hundred and thirty thousand employees in fifty 
countries (AXA 2001), and its UK operation is the result of the amalgamation of ten 
smaller companies. Notwithstanding extensive competition from within the insurance 
sector, it was one of the banks 
- 
the Royal Bank of Scotland 
- 
that first started using 
direct marketing techniques to sell car insurance through its subsidiary Direct Line 
(RBS 2004). Unlike the banks and building societies, sales has always been an essential 
function for insurance companies, and this remote method of reaching potential 
customers soon supplanted the 'Home Service' agents (Pearson 2002). The 
introduction of strict regulations for the qualification of sales representatives and the 
conduct of sales by the Financial Services Act 1986 changed the nature of the role such 
that fifty per cent of the sales force resigned from at least one company in the year after 
it came into effect (Knights & Morgan 1990). 
The impact on employees 
Although each of the sub-sectors of the finance industry discussed above still has 
distinctive characteristics, there are some common themes to the nature of the changes 
that have taken place in the last twenty years. Firstly, deregulation of the money 
markets has produced a competitive environment in which the importance of sales has 
outstripped all other functions, and all customer facing employees are expected to get 
leads for the personal bankers and financial consultants to follow up. The second 
major change has been facilitated by advances in information and computer 
technology, whereby most of the routine work has been taken away from branches into 
massive data processing and telephone call centres, many of which are open for 
considerably longer hours than the traditional branch. The effect has been to bring the 
working environment of banks and building societies into line with that of the 
insurance companies, abandoning the stability of a service culture in favour of a new 
orientation to profit. 
Before these changes industrial relations and personnel management in the finance 
sector had been stable, and overwhelrningly paternalistic. In return for a generous 
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package of benefits, employees were expected to demonstrate loyalty to the 
organisation, in some cases to the extent of seeking the branch manager's approval for 
marriage plans (Morris 1986; Cressey & Scott 1992). Loyalty was reinforced by an 
informal 'no poaching' agreement between the banks, restricting employees' 
opportunities for alternative employment. Male employees could expect their 
experience to be rewarded, not just through the incremental salary structure, but also 
by the reasonable certainty of progression up the career ladder, with fifty per cent 
achieving management grades (Morris 1986). The career path was the same for all, 
because of the concentration on creating generalists rather than specialists. New 
entrants all started by learning each of the clerical tasks, before progressing to the 
counter as cashiers, after which the men started to work their way up through the 
ranks to management (Halford et al. 1997). The workforce stability produced through 
this combination of paternalism and career certainty meant that 'manpower planning' 
was an essentially reactive process, whereby employers simply recruited or made 
redundancies as and when required. All of these elements featured in accounts of the 
changes necessary to transform the management styles of banks and building societies 
to respond to the new competitive culture (Macey & Wells 1987; Cressey & Scott 1992; 
Cave 1997). The remainder of this chapter reviews accounts of the measures 
employed to move to a performance culture in which the criteria for reward and 
promotion are directly related to individual achievement, and the practice of 
'manpower planning' provides a flexible workforce within a flatter organisational 
structure. 
New career structures 
The restructured branch banking career described by Halford et al (1997) features a 
relatively small number of routine clerks at the very bottom of the ladder, with a 
considerably larger contingent of cashiers above them, approximately half of whom 
work part-time. Above that they have a further three layers similar in size to the 
routine clerks. The first level is a group of specialist clerical staff, who are beneath two 
layers of three different categories of manager: selling officers who can progress to 
lending and specialist officers; senior branch clerks, who may become branch 
managers; and securities clerks for whom the next step is operations manager This 
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model is an early representation of the segmentation of finance sector employment, 
which has contributed to the development of a "dual internal labour market", with 
severely restricted opportunities for promotion from the clerical grades (Baethge et al. 
1999). The clerical labour market culminates with the senior clerical grades, who have 
a relatively high degree of job security, and who can earn pren-durn rate overtime 
payments for any extra hours worked. Beyond that level job security decreases, job 
holders are expected to work extra hours whenever necessary, but without any 
overtime payment and the intensity of work increases, (Halford et al 1997; Green 2001; 
Grimshaw et al 2002). Previously, the limited opportunities for promotion had been 
managed by explicitly excluding or discouraging women; by making managerial work 
unappealing, employers may be substituting a new method of 'policing promotion' for 
one which has been outlawed by equality legislation (Halford et al 1997: 125). 
Halford et al only looked at the branch network of their case study bank, simply noting 
that the jobs and workers in 'specialist units' have separate career structures. Some of 
these were described in a study of work organisation in call centres. Frenkel et al (1998) 
found a similar, informal career structure in all of the centres they studied, whereby 
trainees progressed to fully fledged agents, and eventually team leaders, with the 
possibility of becon-dng trainers, senior agents or supervisors if vacancies should arise. 
All of these options are witl-dn the clerical classification, beyond which they found the 
career path to be effectively truncated, with all management jobs advertised in the 
external labour market. Despite the sin-dlarities, there is no single employment system 
for all of these centralised units, even within the same sector. Purcell and Kinnie (2000) 
studied four telephone call centres, one of which was part of an established bank, and 
another a completely separate on-line subsidiary of another bank. In the first case the 
centres were set up in locations where they could use displaced branch staff, using the 
same terms and conditions and managed by bank managers. As the managers gained 
experience of working in a call centre environment they negotiated a degree of 
autonomy in human resource management, and implemented new terms and 
conditions and different criteria for recruitment and promotion, that recognised the 
different staffing requirements. The online bank took a completely different approach 
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to employment than either its parent company or the in-house call-centre, with three 
distinct groups of employees. The only people directly employed by the bank were the 
managers and team leaders; a managed service organisation was used to recruit and 
manage most of the customer service agents, and most of the routine clerks were 
temporary agency staff, whose salaries were twenty per cent below those of the 
customer service agents. From the bank's point of view outsourcing most of the 
personnel function limited the risks associated with operating in a rapidly evolving 
industry, but from the majority of the employees' point of view this segmentation 
effectively creates a substantial barrier to promotion. In at least one of the major banks 
segmentation of the organisation has resulted in the creation of twenty three different 
business units, each of which has its own distinct career structure and pay bargaining 
arrangements (Sweeney 2003). An increasingly popular method of conveying an 
impression of standardisation in segmented organisations is the use of broad-banded 
grading structures and job fan-tilies. Figure 3-1 is a hypothetical example, typical of the 
systems described in practitioner literature (CIPD 2000; Armstrong 2001a; 2001b). It 
shows how the varying concentrations of employees in different departments can 
produce differentiated career ladders within a pay scale that applies throughout an 
organisation. 
48 
Figure 3-1 
- 
example of a broad-banded pay structure 
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In the call centres researched by Frenkel et al (1998) there was an official point of view 
that call centre experience could be a useful preparation for work elsewhere in the 
organisation, and in the finance sector it is now the norm for all job vacancies to be 
advertised throughout the organisation (Hirsh et al. 2000), yet Frenkel et al found no 
evidence that such moves were commonplace (Frenkel et al. 1998). This is 
unsurprising given the lirnited amount of training available for most call centre agents; 
even team leaders and supervisors are given little if any management training, even 
though they are unlikely to have prior management experience (Belt et al 2002). The 
routine, mechanistic nature of the work, which often involves little more than the 
reading of standard 'scripts', does little to impart the level of knowledge likely to be 
needed for the more specialist roles. 
Although segmentation and specialisation may serve to limit the opportunities for 
promotion within an organisation, new opportunities have opened up through the 
abandonment of 'no poaching agreements' by the banks. The open advertising of job 
vacancies means that instead of two or three entry points depending on educational 
qualifications, in theory at least new entrants can join the organisation at any point for 
which they are suitably qualified (Baethge et al 1999). This new opportunity is, 
however, limited by the degree of mobility of the individual employee, and that tends 
to be greater for men than women (Booth et al. 2002). 
Flexibility 
The emerging dual internal labour market identified by Halford et al (1997: 123) has 
some resemblance to the concept of a 'flexible firnY as advocated by Atkinson (1984; 
1986). This featured an organisational structure in which core workers perform the key 
activities, and are expected to have sufficient 'functional' flexibility to adapt to changes 
in those activities brought about by technological or commercial developments. In 
return they are given appropriate training and development opportunities, have a 
degree of job security, and can expect reasonable pay and conditions. The peripheral 
workforce performs the routine, monotonous tasks that have become commonplace as 
the result of computerisation. The volume of this type of work is prone to fluctuate, 
whether seasonally or across the working week, and the employment of an entirely fall 
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time, permanent workforce would result in paying people during idle periods. The 
requirement for 'numerical flexibility' means that the workers are likely to be on short- 
term, temporary, part-time or zero-hours contracts, and any job security that they have 
depends on their ability to be flexible in the times that they are available for work. 
These two groups of workers could equally be described as, respectively, multi-skilled 
and de-skilled. External workers could be either, but working for a different employer 
who specialises in sub-contracting one specific function, such as cleaning, data 
processing or telephony, providing the third version of flexibility, designated 
'distancing'by Atkinson (1984). 
Part time and temporary workers are the main methods used in the industry to cover 
peak periods of activity (Ackers et al. 1996). Fourteen per cent of all employees 
working in the sector are part-time women, and a further nine per cent are employed 
on temporary or short term contracts (ONS 2004a). Although often used as an example 
of numerical flexibility (Purcell et al. 1999; Coyle 2003: 21), part-time work is not really 
flexible, as the hours to be worked are precisely defined in the employment contract 
and therefore entirely predictable for both employer and employee. Purcell 
diffentiates between structured and unstructured flexibility, with part-time work 
falling into the former category (Purcell et al 1999), as do fixed term contracts, wl-dch 
account for more than one per cent of employment in the finance sector (Cole 2002b). 
With unstructured flexibility working hours are variable and can be changed to match 
fluctuations in work load. During the 1990s most of the finance sector employers 
adopted some form of unstructured numerical flexibility. Among the earliest examples 
in unionised companies was First Data Resources Ltd, an American data processing 
company that had taken over the Access credit card processing business of Lloyds, Nat 
West, Midland and Royal Bank of Scotland. 'Work Schedule Bidding, involved the 
projection of hour-by-hour labour requirements for the con-ting six month period in 
order to compile detailed tables of work schedules. Employees then bid for their 
preferred work schedule and allocations were made in accordance with employer- 
defined criteria including seniority, performance and attendance. By the end of the 
decade Nat West and the Co-operative Bank had introduced annualised hours, and in 
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another six banks the contracts of new employees were for thirty five hours to be 
worked on five out of six or seven days a week. At least two of the banks, Royal Bank 
of Scotland and HSBC, offered existing employees a financial reward in return for 
accepting the new contract terms. In theory, flexible working gives employees some 
control over the hours they work (Ackers et al 1996). In practice, schemes that offer 
employees a degree of autonomy in deciding the minutiae of their working time are 
most likely to be available to those with skills that are expensive to replace (Fagan & 
O'Reilly 1998; Dex et al. 2002). The most commonly available flexible working patterns 
are more likely to benefit the employer than the workers (Mennino & Brayfield 2002; 
Jany-Catrice & Lehndorff 2002; Coyle 2003), and in practice are likely to be used by 
managers to change working arrangements at short notice (Sweeney 2002). A much 
more useful form of flexibility for the working mother, who may have to deal with 
unplanned medical or school visits, was the flexi-time system that operated in some of 
the larger departments. These had given genuine flexibility in determining their start 
and finish times as well as the opportunity to work additional hours in return for time 
off in the future. These systems have now been abandoned in most banks, and in at 
least two they were abandoned at the same time as the introduction of flexible 
contracts (Sweeney 2002). 
Government initiatives to improve 'Work Life Balance' almost all depend on the 
voluntary implementation of appropriate policies by employers. Several finance sector 
organisations have taken this step or are planning to do so (Sweeney 2003), but the 
evidence of a survey in one major bank suggests that awareness of the options is very 
low, and that local management are reluctant to implement them fully (Fisher 2002). 
Data from the 1998 WERS indicates a significant difference in the level of awareness 
between women and men. In addition to questions about part time work, which was 
predon-dnantly low skilled and performed by women, the survey asked about access to 
flexi-time, job-sharing, home-working, parental leave and assistance with childcare. At 
least one of these was available in approximately half of the private sector 
organizations surveyed, but forty two per cent of women and fifty seven per cent of 
men reported having no access to any of the arrangements (Cully et al 2000: 146), 
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seen-dngly women are more likely to believe they have an entitlement that does not 
exist, and men are more likely to be unaware of the entitlements that they have. 
Whatever the entitlements, other researchers have found that take-up of these 
arrangements is very limited, mostly by women (Kodz et al 2002; Bond et al 2002), and 
almost entirely in the lower grades (Clutterbuck 2003), and is most likely in 
organizations where there are no limits to eligibility, no managerial discretion 
regarding either eligibility or availability, and there is a written policy on working time 
arrangements (Kodz et al 2002: 34-35). Nevertheless a significant proportion of fathers 
claim they would like to have the option of flexible working (O'Brien & Shen-dlt 2003) 
suggesting that recent legislation obliging employers to consider requests for flexible 
arrangements might encourage an increased take up. DTI statistics show that although 
eight out of ten applications were granted during the first year, only ten per cent of 
fathers with children under six requested flexible working, compared with thirty seven 
per cent of mothers (Palmer 2004). However while we still have a two-tiered (by 
gender) workforce, fathers will continue to be reluctant to request concessions that are 
likely to damage their future career prospects (Hatter et al 2003; Reeves 2004; Saunders 
2004). 
Like the more traditional strategies of employing part-timers and temporary workers 
to cover peak periods, work life balance options are used in workplaces that are 
predominantly staffed by women. If flexibility is required in male dominated areas it 
is more likely to be through overtime or sl-dft work, with the additional possibility of 
annualised hours (Dickens 1998; Fagan & O'Reilly 1998), all of wl-dch are work patterns 
that are difficult for workers with domestic responsibilities. This distribution of 
working hours not only exaggerates the difference between women and men's 
earnings potential, it also perpetuates the gendered distribution of domestic work 
(Siriani & Negrey 2000; Duncan et al. 2003). Most British workplaces, especially in the 
finance sector, are characterized by a 'long hours culture' exacerbated by the use of 
paid overtime to compensate for low pay, and the expectation that working additional 
unpaid hours will boost performance and enhance performance related pay (Coyle 
1995; Simpson 1997; Kodz et al 1998; Cully et al 2000; Hatter et al 2003). This culture is 
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predominantly the preserve of men, as many women are excluded by virtue of their 
domestic responsibilities (Rutherford 2001) and the most disturbing aspect from the 
point of view of eventual redistribution of these responsibilities, is that the longest 
hours are worked by men with dependant children (Cully et al 2000: 155). 
A Performance Culture 
The shift in emphasis from service to sales in the 1980s was resisted by most bank staff 
over the age of forty (Storey et al 1999). Not only was the nature of the work 
completely different from the work they had been trained for, but there was also an 
element of fear that selling new products would eventually lead to job losses (Brubakk 
& Wilkinson 1996). Concerns over the professionalisation of sales in the insurance 
industry were of a different nature, but equally disruptive, resulting in an accelerated 
staff turnover (Knights & Morgan 1990). CIPD surveys consistently show that most 
employers consider support for business goals to be the most important function of 
payment systems (CIPD 2003a). Payment systems such as performance pay and 
payment by results, which tend to individualise the employment relationship, are used 
to raise employee comn-dtment and increase output (Waddington & Whitston 1996). In 
the finance sector, at the end of the 1980s, most of the banks introduced individual 
performance related pay as the motivation for achieving sales targets (Cressey & Scott 
1992). As Brubakk and Wilkinson noted, the branch managers who would normally be 
expected to mediate both procedural and cultural changes were as likely as their staff 
to feel threatened by the changes (Brubakk and Wilkinson 1996: 41), so it was initially 
implemented for just the managerial staff (Goodswen 1988), but extended to all staff 
once the managers had become accustomed to it. 
Individual performance related pay is one element of the 'New Pay, that was 
advocated as a method for securing the employee behaviours and attitudes deemed 
necessary to achieve current business objectives (Lawler 1995; Ledford 1995). 
Employers were advised to conduct a continual review of pay policy, possibly 
involving frequent changes to payment systems, from a portfolio including 
performance related pay, competency pay, and 'cafeteria benefits' (See Appendix One 
for an description of the different payment systems). According to the annual reports 
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of Unifi between 1991 and 2003, most of the major employers have implemented 
changes to their payment systems at least once since the original implementation of 
performance related pay. The changes include moving from individual targets to team 
objectives; from perfon-nance related to competency based pay or a combination of the 
two; from a matrix based assessment of bonuses and increments to managerial 
discretion, and the consolidation of Christmas bonuses and territorial allowances into 
basic salary. During the period a version of profit related pay had been introduced and 
abandoned by most of the large banks, and at least one stopped paying the annual 
'profit share' bonus. Particularly in the larger banks, segmentation was intensified by 
reference to different markets for the determination of the appropriate level for 
salaries, using both regional and vocational criteria. 
In addition to changes that were implemented as part of everyday personnel 
management, several employers in the sector have been involved in mergers and 
acquisitions that have required harmonisation of all terms and conditions, including 
payment systems. In Lloyds TSB the complete process took three years; and the result 
was a broad-banded structure with pay levels linked to the external market. In the 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group the merger with Nat West was used as an opportunity 
to change the approach to benefits, from what they described as the traditional 
paternalistic approach of the finance sector whereby staff were deemed to have an 
entitlement to a range of benefits, to a flexible benefits package whereby employees 
choose from a range of benefits and receive an end of year statement detailing the 
value of their total package (Personnel Today 2003). When Norwich Union merged 
with CGU the management decided against harmonisation in favour of a completely 
new structure, that offers performance related increments based on individual skills, 
knowledge and behaviour, a non-pensionable bonus related to the achievement of 
individual and/or team performance objectives, an all-employee share option scheme 
related to company performance, and local incentive awards (Milsome 2002a). 
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Insecurity, work intensification and stress 
Despite the variety of payment systems in operation and the frequency with which 
they are varied, almost all of those in the finance sector now include some element of 
pay for performance. Aside from the potential for bias that is present in both the 
design and implementation of these systems (Bevan & Thompson 1992; Winstanley & 
Stuart-Sn-dth 1996), they also introduce an element of risk from the employee 
perspective, because of the uncertainty of payments that are contingent on 
performance, especially when the performance in question is outside the direct control 
of the employee, as in team pay, or bonuses linked to company performance (Heery 
1996). It is not only pay that is insecure in the new workplace. Much of the reduction 
in the size of the individual workforces has been achieved by redundancy 
programmes, in which the principal targets were the longest serving supervisory level 
employees (Grint 1998: 317). During the 1990s most finance sector organisations 
outsourced ancillary tasks, such as cleaning, catering, and security, and towards the 
end of the decade data processing operations such as cheque clearing and payrolls 
were also performed by independent contractors (BBA 2001). Rapid improvements in 
information and communication technologies have reduced the time needed to 
perform many tasks, and have also enabled the outsourcing of call centre operations to 
the Indian sub-continent (Holliday 2003). Keith Grint highlights the contradiction 
between the increased insecurity at work, and the Human Resource Management 
(HRM) concept of the motivational power of employee comn-dtment (Grint 1998: 315). 
Another perspective on this situation is that the presence of insecurity may actually 
augment the motivational power of the new payment systems. On its own the appeal 
of performance related pay to the individual is based purely on acquisitiveness, and if 
base pay is adequate, some employees will decide that the extra effort is not warranted. 
With the addition of job insecurity, it is in the interests of all employees who want to 
retain their jobs to present themselves as excellent performers. In some of the call 
centres, such as the online bank studied by Purcell and Kinnie, performance targets are 
met without any financial incentive (Purcell & Kinnie 2000). Electronic monitoring of 
all work processes ensures continuing awareness of performance expectations, and 
probably contributes to the high annual staff turnover. Nevertheless seventy five per 
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cent remain in employment each year, and most meet the increasingly stringent targets 
(Brannen 2001; IDS 2003a). 
Julia Brannen gave a graphic account of the hectic life of one banking call centre 
supervisor, who frequently worked through her lunch break and took boxes of work 
home with her, where she combined her work with the domestic 'duties' of a wife, 
mother and daughter (Brannen 2001: 7-9). The increasing intensity of work towards 
the end of the twentieth century has been well documented (IRS 1996; Burchell et al. 
1999; Green 2001; Green & McIntosh 2001), and shown to be greater for women than 
for men (Bielby & Bielby 1988; Green 2001). Green uses WERS to show that a principal 
reason for this increase is technological change, wl-dch allows both the detailed 
monitoring of output and the efficient allocation of tasks (Green 2002). Green also 
found that, in service sector establishments employing less than one hundred 
permanent staff, the introduction of performance related pay has a significant impact 
on work intensification. He does not define his use of the word 'establishment' but, as 
he refers separately to organisations, I take it to include discrete workplaces within 
organisations. In the case of the finance sector this would include most branches, 
regional offices and even some of the call centres. 
It has been argued that rather than creating a 'high commitment workforce', the use of 
HRM practices amounts to "management by stress" (Parker & Slaughter 1990; Green 
2002). Surveys conducted for the Health and Safety Executive show that approximately 
twenty per cent of the population report suffering work-related stress (Smith et al. 
2000a; 2000b). Although there was no significant correlation with gender, stress was 
more likely to be reported by full time than part-time employees, and one of the 
occupational groups most severely affected was financial institution managers. A 
survey of Unifi members in Barclays' Business Banking Division found that eighty one 
per cent of respondents considered they had suffered from stress during the previous 
year, thirty six per cent had visited the doctor as a result and sixteen per cent had been 
signed off by the doctor. A report by the European Agency for Safety and Health at 
Work summarising extant research on work related stress suggests several possible 
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psychological causes that could be relevant to finance sector workers (Cox et al. 2000). 
Role conflict, such as a bank clerk being expected to switch from customer service to 
sales, is most likely to affect white collar workers (Cooper & Smith 1986). job 
insecurity, particularly the threat of redundancies when there is still an expectation of 
employee commitment (Porter 1990); payment systems that are related to the rate of 
working (Kasl 1992) and long working hours (Spurgeon et al. 1997) have all become 
common place in the industry, and have all been cited as potential stressors. 
In the space of little more than two decades the financial services sector has changed 
from a group of highly regulated cartels operating paternalistic personnel policies, to a 
highly competitive industry in which employees are a tool for achieving business 
objectives. In this chapter I have shown how the restructuring of the sector has 
reduced the opportunities for advancement, whilst ensuring that only the most 
'committed' employees progress into those opportunities. The requirement to achieve 
'stretching' targets means that ambitious employees are unlikely to take advantage of 
any flexible working opportunities, and will instead work extra, unpaid, hours in order 
to meet, or even exceed those targets. Failure to perform at this level is likely to be 
seen as lack of commitment; success will often result in serious stress related illness. A 
large proportion of the workforce will remain in the comparatively less aggressive 
subordinate grades for most or all of their careers; some may expressly reject the 
competitive performance culture but there will be others who cannot get promotion 
despite having all of the necessary qualifications and experience. Whatever the reason, 
the vast majority who remain in the clerical grades are women. In Chapter Four I 
review the literature that attempts to explain why women and men fare differently in 
the employment relationship. 
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Chapter 4. Explanations for Women's Lower Pay 
"The workings of the labour market are complex and, for this reason, no theory 
alone can explain the gender pay gap: a whole range of factors must be 
examined if any sense is to be made of its existence and persistence... " 
(Anderson et al 2001: 35) 
The original decision to employ women in the finance sector was the result of an 
economic calculation by the employers (Zimmeck 1986; Anderson 1988; Dohm 1988). 
Faced by rapidly increasing business expansion early in the twentieth century, the 
employment of women on a separate, lower pay scale was a cost effective solution. 
The lower wages reinforced a perception of women as a secondary workforce, who 
should not therefore have any expectations of progression to management, thus 
avoiding the alienation of existing male employees, who might otherwise have seen a 
dilution of their promotion prospects (Heritage 1983; Povall 1985; Morris 1986). 
Although separate pay scales for the same jobs have long since been prohibited by 
legislation, vertical segregation continues to be considered as a major source of wage 
differentials between women and men (Hakim 1996a; EOC 2001b; EOC 2001e). 
The subsequent prevalence of employers, strategy of workforce feminisation does not 
explain it, or why women seem to be preferred as a source of cheap labour. Gender is 
a relatively new topic for debate in the sociology of work, having been largely ignored 
by the classical theorists Marx, Weber and Durkheim (Oakley 1974; Walby 1986; Grint 
1998; Penn 1998). The exclusion of gender from social analysis has been justified on the 
grounds that women's position in employment is determined by their position in 
society, which in turn is detern-dned by the social status of their husbands (Parkin 1972; 
Goldthorpe 1980), or that women are not a homogeneous group witl-dn society 
(Lockwood 1986). Regardless of the validity of these arguments in themselves, neither 
of them explains why women continue to earn less than men of the same class and 
performing the same work. Even when the categorisation of 'women's work' has 
changed, and women have moved into jobs traditionally performed by men, the 
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relative wages and status have tended to adjust to reflect this distinction (Harrison 
1990; Reskin & Roos 1990, Kirkham & Loft 1993, Skuratowicz & Hunter 2004). 
The aim of this chapter is to seek clarification of how women may be constructed as 
being of lower value, and why the differentiation persists in the twenty-first century. 
The theories that have been developed over recent years can be grouped into two 
broad categories. Explanations based on individual characteristics derive largely from 
neo-classical econon-dcs, and suggest that the roles women fill in the labour market are 
detern-dned by gender specific characteristics, whether natural or acquired, or 'chosen 
"according to their personal preferences (Webb 1891; Bergman 1974; Filer 1983; Becker 
1985; Killingsworth 1990). Structural explanations look to society for the sources of 
inequality, represented by patriarchy, capitalism or a combination of the two (Firestone 
1970; Eisenstein 1979; Walby 1990), and resulting in organisational cultures that are 
intrinsically gendered (Acker 1990). 
Individual factors 
- 
preference or destiny? 
Preference Theory 
Hakim (1995; 1996a; 1998) argues that there are three distinct 'types' of working 
woman: 'committed' or 'work-centred' and 'non-comn-dtted' or 'drifters', and a third 
group, which she describes as totally 'home-centred'. Hakim subsequently developed 
her 'preference theory' to suggest that there are approximately ten to twenty per cent 
of women at each end of the spectrum, who are either totally 'home-centred' or totally 
'work-centred'. The majority (now called adaptives) drift between the two, willing to 
accept low paid, part-time jobs where that will facilitate a balance between the two 
(Hakim 2002). She argues that this is a luxury not enjoyed by men, for whom the only 
socially acceptable choice is to work. 
Critics of Hakim do not deny that women make choices, but argue that they are 
obliged to make those choices within lin-dts and constraints that are the result of the 
cultural and structural barriers erected by patriarchy and/or capitalism (Bruegel 1996; 
Ginn et al. 1996; Crompton & Harris 1998a; Walsh 1999). Some barriers may have been 
lowered, but they still exist. The 'emancipatioW provided by the contraceptive pill has 
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mainly benefited middle class women (Marks 2001), and the UK continues to have the 
highest incidence of teenage pregnancies in Western Europe (Scally 1999). Every year 
one hundred thousand girls have to choose between abortion, adoption and entering 
adulthood with the responsibility for a child as well as themselves. Fan-tilies may be 
smaller, but parents still have to balance the potentially conflicting needs to care for 
and to provide for their children. The relative earning potential of each parent, 
together with the cost and availability of childcare, are important criteria that may well 
take precedence over the preferences of either parent. So too are the prevailing social 
and moral discourses about the type of behaviour considered right and proper, wl-tich 
vary between particular social, religious and ethnic groups (Duncan 2003). If Hakim 
is right that fathers have no choice but to work, the decisions of mothers must be 
constrained by the demands of childcare. Beck's thesis that issues of marriage and the 
family are affected by "work, profession, inequality, politics and economics" as well as 
"sexuality, affection, marriage, parenthood and so-on" (Beck 2000: 103), also applies in 
reverse. 
There are reports of an increasing incidence of young women demonstrating a 
commitment to career development (Walby 1997; Bradley 1999) there is also evidence 
that some young men are electing to play a more prominent role in child care (Hatter et 
al 2003; O'Brien & Shemilt 2003), however these are still the exception to the general 
rule. Even households without children have household chores to perform. Rather 
than reducing the workload, 'labour saving devices' resulted in an increase in the 
expected standards of housekeeping, and a reduction in the number of people 
available to perform it 
- 
whether domestic servants, um-narried sisters or daughters 
(Cowan 1983). Traditionally even men who were out of work were unlikely to 'help 
out' (Hartley 1987). More recent research indicates that women and men who become 
unemployed increase the time spent on domestic chores by similar amounts (four point 
four hours and four point one hours respectively), however those hours are on top of 
the eighteen and a half hours performed by working women and the six hours by 
working men (Kan 2001). Kan also found that the most likely factor to produce a 
decrease in women's housework hours was increased income, as opposed to increased 
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employment hours. With no comparable increase for men, it would appear that 
womeWs 'double burden' is only likely to be relieved by the ability to employ domestic 
labour. As the housework gap remains, even when the pay gap is closed or reversed, 
the 'choices' made by most women still involve a balancing act between the demands 
of domesticity and those of paid employment. Even though the impact of 
contraception and household technology may not have been sufficient to give women 
the absolute freedom to choose between domesticity and career, it has probably 
contributed to the significant increase in the numbers of women in paid employment 
(Oakley 1974; ONS 2004a). 
Hakim's thesis goes on to suggest that women who 'choose' to be career oriented are 
now able to pursue those careers in the same way as men because of the existence of 
equal opportunities policies. In practice equal opportunities policies and diversity 
management tend to be most effective when introduced as a response to business 
demands such as labour shortages (Mason 2002). In a study of seven finance sector 
companies, only five out of forty five interviewees were aware of the content of the 
companies' equal opportunities policies (Ozbilgin 2000). Although the companies had 
equal opportunities departments with responsibility for auditing, monitoring and 
reporting, they did not have the authority to implement changes (Ozbilgin 2000: 61). 
Organizational changes are dependent for success on the support of senior managers. 
A survey by the Industrial Society in 2001 found that although sixty seven per cent of 
UK human resources managers claimed to regard equal opportunities as a high 
priority, only eighteen per cent felt that their senior managers had extensive 
knowledge of their companies' policies, and a third felt senior managers to be a 
significant obstacle to the implementation of the policies (Ishmael 2001). If equal 
opportunities is no more than a policy to be put into practice when it suits the business, 
its impact on the 'choices' of women can only be very limited. 
Gender specific characteristics 
Hakim's theory attempts to explain why not all women follow a full time, linear career. 
Biological determinists go a step further, arguing that women have physical and/or 
psychological characteristics that lead to them having a natural predilection for certain 
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types of occupation, such as caring, teaching and serving (Killingsworth 1990). Their 
preferences are credited with causing them to congregate in these jobs, raising supply 
relative to demand, and thus reducing the price of their labour (Reskin & Padavic 
1984). Compensating differential theory further justifies the lower wages by suggesting 
that the attraction of comfortable working conditions serves to offset the wage 
differential. Such arguments ignore the six thousand women and girls who were 
employed underground in coal mines in 1841, in the same conditions but for lower 
wages (Hobsbawm. 1968), and disregard the fact that women were both physically and 
psychologically able to take on all types of work during the two world wars (Reskin & 
Padavic 1984; Bruley 1999). Sex role socialization theory suggests that childreWs 
preferences and talents develop as a result of adjusting to conform to the stereotypical 
sex role models that they encounter throughout their upbringing (Chodorow 1978). 
The concept of gendered attributes being acquired in this way does not conflict with 
the different degrees of conformity that exist in society, unlike the argument that 
socialization merely reinforces natural differences. For example, Paglin and Rufolo 
(1990) claim girls would continue to fare worse than boys at mathematics even if they 
overcame their conditioning against this traditionally male dominated subject. Since it 
has been compulsory for both boys and girls to study mathematics to level two, girls 
have begun to achieve as many A to C grade GCSEs as boys (EOC 2001a; EOC 2001d). 
Women are not a homogenous group of workers, they differ from each other, and their 
priorities and preferences differ over their life course (Elder 1978; Brannen 2001). It 
may even be that they differ by generation, Harriet Bradley (1999) suggests that the 
feminization of the work force is producing a generation of young women who have 
both the qualifications and the will to pursue a life time career path. 
Human capital theory 
Although the theory of sex role socialization acknowledges that gender traits are not 
biologically determined, there is little room for individual agency if the conditioning is 
completed during a child's early years. Human capital theory implies a degree of 
personal involvement in the process (see Chapter Two). The proposition that workers 
are paid in proportion to their investment in human capital assumes the existence of a 
perfect labour market. This assumption has been challenged on the grounds that the 
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assessment of skill can be influenced by factors other than the purely technical (Phillips 
& Taylor 1980; Cockburn 1983). Phillips and Taylor suggest that, because they are more 
powerful than women in the workplace, men are likely to get greater recognition for 
the acquisition of skills requiring similar amounts of training. Cockburn gives the 
example of a strong union having the ability to resist the reclassification of work, even 
though it has diminished in technical complexity due to technological innovation. She 
cites the printers, who were able to retain the highly skilled classification even once 
their work had become no more complex than that of a copy typist. By contrast, in the 
finance industry only the insurance sector was unionised at the end of the nineteenth 
century, yet it was in this sector that women were first recruited in any large numbers. 
It would appear that in this argument it is the strength of the union's organisation, not 
merely its existence, which is of paramount importance. 
There is evidence to suggest that, in the finance sector at least, the historical failure of 
women to make the necessary human capital investment by acquiring professional 
qualifications was largely a result of active discouragement by the employers 
(Crompton & Jones 1984: 145), rather than as a result of deliberate choice by the women 
workers. This theory is supported by the significant increase in the proportions of 
women taking the professional exan-tinations of the Institute of Bankers, the Chartered 
Insurance Institute and the Building Societies Institute between 1979 and 1983, after 
this policy of discouragement had been abandoned (Crompton & Sanderson 1986). 
Women, especially part-timers, are still slightly less likely than men to receive 
employer funded training that leads to a qualification (Blundell et al. 2000), however 
there is also evidence that they are more likely to participate in self-funded training in 
their own time (Callender & Metcalf 1997). This suggests that it is employers' attitudes 
rather than those of the women employees that are responsible for women having less 
employer-funded off the job funding. A consequence of human capital theory as an 
explanation for the gender pay gap would be that men and women benefit equally for 
the acquisition of the same qualifications. This is not the case for either full time 
education (Purcell 2002) or subsequent employment related training (Blundell et al. 
1996). Between 1981 and 1991 the impact on wages for men in the National Child 
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Development Study (NCDS) was an increase of sixty four per cent (five point one per 
cent per annum), compared with forty five per cent (three point eight per cent per 
annum. ) for women (Blundell et al 1996), and human capital was found to account for 
less than ten per cent of the overall pay gap of women and men in the NCDS and the 
National Survey of Health and Development (Joshi & Paci 1998). 
These theories that purport to explain gender difference tend to be descriptive of the 
mechanics of inequality rather than explanatory. Theories of biological determinism 
that developed out of the work of Charles Darwin and Gregor Mendel have been 
largely discredited, as anthropologists have demonstrated that the criteria for 
determining the distribution of work between the sexes is neither universally nor 
temporally consistent (Davidoff 1986; Crompton 1997; Stainton Rogers & Stainton 
Rogers 2001). The segregation of women and men into different occupations does not 
explain why women's jobs have a lower value than meWs (Crompton & Sanderson 
1990); human capital theory does not explain why women and men are considered to 
have different abilities and skills (Anderson et al 2001; Walby & Olsen 2002), and 
compensating differential theory does not explain why women should be more likely 
than men to sacrifice financial reward for non-monetary benefits (Anderson et al 2001). 
The 'explanation' that the crowding of women into a restricted range of jobs means 
that supply outstrips demand and keeps the price low (Bergman 1974) should work 
equally well for those jobs preferred by men, yet it is consistently 'women's jobs' that 
are low paid. 
Structural explanations for the existence of the gender pay gap 
Structural explanations suggest that society is arranged in such a way that women's 
"choice' of jobs is restricted. There are two main strands to this group of theories; 
patriarchy, which can be applied to any historical time and in any economic order, and 
a further group of theories that specifically address the impact of capitalism on 
womeWs income. 
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Patriarchy 
Patriarchy describes a system in which men are regarded as the don-dnant members of 
all hierarchies, whether fan-dly, state or corporation. Even though most men are in the 
lower levels of hierarchies, their identification with those at the top creates a sense of 
solidarity between them, allowing them to control women (Hartmann 1979). The 
theory attributes the subordination of women to the debilitating effects of their 
biological role in reproduction (Firestone 1970); in its most extreme construction men 
are portrayed as actively seeking the exclusion of women from the best jobs (Walby 
1986). During the 19th century, the concept of male superiority was supported by 
contemporary scientific theorists, including biologists, anthropologists and physicians 
(Harrison 1990). More recently, critics accuse patriarchs of the use of both physical and 
psychological tactics to sustain this hierarchy. The use of sexual harassment, the 
increased availability of pornography (Hadjifotiou 1983; Walby 1990; Halford & 
Leonard 2001) and the encouragement of many women's obsession with their physical 
appearance (Bartky 1988), are all seen as reinforcing womews acceptance of their 
inferiority to men. Anderson and Tomaskovic (1995) argue that meWs efforts in this 
direction may be moderated by powerful women, the formalization of industrial 
relations, or by employers who recognise the business sense in adopting an egalitarian 
approach. They find that patriarchal pressures are greater in those jobs with higher 
pay and/or status: "Women get access to meWs jobs only when men do not have a 
strong interest in entering them" (Anderson & Tomaskovic 1995: 348). The power to 
get the best jobs includes the power to refuse the low paid and those personal service 
roles that are commonly regarded as demeaning (Walby 1988; Crompton & Harris 
1999). 
Sociological functionalism attempts to explain the position of employed women in 
relation to their role in the patriarchal fan-dly. It suggests that the use made of its 
resources by the typical fan-dly unit will be that which is most beneficial for both the 
family members and for society as a whole (Parsons & Bales 1956; Pahl 1984). The 
theory dates back to a period when it was still seen as a deviation for married women 
to work (Oakley 1974), so the unstated assumption is that the most beneficial allocation 
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of resources is for the wife to devote her energies to caring for the home and fan-dly. 
Even if she does need or choose to work, the pre-existence of gender pay inequality 
means that in most cases the man will be able to command the highest salary, so his 
career will take priority over any aspirations of his spouse. Her job will therefore be of 
secondary importance in the family and she will be restricted to work that can be easily 
combined with domestic and caring responsibilities. The demand for such jobs keeps 
their market value low, and serves to maintain the gender pay differential, creating a 
vicious circle of low pay and domesticity (Anderson et al 2001). 
Critics claim that patriarchy as an explanation for women's subordination 
""underestimate[s] womeWs agency and overestimate[s] men's agency" (Blackburn et al 
2002: 521). It is unrealistic to conceive of all men as a single collectivity, dedicated to 
the preservation of their advantage. Some suggest that patriarchy is a description 
rather than an explanation (Blackburn et al 2002), however a more plausible account is 
that the description has become so entrenched that it has become the discourse of a 
social system, with the result that both women and men believe that the roles of men 
and women are unavoidably pre-determined, and act appropriately. 
Capitalism 
Patriarchy is a system that pre-dates capitalism by many centuries (Hartmann 1979; 
Grint 1988), although it has not necessarily been universal throughout time or space 
(Firestone 1970). The pre-existence of a patriarchal culture would account for men 
becoming the don-dnant movers in the emerging capitalist society, but there are also 
theories that suggest women have been isolated by capitalist employers to help divide 
and rule the workforce (Firestone 1970; Edwards 1979) Marxist analyses of gender 
inequality tend to be a subset of their overall critique of capitalism, women are treated 
as an inferior and relatively insignificant class of worker, who are even more 
susceptible to exploitation than are their male counterparts. Promotion of the concept 
that a womaWs principal responsibility is in the domestic sphere, enables the capitalist 
employer to ensure the maintenance and reproduction of the labour force (Seccombe 
1974). It is argued that ferninisation of the workforce is accompanied by deskilling, or 
task degradation, (Braverman 1974; Beechey 1977, Bruegel 1979; Bradley 1999). 
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Deskilling 
Braverman (1974) describes deskilling of occupations as a form of managerial control 
by capitalist employers, enabling the work to be performed by lower skilled workers 
for lower wages. If, at the same time, it is possible to perform traditionally domestic 
functions (clothing manufacture, baking, etc) more econornically under mass- 
production, women become available to take those deskilled jobs. Because of women's 
relatively late entry into the capitalist labour market they became available in vast 
numbers, thus allowing the law of supply and demand to re-enforce any pre-existing 
tendency to low pay. He argues that the eventual result will be a convergence of the 
proportions of men and women in the labour force as the lower paid women force out 
the men. Early critiques of Braverman accused him of failing to take account of the 
range of managerial controls that employers have available to them, and suggested 
that deskilling is not sufficiently inevitable to ensure the fulfilment of his prediction 
(Friedman 1977, Elgar 1979; Wood 1982). However the finance sector and the clerical 
career provide prime examples of work evolving from an exclusively male, high status, 
high income profession to a predominantly female, low status and relatively low paid 
occupation (Lockwood 1958; Kirkham & Loft 1993). just as today it is said that women 
have the ideal 'soft' skills for the new call centre operations (Belt et al 2002), so a 
century ago it was said that their patience, docility, gentility and accuracy made thern 
suitable for routine clerical work (Guerriero Wilson 2001). It was also pointed out that 
women were cheaper, so it was in the employers' interests to promote the work as 
suitable for women. Whatever the reason, the employment of women for clerical work 
continued to increase throughout the twentieth century; their representation in the 
finance sector exceeded fifty per cent by 1970, making Braverman's prediction appear a 
conservative estimate (Morris 1986; Duffield 2002). Alternative management controls, 
in particular outsourcing of some of the routine operations, facilitated by deskilling 
strategies such as automation, are also used (BBA 2001), but although this has resulted 
in the creation of an even lower paid group of workers in the industry, there is no 
evidence of any deceleration in the fen-dnisation of the UK finance sector. 
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Reserve amy of labour 
Braverman theorised that women were being used as a long-term reserve army of 
labour, to replace the more expensive male labour. Marx had identified three types of 
labour reserve that capitalism uses to control wage costs: floating, comprised of 
workers who have become unemployed from capitalist industry; latent, comprising 
workers who have never been employed under capitalism but have become available 
due to changes in the relations of production; and stagnant, or those who only enter 
the labour market intermittently. Beechey (1977) argued that women fall into the latter 
category, particularly once they have married, because they "have a world of their very 
own, the fan-dly, into which they can disappear when discarded from production" 
(Beechey 1977: 57). Bruegel (1979) developed the concept of a stagnant reserve army of 
women with particular reference to part-time workers, specifically in the electrical 
engineering industry, where she demonstrates greater fluctuations in the part-time 
element of the workforce than occur among the workforce generally. Her thesis is 
supported by the findings of O'Reilly and Bothfield (2002), that approximately twenty 
five per cent of women in the British Household Panel Survey in 1991 who had worked 
part time at some point between 1991 and 1995, had dropped out of the labour market 
in 1995, and only seventeen point six per cent had moved into full time employment 
Nevertheless, the concept of a reserve army of women has been criticised firstly on the 
empirical evidence, that women have not been the first to go in downsizing operations 
(Milkman 1976; Walby 1989), secondly, because it would defeat the object of reducing 
wage costs if the lowest paid workers were let go first (Bruegel 1979; Anthias 1980), 
and thirdly because in a sex segregated labour market it is difficult to replace 
experienced men with inexperienced women (Grint 1998). These critiques presume 
that a reserve army is by nature only intended to be temporary, however the 
terminology employed by Braverman refers to "a reservoir of labor for the new mass 
occupations" (Braverman 1974: 385), and implies one whose value to capital is its 
availability at a time of need, but for the long term. I would argue that this is closer to 
a latent army than stagnant, and reflects the position in the finance sector for much of 
the twentieth century when expansion created additional demand for low skilled 
labour. That army has now been largely utilised, as women have smaller fan-tilies and 
68 
Explanations for Women's Lower Pay 
are more likely to return to work after a period of maternity leave. Seventy three per 
cent of working age women were economically active in 2003 (ONS 2004), so even the 
floating army, of women who are ready to return to employment after a break for 
childcare, is diminishing. Employers now have to look further afield for a new source 
of cheap labour, and thanks to advances in information and communication 
technologies, some have chosen to locate part of their operations in Asia and the Indian 
sub-continent (BBA 2001; Holliday 2003). 
Thefamily wage 
Jane Humphries (1977) argues that the exclusion of women from the labour force was a 
strategy to enable the working class as a whole to control the supply of labour and 
consequentially increase its market value. The male "breadwinner wage" would 
enable a sole male wage earner to earn as much as his whole fan-dly would otherwise 
have been able to earn; and allow women to concentrate on their social reproduction 
role as mothers and home-makers (Humphries 1977). The ideal of a family wage was a 
concept endorsed by the TUC in 1897 (Davis 1993). It was assumed to have been 
achieved when the government was designing the national insurance scheme in 1942 
(Land 1994) and as recently as the 1970s pay claims for low paid workers stressed the 
need "to maintain the standard of living of a married man with two children" (Barrett 
& McIntosh 1980: 51). However it is unlikely that the quest for a family wage was an 
original cause of the lower pay of women, indeed it has been claimed that the lower 
pay of women was a contributory factor in the origination of the family wage 
campaign (Creighton 1996). Failure to achieve the required standard on a universal 
basis is clear from the continuing need, throughout the twentieth and into the twenty 
first century, for a social benefit system to supplement wages. However, by continuing 
to strive for the ideal and thereby keeping women's wages even lower than mews, the 
campaign almost certainly contributed to the poorest fan-dlies being unable to achieve a 
living wage even when both partners worked. The finance sector effectively met the 
demand for a family wage, but out of concern for security rather than philanthropy. In 
order to limit the temptation to steal, the Banks refused permission for male clerks to 
marry until they had reached a specified salary level (Winterton 1969; Blackburn et al 
2002). This would also have provided justification for the continuation of the marriage 
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bar, as there would have been an assumption that the woman's husband would be 
earning sufficient to support a wife. 
Labour market segmentation 
There are several variations of labour market segmentation theory, but essentially they 
all agree that the labour market is divided into two sectors, with the deliberate 
objective of dividing and controlling the workforce (Edwards 1979; Anker 1997). Those 
sectors are variously described as 'primary' and 'secondary' (Doeringer & Piore 1971; 
Edwards et al. 1975), orformal' and 'informal' (I. L. O. 1972). Primary sector employers 
are those with a high degree of market power, and are more likely to provide job 
security, career progression and relatively high earnings. In contrast, secondary sector 
employers operate in the most competitive markets, and the jobs are more likely to be 
part time and low paid with little or no prospect of advancement (Anker 1997). 
Primary sector employers are presumed to have the pick of the labour market, and to 
favour men because they are better educated and more experienced than women 
(Anker 1997). Voluntary mobility between the two sectors is unlikely, because 
secondary sector employees are likely to be regarded unfavourably by primary sector 
employers because of their association with low productivity (Anderson et al 2001), 
and moving from primary to secondary would incur financial penalties for the 
employee. The main exceptions to this stability are those women who move out of the 
primary sector following childbirth (Burchell & Rubery 1989), and the involuntary 
transfer of primary sector workers to a secondary sector employer as a result of 
outsourcing. Internal labour markets are said to min-tic the dual labour market model, 
with the language of 'core' and 'peripheral' workforces becoming common (Atkinson 
& Meager 1986). A government inquiry in 1965, into the salaries of Midland Bank 
employees, actually recommended a similar arrangement and suggested separate pay 
structures for the women employed for the routine work, from that of the men in 
"more responsible posts" (NBPI 1965: 53), however the banks implemented a single 
pay structure to cover all employees. In his critique of Atkinson's flexible firm model 
Legge (1995) suggested that flexibility has become part of management rhetoric, 
covering a wide range of labour use strategies with the purpose of maxin-dsing 
competitive advantage. Even in call centres, where the broad based, flattened 
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hierarchy and requirement for round the clock staffing seems to favour the 'flexible 
firm' model, Bain and Mulvey (2002) found that more than ninety per cent of 
employees were on permanent contracts, and that the temporary workers performed 
the same tasks as the permanent. In the finance sector call centre they studied, the use 
of temporary staff was partly a buffer against the possibility of staff cutbacks, and 
partly a way of assessing potential recruits for permanent positions (Bain & Mulvey 
2002: 6). Temporary contracts are also commonly used for information and 
communication technology employees; in 2003 approximately fifteen per cent of all UK 
ICT employees were classed as either 'non-permanent' or self employed, but rather 
than being on inferior terms and conditions, these contractors earned one point eight 
times more than permanent employees (e-skills UK 2003). 
'Dualist' approaches 
All of the theories above tend to base the subordination of women on either the 
patriarchal hierarchy of typical families, or the efforts of capitalist employers. 
Hartmann (1979) argues that capitalism developed by borrowing many of its structures 
from the already well-established system of patriarchy, and since that time the two 
systems have interacted to maintain the relative status of women and men. For 
example, when four of the clearing banks set up the Joint Credit Card Company 
(JCCC) in 1970 to adn-dnister the Access Credit Card, there was no certainty of the 
quantities of work that would be created. The solution used by the new organisation 
was to recruit the non-working wives of the male bank employees to function as a 
"'housewives' panel" to be available to cover peak periods and emergencies, in the 
expectation that the exercise of patriarchal relationships in the home would facilitate 
their availability at short notice (Joss 1998). 
Hartmann's analysis provides an account of two systems operating in parallel to 
influence the market for women's labour. Walby (1986; 1990) takes the 
interdependence of capitalism and patriarchy to a more complex level, by including 
the effect of racism and suggesting that, rather than operating in parallel, the various 
systems are intertwined and will interact in different ways at different times and in 
different contexts. Although complex, this model is the most satisfactory version of the 
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theories because it allows for both the heterogeneity of women, and the volatility of 
capitalist economies. 
The theory of gendered organisations 
All of the structural theories rest on the assumption that women are disadvantaged as 
a result of their actual or perceived biological and psychological constitution. At the 
beginning of the twenty first century there is no longer any necessity for the 
reproductive process to cause major disruption to women's careers; girls are leaving 
school with similar or better qualifications than boys; the government advocates 
employment for all, including single mothers, and employers profess themselves to be 
equal opportunities employers. Nevertheless women are still paid less than men. Joan 
Acker (1990) explains the continuation of inequality with the theory that organisational 
culture is intrinsically gendered, but that fact'is generally concealed by the dominant 
organisational discourse, which is gender neutral. The result is the automatic 
gendering of even the best intentioned of management processes. She demonstrates 
that job evaluation schemes are dependent on the concept of workers who have no 
distractions from their dedication to work. This explains the low status of 'women's 
jobs' and the preservation of gendered hierarchies, (Acker 1990: 150-152); her logic is 
equally likely to apply to the development of the performance criteria and 
competencies used for determining individualised pay awards, and to the criteria for 
recruitment and promotion. 
Despite being the originator of the theory of gendered organisations, Joan Acker was 
not the first to recognise the differential impact of organisational culture on women 
and men. Rosabeth Kanter (1977) designated "... the nature of organizations, not men 
or women as individuals, as the [cause of womeWs inequality in organisations]" 
(Kanter 1977: 291); Szafran (1984) used organizational and community characteristics to 
account for the proportion of women and ethnic minorities occupying managerial 
positions in twenty four US banks; and Mills pointed out that "... gender 
discrimination, far from being obvious and overt, is embedded, more-or-less 
unconsciously, in the processes that make up an organizatiows culture" (Mills 1988: 
356). These processes range from the most sophisticated to the completely informal. 
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The gendered nature of the values and practices that constitute an organisation's 
culture may reveal itself in the conduct of staff meetings (Alvesson & Due Billing 1997), 
the dress code of the office (Cockburn 1991) and the language of official 
communications (Alvesson & Due Billing 1997; Parker 2000). Even the appearance of 
the working environment can convey the gendered nature of an organization. Neutral, 
impersonal and purely functional designs can be interpreted as masculine, while the 
introduction of colour and softer lines are less likely to alienate women (Alvesson & 
Due Billing 1997). 
Gender, culture and change 
Itzin (1995) and Acker (1990) contend that the power in an organisation. is always going 
to be gendered, and will remain so unless there is a fundamental change to the 
capitalist model of organisation. As Beck (2000) explains, the institutional structures 
of industrial society have inequality incorporated in their design, and equality between 
men and women requires those structures to be "thought through and changed to 
reflect the vital requirements of families and relationships" (Beck 2000: 124). Others 
point to the potential influence of women on culture creation, citing a few exceptional 
examples, in which fen-dnine qualities such as interpersonal relationshaps and power 
sharing are valued and the barriers to women's progress have been lowered (Grant 
1988; Rosener 1990; Anderson & Tomaskovic 1995). It is nevertheless the case that 
most cultures have been shaped by men (Bajdo & Dickson 2002). 
The more progressive organisations are, as yet, unlikely to be found in the finance 
sector, where the most influential people are stiff men, who have been immersed in the 
capitalist culture for generations, and for whom the overriding objective of their work 
is to make a profit. Despite the introduction of equal opportunities and work life 
balance policies, whenever they come into conflict with this objective they are likely to 
be sidelined. The main focus for contrived culture change in the finance industry since 
deregulation has therefore been the attempt to implement a sales culture (Storey et al. 
1997; Storey et al 1999). In the most prestigious sectors, such as investment banking, 
even the recruitment process is still overwhelmingly gendered (McDowell 1997; Jones 
1998) The impact of the few women who have been appointed to senior positions is 
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likely to be far more subtle, especially if they have reached those positions by 
immersing themselves in the existing male culture. Even when restructuring changes 
the established order, there is evidence that the proportions of women and men in the 
new jobs adjust so that men once again dominate the higher graded jobs. One such 
restructuring of an American bank, supervised by two women managers, was the 
subject of a case study by Skuratowicz and Hunter (2004). The branch management 
role came out with lower status and salaries, and a new sales job was created with high 
pay and status. The representation of women in branch management increased 
significantly, and a larger proportion of men were appointed to the sales job than had 
been the case for the equivalent jobs in the previous structure. Gendered assumptions 
had been built into the jobs, picked up by the employees who responded by applying 
for the appropriately gendered role, and appointments were made in accordance with 
the assumptions. The process of appointing candidates of predon-tinantly one gender 
served to reinforce the original gendered assumptions and ensure their reproduction. 
These findings support those of Bradley, that even though young women have the 
qualifications to challenge male power in the work place, "women and men are led 
into replicating patterns of gendered difference at work through processes both of 
(imposed) gender stereotyping and of (active) fen-tinine and masculine identification" 
(Bradley 1999: 213). 
In this chapter, I have set out the various debates about the fundamental causes of 
unequal pay. These emanate from theories of culture, of structure and of agency, and 
there is a growing school of thought, which I support, that these perspectives are 
complementary (Crompton 1997; Crompton & Harris 1998b; Evetts 2000). This is a 
challenge to the conventional approach of treating 'dualisms' such as 'action versus 
structure' 
, 
'structure versus culture', and 'theory versus empirical material' as if they 
were in opposition (Glucksmann 2000). It recognises that there are many 
circumstances affecting womeWs position in the labour market, producing 
"opportunities as well as constraints" (Evetts 2000: 65), which together form what 
Glucksman describes as the 'total social organisation of labour' (Glucksmann 2000). 
74 
Methodology 
Chapter, 5. Methodology 
"... Research on pay inequality is methodologically attractive because levels of 
pay are easily quantifiable and generalisable across all manner of jobs and 
employees. 
... 
Obviously, knowledge of the patterning of pay inequalities is 
extremely valuable and has considerable policy relevance. However, what is 
missing from most of [the industrial relations] literature is any attempt to 
explain why sex segregation comes about and how it is maintained". 
(Wajcman 2000: 186) 
I question the 'ease' with which levels of pay can always be quantified. Not only are 
payment systems complicated by performance bonuses, comn-dssion payments and 
other additions to basic salary, but often non-monetary benefits, such as working 
environment, learning and development opportunities and provision for improving 
'work-life balance' are included in the'total reward package' (IýIilsome 2002b). These 
complications are compounded by a 'conspiracy of silence about pay and bonuses' 
(Mellor 2003), to the extent that forty one per cent of private sector organisations do not 
allow their employees to discuss their pay with colleagues, and twenty eight per cent 
do not tell their employees how their rate of pay is determined (Neathey et al 2003: 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Nevertheless I agree that it is much easier to quantify levels of pay 
than to detern-dne the reasons for different treatment of women and men, whether that 
is sex segregation, direct discrin-driation or something completely unrelated to gender. 
The approach described in this chapter is intended to make the connection between all 
of the elements of the employment relationship so that inequalities are both described 
and explained. 
Overall strategy 
A long term objective of this research project is to contribute to an improvement in the 
"condition of the lives of [working] women" (Brunskell 1998: 39), starting from the 
position that, in the employment field at least, women are at a disadvantage compared 
with men. In this respect, the conception of my research could be described as coming 
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from a feminist perspective, where 'feminist' refers to "those who see women as 
exploited, devalued and oppressed" (Oakley 1998: 725). Wise and Stanley (2003) 
express concern that some feminist research is tending to concentrate on "discovery 
and change", implying that this approach precludes developing an understanding 
society (Wise & Stanley 2003: para 2.8). Rather, I suggest that it is necessary to 
understand the organizational and societal roots of women's disadvantage in order to 
discover the elements of the employment relationship that need to be changed. In 
particular, I was aware of the potential conflicts between different elements of the 
complex employment relationship that might demand compromise and long term, 
rather than immediate, programmes for change. 
My research was partly funded, through the medium of an ESRC CASE studentsl-dp, 
by Unifi, the finance sector trade union. It followed that my enquiries also touched 
upon areas of industrial relations, insofar as I was dealing with trade union officials, 
industrial relations managers and the products (agreements and policies) of collective 
bargaining. The traditional approaches of these two disciplines have been somewhat 
divergent. Some feminist researchers emphasise that the concept of value free research 
is not only implausible, but may also be inappropriate for achieving the objectives of 
the research (Duelli Klein 1983; Mies 1993). They tend to favour qualitative methods 
rather than "The Three Ps" of positivism, power and 'p' values (statistics) (Oakley 
1998), and address issues of culture and subjectivity (Wajcman 1998; Brunskell 1998). 
Industrial relations research is more likely to come from the traditional positivist or 
'(scientific' perspective, and concentrate on the "... institutions and structures of 
industrial relations [rather than]... the social processes which gender organisational 
logic, culture and structure" (Ledwith & Colgan 2002: 2). 
My approach has therefore been to integrate an understanding of the gendered 
character of work into my research agenda (Wajcman 2000), rather than favour one 
field over the other. Ann Oakley argues that "The underlying gendering of structural 
inequalities that occurs in most societies could not be discerned using qualitative 
methods on their own" (Oakley 1998: 723). It is not reasonable to discuss potential 
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inequalities of pay without quantifying those inequalities. It was my intention to 
conduct that quantification in as much detail as possible, in order to identify trends 
that may help to explain, as well as describe, the relative pay of women and men. 
National datasets were available that confirmed my conviction that women are 
disadvantaged in their pay, however these covered at best a one per cent sample of the 
working population. I accepted that a more detailed examination might reveal 
circumstances in which the reverse was the case, or where there would be parity. Such 
divergences would not necessarily disprove my conviction, but would provide me 
with fresh avenues to explore, that might reveal anything from the successful 
implementation of equality strategies to new ways of disguising inequality. Rather 
than either 'value free', 'objective', or even open-n-dnded, I would prefer to describe 
this approach as the application of critical realism recognising that "the social world is 
reproduced and transformed in daily life" (Bhaskar 1989: 4). 
As useful as the quantitative approach is in establishing the extent of inequality and its 
potential causes, I realised that my personal values must influence this quantitative 
stage, for the simple reason that I was the only person involved in it, and in 
determining the ways in which I would interrogate the data. Instead of adding 
subjectivity, the subsequent use of qualitative methods to explain the results of the data 
analysis served to both increase the validity of my own conclusions, and enabled the 
consideration of alternative explanations, challenging my own, and causing me to 
reassess my position. Whilst this does not amount to a systematic implementation of 
grounded theory as proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967), it is sufficiently reflexive to 
produce a theory that is grounded in the data (Bryman 2001). 
The size and heterogeneity of the finance sector precludes the possibility of conducting 
research that would be generalisable to the whole of the sector, so I decided to 
concentrate my research in a small number of organisations. The desired improvement 
to the working lives of women throughout the finance sector is a long term project, and 
I anticipate that the detailed findings from the current case studies may be used to 
inform similar investigations in other companies. I considered three different 
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approaches to my research, all of which had some advantages. An evaluation research 
frame of reference, such as that used by Bryman to evaluate the impact of performance 
appraisal in Universities (described in Bryman 2001: 281), would have been a useful 
method of assessing the impact of specific elements of payment systems. However its 
value would have been limited to evaluating those elements and have overlooked the 
contribution of any other aspect of the employment relationship to pay inequality. An 
action research approach also had some attractions, because of its emphasis on 
securing improvements to organisational procedures through the involvement of all 
participants in the research process (Hart & Bond 1995; Greenwood & Levin 1998; 
Griffiths 1998). 1 was confident in the comn-titment of Unifi to act on my findings, but 
was less certain that the employers would be willing to cooperate with any proposals. 
I therefore determined that my aspirations for achieving change should be long term, 
and that for this particular piece of research I should be content with producing 
recommendations without comn-dtting myself to securing implementation. 
A case study approach fulfilled the requirements of being suitable for a small-scale 
project and of being sufficiently flexible to incorporate both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. A particular advantage of the case study method is that it 
provides data that can be retrieved later for further research in a longitudinal or action 
research project (Blaxter et al. 2001). The biggest disadvantage of the method is its 
poverty of both internal and external validity (Bryman 2001). 1 addressed the issue of 
internal validity by using both quantitative and qualitative methods to provide 
support for any indications of causality. I was already aware that I would not be able 
to conduct research of sufficient magnitude to be generalisable to the whole industry, 
but I decided that a case study would at least provide some theories to inform future 
challenges to unequal pay in other organisations. At the same time, the intensive 
nature of the research would enable some positive, actionable results for the women in 
the case study organisation(s). A multiple case study could improve both the internal 
and the external validity of the research by providing the opportunity for comparisons 
but, more importantly, it introduced a wider range of organisational characteristics and 
payment systems into the analysis. 
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Design detail 
My immediate aim in designing this case study research was to produce a model 
capable of showing the extent to which outdated ideologies and discourses impede the 
implementation of practical measures designed, whether deliberately or incidentally, 
to promote gender pay equity. The original working title encompassed the 
possibilities that new payment systems may have effected a change in the relative pay 
of women and men, whether positive or negative, or may simply have reproduced the 
status quo. A longitudinal research design was considered, as it could be capable of 
encompassing data from the old as well as the new payment systems (Hakim 2000). 
Apart from the logistical difficulties of obtaining more than one set of data in the time 
available, I decided that too many factors in the employment relationship are liable to 
change, even over a one year period, to allow for any reliable inference to be drawn 
from such a study. It would be affected by, inter alia, staff turnover, promotions, 
sickness and maternity absence and changes in the way peak workloads are handled 
(e. g. overtime or temporary agency staff). The consequential reduction in the number 
of subjects who could be included in the study would therefore limit the accuracy of 
my analysis, so I rejected this method for the current study. Nevertheless I was able to 
identify a cohort of new recruits who could become the subjects of a future 
longitudinal study should the opportunity for further study materialise. 
Much of the previous research on the gender pay gap has utilised secondary data such 
as the New Earnings Survey (NES) (e. g. Grimshaw & Rubery 2001; EOC 2003b); the 
Labour Force Survey (LFS) (e. g. Anderson et al 2001; Hardy 2001); the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (e. g. Booth & Francesconi 1999; Lissenburgh 2000); or 
the Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) (e. g. Anderson et al. 2001). These 
have the advantage of providing time series data and enabling a retrospective 
longitudinal study, however they have a number of disadvantages making them 
unsuitable for this particular research. The diversity of payment systems, and the 
frequency with which they are changed, means that in order to be able to assess the 
impact of payment systems it is necessary to be able to identify the specific employers. 
It is not possible to disaggregate any of these data sets to that level, and most go no 
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lower than the Standard Industry Classification (SIC). The sample sizes (the largest is 
the NES, with one per cent of employees), whilst large for studies that are looking for 
trends generalisable to a whole industry, are inadequate for providing reliable data on 
the impact of a specific criterion, especially as there is a risk that not an categories of 
workers are represented (Mata Greenwood 1999). The most detailed information is in 
WERS, which does have fully linkable surveys of both employers and employees in 
over two thousand companies (Mumford & Smith 2001), and includes reference to both 
performance related pay and flexible working. The innovation of the employee survey 
in the 1998 WERS is a valuable addition to publicly available data on employee 
relations, but as they only interviewed a maximum of twenty five employees in each 
workplace, it would not be sufficiently representative of any single finance sector 
employer for my purposes. As the researchers themselves said "we trust that in-depth 
case studies will help to establish the conditions under which the statistical 
associations we have found arise" (Cully et al 2000: 2). 
The terms of my collaborative studentship included a comn-dtment from Unifi to 
provide access to all relevant sources of information, including securing the necessary 
introductions, an invaluable advantage for any researcher wishing to do research in 
white collar organizations (Crompton & Jones 1988). The potential components of my 
research design facilitated through this relationship included a survey of union 
members, the secondary analysis of data held by the union, the analysis of current 
payroll data and personnel documents and qualitative interviews with representatives 
of both management and staff. With access to Unifi's membership list, I could 
conceivably have surveyed all of the members in a selection of organisations. The 
main advantages of this proposition were that I would not require employer co- 
operation, and it would have allowed me to collect data on attitudes to pay and 
performance at the same time as actual pay data. These advantages were countered by 
several disadvantages: 
1. Small sample size 
- 
Unifi's membership represents little more than fifty per 
cent of the total workforce in most of the organisations where it is recognised, 
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and typical return rates on their own postal surveys tend to be well below fifty 
per cent. Regardless of my own aspirations, this would fall into the 'not 
acceptable' category in Mangione's classification (Mangione 1995: 60-61). 
Although face-to-face surveys would have a better response rate (Oppenheirn 
1992), the additional time needed to conduct the interviews would reduce the 
potential sample size still further. 
2. The unreliability of self completed data (Oppenheim. 1992; Newell 1993), 
especially if I were to ask for retrospective as well as current data, which would 
be increased if people had changed jobs during the previous twelve months. 
3. The costs of producing and distributing postal surveys. 
4. The time and effort needed to collate the responses and to enter and check the 
data. 
Unifi held a small amount* of information about the distribution of annual pay awards 
for the four major high street banks, disaggregated by gender, for at least one year 
since 1995. In each case, there had been changes to the payment systems after the first 
of these reports, providing an opportunity for a retrospective longitudinal study. In 
one case, the bank had supplied the data regularly for several years, so in theory it 
would have been possible to use secondary data for the whole of the analysis. The 
banks had supplied this data to Unifi in confidence, for the purpose of collective 
bargaining, so it would have been unethical to proceed with this course without their 
express permission. I therefore determined to seek access to two of these banks in 
order to conduct a comparative case study using current data, with the possibility of 
incorporating the historical data if permission could be obtained. I was aware that at 
least two of the four banks were intending to conduct equal pay audits in accordance 
with the recommendations of the Equal Pay Task Force (EOC 2001b), and prepared a 
presentation based on the anticipation of being able to share the results of those audits. 
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Following a presentation of my proposals, the senior full time officials responsible for 
pay negotiations with the two banks agreed to make the necessary introductions. They 
made initial approaches in March 2002, and I followed these by making a presentation 
to the respective Industrial Relations managers. Initial reactions were very positive, 
but by the end of July, neither of these organisations had been able to make a decision 
about granting me access. I had made repeated telephone calls, sent both letters and e- 
mails, and had even re-supplied a copy of my presentation to one of the organisations. 
Interventions on my behalf by the union officials were equally unsuccessful and, 
although it was never at any time denied, access was never agreed. In retrospect, I can 
see that my timing was unfortunate. Guidelines on conducting pay audits (the Equal 
Pay Tool Kit), promised by the EOC for that summer, did not materialise until 
September, and the new Code of Practice did not appear until November. One of the 
banks was planning to use a consultant to conduct a pilot audit, at a time when the few 
experts in the field were not only in great demand, but also involved in designing the 
EOC Tool Kit. I also believe it to be possible that at the time neither organisation was 
confident that it could accurately anticipate the outcome of the audits, and they were 
wary about agreeing to share data that might make them appear in a bad light. 
Furthermore, even though I had given an undertaking not to share any of their data 
with the union without their express permission, I suspect that knowledge of my close 
association with Unifi over several years may have made them sceptical of my 
protestations at a time when they were feeling vulnerable. Had I embarked on this 
research a year later I may have found a more positive reception, however I did not 
have the luxury of waiting to find out. 
Reflecting on the possible reasons for the reluctance of these two organisations; to 
provide me with access to the results of their pay audits inspired me to offer to conduct 
pay audits myself in return for the use of the data in my research. This solution had 
the advantage that I would be able to influence the extent of both the data and the 
analysis used in the process. The model Equal Pay Review eventually produced by the 
EOC was limited by its terms of reference to the identification of unequal pay for work 
of equal value. I was confident that a detailed analysis of pay data could reveal far 
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more about the nature of pay inequalities in the organisations audited, and realised 
that if I were to adopt this approach I would be able to both evaluate the effectiveness 
of the EOC model, and explore the potential of a more in depth analysis. 
Up until this time I had been anticipating conducting my research in two of the major 
High Street banks. Organisations of that size are likely to have suitable resources 
internally to conduct pay reviews so, for that reason as well as the practical one of 
wanting to keep the data sets to a relatively easily manageable size, I resolved to seek 
case study companies with no more than five thousand employees. At that time a 
Unifi colleague happened to be discussing the government recommendation for Pay 
Audits with the Employee Relations manager in one of the Insurance companies, 
which I will refer to as Global, who told her that he would like to conduct an audit, but 
didn't have the expertise or resources to do so. She recommended me, and it took just 
one telephone conversation and an exchange of emails to produce an agreement to my 
proposal. 
I was still convinced of the desirability of a comparative case study rather than a single 
organisation, in particular because it would enable research into a wider range of 
payment systems. My exploratory interviews with union officials had alerted me to 
the possibility that support would be forthcon-ting from a dernutualised building 
society, wl-dch I will call New Bank, now among the ten largest of the UK retail banks. 
Within a week of re-contacting the official, I had a meeting with the Personnel Director, 
who was able to agree my access there and then. At that time, the proposal was that I 
would assist with the conduct of their pay audit, and have access to interview staff 
based on the results of that audit. Subsequently, faced by delays in the conduct of the 
audit, I offered to do the work for them, and they readily accepted. This meant that I 
would have control of the analysis in both organisations, with complete freedom to 
interrogate the data as I wished, a huge improvement on the original plan to utilise the 
results of employer initiated pay reviews. 
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The Research Organisations in Context 
New Bank 
New Bank converted from a building society to a public limited company in 1997, 
when it became the ninth largest retail bank in the UK. As an'amalgam' of fifty three 
building societies and one bank, its core business continues to be the provision of 
residential mortgages, which it offers throughout the UK through a network of 
branches, specialised regional mortgage centres, by post, telephone and on the internet. 
It also deals in household insurance, personal lending, retail savings and commercial 
mortgages. Profits and assets under management have grown each year since de- 
mutualisation, and the company has the lowest operating costs in Europe, with a cost- 
income ratio of twenty nine point eight per cent in 2003 (this compares with forty 
seven point five per cent for its largest competitor bank, HBOS). 
Costs have become a major concern of the organisation since demutualisation, as was 
mentioned by all four of the interviewees, from both company and union. 
Containment is partly achieved by the concentration of employment in the North East 
of England, where the workforce in its headquarters and call centres will have 
expanded from one thousand eight hundred in 1997 to four thousand five hundred by 
2005. In the rest of the UK the branch network was cut from one hundred and fifty six 
to fifty six between 1995 and 2003. In 2002 the unemployment rate in the North East 
was two point four percentage points higher than the national average, and the 
average earnings of men in non-manual occupations was eighteen per cent below the 
national average, and for women the disparity was fourteen per cent (Stone 2002). The 
region was the worst affected by the collapse of the manufacturing industry in the 
1970s and 80s, amounting to a reduction of fifty four per cent of all manufacturing jobs 
in Wearside, a decline that has continued at twice the rate as in the rest of the country 
(Robinson 1994; Stone 2002). In an attempt to create alternative employment the 
Regional Development Agency (RDA) has actively promoted the area for the 
development of call centres. The financial services sector, which now accounts for 
thirteen per cent of all employment, has the largest number of call centres in the region, 
although the telecommunications sector employs a larger proportion of the workers 
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(Richardson et al. 2000). The attraction of low wages and subsidised pren-dses in 
enterprise zones has been augmented by a proactive approach to training, including 
the foundation of a specialist 'call centre college' and training outlets in 'electronic 
village halls' located in housing estates for the benefit of the 'socially disadvantaged' 
(Richardson & Belt 2001). New Bank participates in this by providing pre-employment 
training which aims to encourage under-represented groups, such as lone parents, and 
to assist them through New Bank's recruitment selection process, regardless of their 
previous work experience or educational standard. 
In addition to low labour costs, call centre managers told Richardson and Belt that their 
firms expected low staff turnover rates because of the high level of unemployment in 
the region (Richardson & Belt 2001: 78). Most would not say whether that anticipation 
had been realised, but in 2001 New Bank acknowledged that it had an unsatisfactorily 
high turnover rate of forty per cent in its mortgage call centre, accompanied by a high 
rate of absenteeism. A focus group participant indicated that the problem was the 
level of wages, which he considered to be low even for the area: 
David: "I remember when I was made permanent I was specifically told this is your 
starting salary 
- 
you must not discuss your salary with anybody. I wouldn't have 
dared, I was that embarrassed of it, couldn't have sat in the pub and told my mates this 
is what I'm on". 
Rather than increasing the rates of pay, the company hired a management consultancy 
to promote their work life balance policies, with the stated intention of becon-ting the 
"employer of choice' in the region. New Bank has since been awarded platinum 
ranking in the 2002 Opportunity Now benchmarking exercise, and was ranked sixth in 
a survey of the 'Best Work Life Balance Employers in Britain' (UMIST 2001; 
RightCoutts 2002). 
The company also promotes itself as an equal opportunities employer, as part of its 
Corporate Social Responsibility accounting, it produces an annual 'Community 
Report', which in 2002 included a commitment to "equality 
... 
across all aspects of 
working life". New Bank is managed by a board of four male executive directors, and 
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eight non-executive directors, one of whom is a woman who joined the board in 1999. 
In her response to the news of being short4isted for a 'Framework for Action' award 
by Opportunity Now the Assistant Director for Personnel and Training claimed that 
New Bank was "very close to achieving an even gender split in management roles and 
above". The actual split in 2002 was forty six per cent women to fifty four per cent men 
in management grades, but women still only comprise twenty seven per cent of the 
senior management grades. One of the manager interviewees also commented on the 
relatively high proportion of women in management compared with other companies 
in the sector, and suggested it may be due to the company's 'grow our own' policy. 
Outside of the call centres New Bank employs a number of specialist workers, such as 
underwriters, surveyors, valuers and credit scorers. The bank is the only large finance 
sector employer in the region, so is unable to recruit experienced specialists from the 
local labour market. Compared with offering salaries that would attract experienced 
staff away from the financial centres, their strategy of training inexperienced graduates 
and internal recruits in these specialisations is cost effective, because the lack of local 
demand keeps staff turnover in these areas very low. 
New Bank recognises; the finance sector trade union Unifi as the "representative and 
negotiating body on behalf of graded staff on matters relating to salaries, hours of 
work, holidays etc". Both the current and previous full time union officials contrasted 
the relationship between the company and the union with the confrontational 
approach of the clearing banks they had previously dealt with: 
Rob "I went from that culture of confrontational negotiations 
... 
to an organisation 
which was very keen to reach agreements with the trade union, not one that was 
antagonistic towards the trade union, one which on the whole encouraged good 
relations with the trade union". 
Gwyn "They quite openly will come to us and ask us for our ideas, our help and our 
input, sofor example if they're revising sickness absence policy they will prefer to start 
with us right at the outset, so that is very satisfying, so if its something that they want 
to drive then we get lots of input, [they are] more open to share problems than *** ever 
were" 
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Global 
Global is the UK general insurance division of a large multi-national corporation, 
selling motor, home and commercial insurance products throughout the UK. It was 
formed in 1998 following the merger of two large global insurance companies, which 
resulted in the parent company becoming one of the largest insurance and asset 
management companies in the world, with operations throughout Europe, North 
America and the Asia Pacific region. Following a further merger in 1999 Global had 
over seven thousand staff, reduced almost immediately to five thousand three hundred 
by the first in a series of redundancy exercises, and to four thousand eight hundred by 
2002 when tl-ds research was conducted. The cutbacks were partly in response to a ten 
per cent group wide cost cutting exercise, but also as a result of the poor performance 
of Global, represented by an overall decrease in both gross and net premium income in 
2001. Since the pay review was conducted Global has announced plans to outsource 
up to two hundred and thirty jobs to the parent company's operation in India. 
At the time of the pay review Global had five large offices, four call centres, six claim 
centres and a network of nineteen small branch offices. Although there are also large 
offices in the North West, approximately one third of all employees work in London 
and the South East. The town in which the head office is based had an unemployment 
rate of three point eight per cent in 2002, approximately fifty per cent higher than in the 
rest of the county and region. Together with the reductions in the overall workforce 
this may explain how the company manages to maintain its employment levels despite 
paying average salaries (E385pw) that are lower than those that apply to non manual 
workers throughout the county (E414pw) as well as the regional (; E459pw) and national 
(E464pw) averages (ONS 2002). 
The company has an equal opportunities policy that states that it covers: "sex, marital 
status, disability, age, religious or political beliefs, race, colour, nationality, ethnic or 
national origins or sexual orientation". It includes a comn-dtment to training, fair 
selection criteria for recruitment and promotion, and to seeking opportunities for 
flexible patterns of work for all staff. The twelve members of the board are all men, 
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although the employee relations manager informed me that immediately post merger 
there had been one female director. Women occupy thirty per cent of the lowest two 
management grades, and twenty per cent of the two senior management grades 
Global recognises two trade unions, AMICUS and Unifi, wl-dch have been working 
together in a partnership agreement with the company since 2000. As a result of the 
agreement recognition was extended to all sections of the company, and the unions are 
consulted at an early stage in the development of new policies. They were included 
in the management of a pilot equality and diversity project in the Northern region, but 
a subsequent independent evaluation concluded that both unions and management 
still had a "muddled approach to equality" and was able to find "no evidence of 
commitment from the whole organisation or [the unions] to the implementation of 
equality" (Cole 2002a: 82 
- 
84). 
Although they both have a national presence, I have included brief details of the local 
econon-des of the regions where most workers are employed, as this can influence the 
priority given to recruiting, training and retaining women in employment. Global and 
New Bank have many features in common. At the time of this research they employed 
a similar number of employees, most of who were based in economically depressed 
areas of the country. Both have a co-operative relationship with their trade unions, 
and profess a comn-dtTnent to equal opportunities. For adn-dttedly different reasons, 
each company places an exceptionally high emphasis on cost reduction, even for an 
industry in which a high cost-income ratio is recognised as a common problem 
(Peppard 2001). The source of the pressure on costs is one of the major differences 
between the two companies, in New Bank it is internal pressure to maintain or 
improve their position in the top ten of UK retail banks, and in Global the pressure 
comes from the parent company, to reverse poor company and group performance. 
Although neither of these companies could be described as typical of UK finance sector 
organisations, their size is sufficiently large to encompass the full range of retail 
banking or insurance activities, but small enough to be able to conduct a detailed 
analysis at all levels. 
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The eventual design was a comparative case study of these two finance sector 
organisations, incorporating: 
A detailed analysis of the pay and personnel data of each organisation to 
detern-tine the size and location of any pay differences related to gender, and to 
identify any obvious justification or cause for those differences, 
Focus groups with the leading union activists in each organisation, 
Sen-d-structured interviews with relevant trade union officials and managers. 
The purpose of the interviews and focus groups was to aid my interpretation of the 
data, so they were to be held after I had completed the audits, but before the results 
had been made available to management (any distribution of the data to the union 
representatives was to be made by management). 
Preparation 
During the months that I had been arranging access for my empirical research, I had 
been able to conduct some prelin-dnary focus groups and interviews with union 
activists and officials. This proved to be extremely useful, both by providing an insight 
into the existing knowledge in the union, and giving me the opportunity to practice 
these research methods. In addition to many general conversations, I interviewed five 
National Secretaries and conducted four focus groups. The overall intention was to 
determine the level of awareness of the gender pay gap among the most informed 
people involved in the union, and to discover their theories about the causes or the 
reactions of the uninformed on being advised of the full extent of the problem in the 
industry. 
As well as confirming my suspicion that the level of awareness was extremely low, 
especially among lay activists, these interviews served as a pilot for the qualitative 
element of my research programme. Initially I had thought that I would develop 
questions out of the responses received in this preparatory stage, but the rich data that 
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I obtained from a relatively unstructured approach convinced me that this was not 
necessary. I realised that my respondents had sufficient experience to be able to make 
reasoned and reasonable contributions even if they had not previously considered the 
problem of unequal pay. 
Sample selection and recruitment 
The 'selection' of New Bank and Global for the pay audits, with only nine thousand 
employees between them, gave me the opportunity to access data for every employee. 
This placed me in the privileged position of being able to compare the wages of women 
and men in much more narrowly defined occupations than has been the case for most 
equal pay researchers (Robinson 1998). Realisation of that fact added weight to my 
conviction that my analysis should include one hundred per cent of the employees in 
each organisation. Neither of the organisations objected to that suggestion, and they 
both supplied data for every employee on the payroll, including the directors and the 
newest recruits. My main concern with this level of recruitment was the ethical 
consideration of confidentiality. It would not have been possible to remove all 
identifying features from the data, as it was necessary to be able to check back to 
personnel files if data errors or discrepancies were encountered. That could be done 
perfectly well with just identification numbers, and all names were removed before the 
data was supplied to me. As an additional precaution, the spreadsheets were 
password protected and I was rigorous about closing down the computer whenever I 
was away from it. 
It was important to me that the interviewees and focus group participants should have 
an understanding of how the payment systems operate and some knowledge of the 
issues that concern members in their organisations. The risk of sample bias inherent in 
selecting from a limited source (Morgan 1997), was outweighed in my mind by the 
value of that experience, and the most obvious candidates were union activists, 
specifically the officials who dealt with the two companies, and the members of the 
union's National Company Committees. Even though my preparatory work had 
shown that the level of awareness was low even among the most active of lay officials, 
these participants were more likely to be aware of speculation about the causes of 
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unequal pay than would a more random sample of union members. The selection of 
National Company Committee members also meant that, with the co-operation of the 
full-time official, I could schedule the focus groups to coincide with conunittee 
meetings, and ensure a reasonable attendance. It had the additional advantage that, 
with the advice of the full time official, I was able to predict the group dynamics and, 
in particular, be ready for the likelihood of one member trying to dominate in one of 
the groups. I was aware of the risk that the principle of informed consent can be 
overlooked in this type of recruitment situation (Bloor et al. 2001). To ensure that no 
one felt they were coerced into attendance, I personally briefed them on the purpose of 
the interview and offered them the opportunity to decline participation. The other 
disadvantage identified by Bloor et al in using "formal pre-existing groups" (Bloor et al 
2001: 33) is that the researcher may lose control, particularly concerning the 
environment. As the meeting room requirements of a committee are not much 
different from those for a focus group, I decided that the advantages far outweighed 
this risk. 
The different levels of analysis I had been able to perform in the two host organisations 
determined the choice of interviewees on the management side. In New Bank I had 
been able to analyse the data at departmental level, could therefore identify two 
departments with significantly different results, and chose to interview an operational 
manager from each of those departments. Out of respect for the operational 
requirements of the business, I left the choice of interviewee to the personnel manager 
with whom I was liaising. This had the obvious risk of allowing the selection of a 
manager who would be biased in favour of the company. However, as I had already 
been given payroll data for every employee including the managing director, I was 
confident that there was unlikely to be any deliberate attempt to n-dslead. The lowest 
level of analysis in Global was London versus 'Regional' (everywhere other than 
London), so there was nothing valuable to gain from speaking to departmental 
representatives. Instead, I was more interested in the overall picture, and chose to 
interview the Employee Relations manager, accompanied by his assistant, as the two 
people most directly involved in the overall employment process. 
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Data Collection 
The pay audit 
In her work on mainstrearning equality in the European Union, Rees emphasises the 
importance of disaggregating statistics, "not simply by gender, but by gender cross- 
tabulated with other variables to reveal the structural disadvantages experienced by 
smaller units of analysis" (Rees 1998: 193). In order to perform as comprehensive a pay 
audit as possible, including ethnicity, age and educational qualifications, I requested an 
of the data listed in Appendix Two from both organisations. The fact that not all of it 
could be supplied highlighted an important caveat to the value of pay audits for 
establishing the locus of unequal pay, being their dependence on the nature and 
quality of record-keeping. In common with other researchers, I have had to accept that 
some data is simply not available (Anderson et al 2001), or would take too long to 
obtain. The data that was available, and provided to me in Excel spreadsheet format, 
was as indicated below. 
Demographics 
Although gender would appear to be an obvious necessity for an equal pay audit, it 
was initially on-dtted from one set of data. The omission was a genuine oversight, but 
resulted in a further delay to my work. Both organisations provided the actual hours 
worked, so that I was able to distinguish between full and part time workers, and also 
calculate full time equivalent salaries. Although less important as demographic 
information for this particular project (but see below regarding age), age, disability and 
ethnic origin would have enabled a much richer analysis had they been available. 
However, both organisations were unable to provide any information on ethnic origin, 
and only one was able to supply the date of birth of employees. New Bank had the 
information, but not in a format that could sufficiently easily be supplied to me for the 
analysis. 
Measures of experience 
According to Mumford and Sn-dth "Measures of experience are 
... 
usually assumed to 
be positively related to wages via the ability to acquire skills over the time period the 
employee has spent working" (2001: 14). As data on actual experience is not usually 
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available for large studies, some, such as WERS, calculate potential experience by using 
the equation age 
- 
[infant years + years spent in full-time education] (Mumford & 
Sn-dth 2001). Where the actual length of work experience is available, such as in the 
BHPS, it is possible for calculations of the gender pay gap to reflect the impact of 
periods of labour market inactivity, and this can reduce the unexplained element of the 
pay gap by as much as twenty five per cent (Swaffield 2000). Even this measure cannot 
accurately indicate experience in the current job, especially for those women who take 
long periods away from the labour market to care for children, and may return to a 
very different occupation. 
In order to optimise the measurement of experience, I requested three data elements: 
age, date started in current role and date started employment with the organisation. 
Both organisations provided data which suggested that no-one had been in the current 
role for more than two years, not, as I had presumed, because of a recent re- 
organisation in which all job titles were changed, but because of a failing of the payroll 
software, which I subsequently found to be a common problem for employers in the 
finance industry. In the event, I decided that I would be content to use the date started 
employment with the company as proxy for experience, rather than a formula 
incorporating age and length of service, so that I would be producing comparable data 
for both organisations. 
Measures of job Value 
The legal requirement for equal pay relates to jobs of equivalent value. Whilst there is 
doubt in some quarters about the equity of employers' evaluation processes, (Heneman 
2003), 1 did not feel that I had either the time or the expertise to verify those used by 
the host organisations. Instead, I satisfied myself with asking for grade and job 
description, which I felt should indicate the relative values of the jobs according to 
whatever processes are in use. 
Global has a comprehensive job evaluation system in place, whereby all jobs fit into 
one of nine grades according to their score, each grade having a range of salaries 
attached to it. In order to cater for variations in the market rate there are two further 
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sub-divisions, one relating to the geographical location of the job 
- 
employees based in 
London are on a higher pay scale than are those in the rest of the country 
- 
and the 
other allocating separate pay scales for general staff, underwriters, secretaries and U 
staff. Only sales staff were outside these scales, in a grade with no published rates of 
pay. Global supplied the grade, location and job type for every member of staff. 
At the time of the audit, New Bank did not have an analytical job evaluation scheme 
for the majority of its staff. Instead, it had three broad grades covering clerical 
workers, junior managers and managers, a similar structure for 17F staff and it was only 
the manager grades in the branch network which had a clearly defined hierarchical 
scale, incorporating five grades. In addition to the grade, New Bank supplied me with 
the job description of every member of staff. 
Measures of earnings 
I requested details of basic pay, allowances, overtime and bonus payments for a recent 
twelve-month period, but only received basic pay, allowances and comn-tission. New 
Bank provided one month's data on overtime, which had only limited value because of 
the tendency for overtime to fluctuate both seasonally and by department. These 
on-tissions were unfortunate, as they are elements of pay that are considered more 
likely to be earned by men than women (Kodz et al 1998). 1 considered the credibility 
of continuing with the research in the absence of this data, and concluded that as no 
previous study of basic pay had included all employees in an organisation, it would 
still be a valuable contribution to the identification of the causes of unequal pay. 
Both organisations supplied their salary scales; for Global this was a series of ranges 
with a minimum, target and maximum figure. The New Bank clerical grade scale had 
ten scale points, which were effectively spot rates, and the other grades had a 
minimum and maximum salary. 
Measures of Performance 
Both organisations operate a form of pay for performance for at least some of their 
employees, but only Global Insurance was able to provide the last performance rating. 
Neither was able to identify the amount of the last pay increment so I could not 
94 
Methodology 
establish a direct, quantifiable link between performance and pay. Global also 
operated a competency-based system for some staff, and provided the skill level as 
well as the perfon-nance rating where appropriate 
Other data 
Only New Bank supplied details of the departments in which each employee worked, 
which was useful for distinguishing areas in the company for more detailed research, 
particularly into occupational segregation. Global has undergone a series of mergers in 
recent years, so there was a distinct possibility of historical explanations for pay 
differentials, and they were able to provide me with the original employer of each 
employee. 
In addition to those already mentioned, there were two significant on-tissions from the 
data. Qualifications, or at least highest qualification, would have been particularly 
useful for comparing starting salaries as well as providing an additional demographic 
control. Historical data on maternity leave and/or pay would have allowed me to 
distinguish between the amount of any gap directly attributable to 'the mother-gap' 
and any other reasons for pay differences between women and men (Joshi et al 1999; 
Davies et al. 2001). 
Focus groups and interviews 
The purpose of the focus groups and interviews was to collect qualitative data from 
people in a position to be aware of the way in which their organizations implement 
their pay systems. They were only very loosely structured, in that I started each 
interview with the question "Do you think there is likely to be a pay gap in your 
organization/department", before telling them the overall figure and asking them to 
speculate on the causes. I had an aide-memoire, so that additional questions could be 
introduced, relating to the appraisal system, promotion process, training and Work 
Life Balance, if not covered in the discussion. The format was similar for the 
management representatives, although I also asked about recruitment practice and 
staff turnover. 
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I decided to use a tape recorder to record all of the interviews, because my preparatory 
work convinced me that union officials and lay activists tend to be self-confident 
respondents, who tend to forget about the presence of the recorder after the first few 
seconds. In fact, I found that conversation flowed much more freely than when taking 
verbatim notes, because the act of note-taking is visible and can easily detract from the 
interaction between interviewer and respondent(s). Pem-dssion to tape the 
proceedings was obtained from all respondents, and they were given the opportunity 
to check my transcription, although none took it up. In addition to the recordings, I 
made brief notes summarising my impression of the main themes as I was travelling 
home from the focus groups. 
I conducted the focus groups during a recess from the comn-dttees' regular meetings, in 
order to optimise attendance and reduce the costs. I was able to use the same meeting 
room that the committees were using for their regular business, and in both cases these 
were private and quiet rooms, in which the participants were seated around a central 
table, ideally suited to the conduct of tape-recorded focus groups (Morgan 1997). 
I transcribed the tapes myself, partly from cost considerations, but also because 
listening to the discussion again soon after the event helps to focus on exactly what 
was said and start to identify themes, an ideal preparation for analysis (Bloor et al 
2001). 1 recorded all of the audible contributions, including laughter, 'ums, and ers', 
and overlapping speech, but as my analysis was to be substantive, my transcription 
did not need to be as rigorous as that demanded for conversation or discourse analysis 
(Bloor et al 2001)); 1 did not record the timing of pauses. 
Data Analysis 
The Pay audits 
Although the data was supplied in Microsoft Excel, I converted it to SPSS for analysis. 
This involved considerable initial preparation, but it produced a data set that was 
much easier to manipulate than it would have been in Excel. As my objective was to 
identify pay gaps as low as the individual level, I chose the mean as my preferred 
summary statistic, rather than the median, which would have failed to reflect the 
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extreme ends of the distribution (Anderson et al. 2001) Additionally I chose also to use 
the range, as even the mean can overlook extreme values if they are balanced at 
oPposite ends of the scale. 
I decided to compare mean annual basic pay rather than hourly or weekly wages, for 
no scientific reason other than it is the format with which I am most comfortable. The 
impact of part time workers was elin-tinated by using the formula '[salary/hours 
worked]*35' to calculate a notional salary for the equivalent of a thirty five hour week. 
In addition, I compared the mean notional salaries of part-time workers with those of 
full time women and full time men. To calculate the pay gap I expressed the mean 
women! s notional salary as a percentage of the mean men's notional salary, subtracted 
from one hundred. To indicate that women earned less than men, I prefixed the result 
with a minus sign and in those cases where women actually earned more than men this 
was indicated by the use of a plus sign. 
I also used the notional salary and salary scales to calculate the following variables, 
reflecting position in the salary scale: 
Notional salary as percentage of starting salary 
Notional salary as percentage of target salary 
Notional salary as percentage of maximum salary 
I made the comparisons at company, grade, department and job type levels, in order to 
distinguish the gaps resulting from both horizontal and vertical occupational 
segregation. Mindful of the wide-ranging levels of experience of the people who 
would be working with the report, I chose to use graphic means to look for a 
correlation between any remaining pay gap and the possible justifications, rather than 
present tables of regression results. The potential justifications that I looked for 
included performance, experience and historical reasons, and from the scatter charts 
produced, I was able to identify groups or individuals whose pay appeared to be 
unjustifiably out of line with their colleagues. 
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Having produced these basic reports for the two organisations, I then manipulated the 
data further in order to group clerical staff, junior managers, managers and senior 
managers in each company. The primary purpose of this part of the exercise was to 
compare the results of the two companies, to determine whether there was any 
evidence to suggest that any remaining pay gap could be attributed to the different 
payment systems. I realised that the decision making process was arbitrary, and 
another analyst may well not have produced the same results. If the purpose of this 
research had simply been to identify and explain unequal pay, this would have been 
problematic; however I was also evaluating pay audits, and this allowed me to test the 
value of audits in companies where there is no clearly defined process for valuing jobs. 
The interviews and focus groups 
The interview data was a qualitative addition to the essentially quantitative pay audit, 
so I could have chosen to forego any formal analysis, and simply pick out relevant 
passages to illustrate points made by the pay analysis. However, I was concerned that 
I might miss spotting a potentially important theme, so I chose to code the data. I 
collated the results of that coding using a process I developed myself in Microsoft 
Excel. 
Reflections 
The research design that eventually emerged from my reflections and re-evaluations 
was very different from that which I first envisaged. It developed from an idealised 
method of inquiring into the processes of an abstract organisation, to a practical 
solution for a real situation. By adapting my plans to deal with changing 
circumstances I created a situation in which I had access to more detailed data than I 
could have hoped for from my original target organisations. The smaller size of the 
two companies meant that I was able to compare a range of different finance sector 
functions, rather than just the one or two that I would have been limited to in a larger 
organisation. In addition to optimising the extent to which I have been able to explore 
the impact of new payment systems, I have been able to use the process to evaluate the 
potential for Equal Pay Audits to contribute to closing the pay gap. 
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I have created a research design that will achieve my immediate objectives as well as 
prepare the ground for my longer-term ambitions. There are some things that I would 
do differently if I were starting again, in particular I would start negotiations for access 
much earlier, with more organisations, and I would be less dependent on my trade 
union contacts. Preparation for this study has shown me that it was even more 
complex than I had envisaged, and the greatest difficulty has been learning to say no to 
myself. I resisted the temptation to indulge in a detailed analysis of the culture of the 
two organisations, or to evaluate the various payment systems. Instead, my design has 
allowed the identification of the most likely of the many contributors to the 
continuation of the pay gap. Further research will take place, as one of the 
organisations has already sought my help in conducting further pay audits. Whether 
the results will be in the public arena is still to be seen, but at least one group of women 
will benefit from this approach. 
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Chapter 6. The Horizontal Gap 
Any gender pay gap in an organization is likely to be comprised of a combination of 
vertical and horizontal pay differentials. In other words, there are two groups of 
reasons for pay differences; firstly women are paid less than men for the same 
(horizontal) levels of jobs and secondly, they are less likely than men to climb the 
(vertical) ladder to the higher paid jobs. It is only the first that is covered by Equal Pay 
legislation, and which the EOC Equal Pay Review Model is designed to reveal. 
However, the official published statistics, of an eighteen per cent overall gap and forty 
three per cent in the financial services sector, reflects the sum of all influences on pay 
(Bulman 2003), and I therefore detern-dned to include both in my review of salaries in 
Global and New Bank. 
It is the horizontal pay gap that would be identified by an Equal Pay audit that follows 
the guidelines produced by the EOC. Although the scope of my pay audit process was 
detern-tined before the publication of the EOC model, I found that my model 
incorporated most of the same factors. In this chapter, I will show the extent to which 
the implementation of personnel policies and practices is a causal factor in the 
horizontal gender pay gap in the two case study organisations. In the course of doing 
so I will show how the pay review model guidelines would have succeeded in 
describing the location, extent and causes of the horizontal pay gaps, and also 
demonstrate how different results may be obtained from different approaches. 
Determining the scope of the review 
The first step of the EOC pay review process is to determine the scope of the review. 
This is a three-part process including the aspects of equality to be reviewed, the 
personnel to be included, and data to be collected. Whilst explaining that the Equal 
Pay Tool Kit was developed to deal with the gap between the pay of women and men, 
it suggests that employers n-dght also want to look at ethnicity, disability and age. This 
would have been my preference, not only because there are concerns regarding pay 
parity in each of these categories, but also because of the likelihood that interaction 
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between them could result in different gender pay gaps. Although I asked for that 
data, neither of the organisations was able to provide any information on either 
disability or ethnicity, and only one had age in a format that could conveniently be 
supplied electronically. The EOC include a caveat that it "can be helpful to consider 
the quality of the information available about the ethnicity, disability status and age of 
the workforce and whether this is adequate for the purposes of carrying out a wider 
review". 
The most obvious deficiency is this complete absence of information, but during my 
preparation of the data I also discovered several examples of inaccuracies. In 
particular, there were employees whose hours or grade had not been adjusted on the 
personnel file following a change, and there were allowances that were pro-rated for 
some part time staff but not others. At the time all such amendments were the 
responsibility of either line managers or the human resources/personnel department. 
Shortly after I completed the audit, Global implemented a new system whereby 
employees became responsible for updating their own personal details on the 
computer, including disability status, ethnic origin, marital status and name. One year 
after the system had been implemented no more than fifty per cent of employees had 
entered their ethnic origin on the system, and a personal acquaintance informed me 
that, several months after her marriage, she had not 'got around to' changing either her 
marital status or her name. Whilst preparation of the data for the review resulted in 
many errors being discovered and corrected, there is no guarantee that less obvious 
errors had been found. 
The decision about which employees to include was not mine to make, however my 
recommendation that the audit should encompass all employees, including the 
directors, was accepted by both companies. Neither was I in a position to dictate who 
would be involved in the review exercise. The EOC suggests that it may be 
appropriate to set up a project team and to involve employee representatives in the 
process. Neither Global nor New Bank put a project team in place to deal with the 
results however Global did share and discuss the results with the trade union. 
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The EOC suggests that the information to be collected for analysis falls into two 
categories 
- 
all the elements of pay, and the personal characteristics of each employee, 
and that difficulty in obtaining all of this information "'may be an indication that pay 
systems do not meet the requirement for transparency". In both Global and New Bank 
there was information that I requested but could not be supplied, including annual 
figures for overtime, the amount of the previous year's increment, educational 
qualifications and the length of time employees have been in their current grade. 
Although the initial failure of New Bank to indicate whether employees were male or 
female was remedied, the oversight was indicative that the disaggregation of 
management information by gender is exceptional rather than automatic. The same 
message came from Global when I asked the Industrial Relations manager about staff 
turnover, and he was surprised to find that the detailed report supplied by his own 
statisticians made no reference at any point to gender. 
Determining where men and women do equal work 
The second step in the pay review model is to detern-dne the basis on which pay is to 
be compared. The Equal Pay Act (as amended) provides three different bases: 'like 
work' relates to work that is the same or broadly similar, and 'work rated as 
equivalent' is work that has been given a similar score in an analytical job evaluation 
scheme. 'Work of equal value' is also likely to have been determined by job evaluation, 
being work that makes similar demands, in the form of skills, knowledge, mental and 
physical effort and responsibilities. 
All of the jobs in Global had been assigned points in an analytical job evaluation 
scheme that had been agreed with the union, and the range of scores was divided into 
nine grades. With the exception of the two highest grades (directors), the number of 
points encompassed by each grade increased at each step, so for example jobs in Grade 
B have between one hundred and twenty one and one hundred and fifty seven points, 
while those in Grade F have between three hundred and fifty five and four hundred 
and sixty four points. The job evaluation scores reflect the demands of the job, but in 
order to also reflect the vagaries of the labour market, Global has four different sets of 
pay scales, three of which (General, IT and Underwriting) encompass all eight grades, 
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whilst the secretarial salary range only included Grades A to C. A further sub division, 
between National and London, allowed the insurance company to address the higher 
cost of working in London. At each point in these scales there was an entry-level, a 
target and a maximum salary. Although the job evaluation scheme had been agreed 
with the unions, concern was expressed to me by one of the union officials that the 
process of slotting people into a relevant point in the scale had been at best haphazard 
following each of the recent company mergers. 
Dave: "Every time there's been a merger, although they've done new job evaluation 
schemes and got it felt fair, that way round, what we've done is we've always 
transposed where people were on their existing salary grades into quite a broad band 
salary structure" 
In other words, people have been slotted in to the scales in accordance with their 
salaries, rather than their job content. Sometimes called red-circling, this problem of 
how to integrate widely differing salary scales is not uncommon in an industry where 
mergers and acquisitions are commonplace, however it should not detract from the fact 
that, in Global, there was a clearly defined structure that I believed would be 
sufficiently transparent for any such anomalies to be identified. I was therefore 
satisfied that I could use the structure as an indication of where women and men were 
doing equal work. 
The situation in New Bank was less straightforward. A new payment system had 
recently been implemented for clerical staff, using a single, broad-banded salary scale 
with ten scale points. The entry point varied according to which of five occupational 
groups (Customer Service/Adn-dn, Direct Sales, Retail (Branch) Sales, General and IT) 
individuals worked in and whether they were classed as trainees, operatives or team 
leaders. There was no point system to determine the appropriate point in the scale for 
each job, but from whichever point an individual started, they could expect to progress 
to the top of the scale by one point each year, so long as they achieved satisfactory 
performance. Two of the occupational groups, IT and Branch Sales, had scales which 
continued for supervisory and manager grades. Grades S6 to S10 covered all of the 
supervisory and management employees in the branches; Grades T2 and T3 were for 
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junior managers and managers in 1717. For the majority, however, beyond the clerical 
grades employees were simply classified as junior managers, managers or senior 
managers. For the first two of these there was a n-dnimum and maximum salary, and 
senior managers were on personal salaries. In none of these groups was there any 
process for determining where within that range any particular job should fit, with 
managers having discretion to determine the appropriate salary for their appointees. 
Nevertheless there was also an absence of any incremental stages, so that the 
appointment salary remained the rate for the job until the employee moved on to 
another post. According to the union official and the lay chair of the union committee, 
the result was a promotions process that was open to abuse: 
Gwyn "... senior managers have been promoting people just on the basis of their own 
personal opinions and recommendation". 
Dora "there has been, we know, money spent on people being promoted or whatever 
else, but not against any set c7iteria, its really been a case of well so and so's really done 
well, so I've given them a bit more responsibility this year, and any manager could go 
and make a casefor anybody to get a bit of money out of the promotions pot" 
In the absence of an analytical job evaluation scheme, I was obliged to find an 
alternative basis for comparing jobs in New Bank. Unlike Global, the bank had given 
me the job title and department of every individual in the bank, so I decided to make 
my comparisons at departmental level. As there were two hundred and fifty three 
different job titles throughout the company, I made the initial comparisons according 
to the grades of the employees in each department, reserving job titles to help explain 
anomalies at the fourth step of the Equal Pay Tool Kit. I was satisfied that this was the 
most appropriate way to make my comparisons in New Bank, however it was not as 
satisfactory as the comparisons in Global for two reasons. on a practical level I would 
potentially be making two hundred and twenty comparisons in New Bank instead of 
the maximum fifty seven in Global, and from the point of view of the analysis, I had no 
reliable basis for comparing jobs in different departments. In an attempt to 
compensate for the second deficiency in the process, and to detern-tine where jobs from 
different departments were of a similar value, I decided to group the job titles together. 
Using an arbitrary process based purely on the semantics of the job title, I produced 
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eleven sets of jobs, including a 'general' classification that covered everything that did 
not fit comfortably in any other category, and excluding directors and senior managers 
who were on personal grades. Spread over three grades, this gave me eight clerical 
'jobs', seven for junior managers and three for managers. Although the value of this 
analysis for employees of New Bank was limited to identifying potential problem areas 
requiring further investigation, it had a significant value to me. The difficulties that I 
encountered in determining where men and women were performing similar jobs 
demonstrated the importance of having a transparent pay system in order to be able to 
place much confidence in the results of a pay audit. 
The Equal Pay Tool Kit is designed to compare pay within single organisations, but I 
also needed to make some comparisons between my two case study organisations. 
Although the pay and grading systems were very different, it was possible to 
distinguish the same four classifications in Global that featured in the New Bank 
system, and I grouped Global's Grades A and B as clerical staff, C and D as 
supervisory/junior management, E and F as managers and G, H and I as senior 
managers. Although the terminology may not necessarily reflect Global employees' 
conception of the jobs done by people in those grades, this provided the closest match 
to New Bank in terms of both relative pay and the numbers of employees in each 
classification. 
Collecting and comparing pay data to identify equal pay gaps 
The next step was to compare average basic pay and total earnings in each of the main 
groupings of staff that I had identified as doing equal work. After discounting those 
groupings where all the employees were of the same sex, I was left with thirty one 
groups in Global and one hundred and fourteen in New Bank. I made the comparison 
by calculating a 'full time equivalent' salary for every employee in order to ensure that 
both part-time workers and those who worked more than the standard thirty five hour 
week were compared on the same basis. Within each group of employees I then 
calculated the difference between the average men's salary and the average women's 
salary as a percentage of the average men's salary. 
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Even though it acknowledges that "averages can conceal important differences 
between individuals", the Equal Pay Tool Kit suggests that differences of five per cent 
or more are sufficiently significant to warrant further investigation, or three per cent if 
that level of difference is consistent across the whole organisation. There was no 
consistency in the results in either New Bank or Global, so if I were following the EOC 
model I would only have investigated differences of five per cent or more; which 
occurred in eighteen of the Global and fifty six of the New Bank groups. However I 
was not satisfied that the smaller differences were necessarily insignificant, as 
calculations using averages can disguise wide variations in scale. The guidelines to the 
Tool Kit suggest a number of statistical methods that can be used for further 
investigation where significant gaps have been found, such as the range and scatter 
plots charting salaries against length of service. By including the range in my initial 
analyses, I found that even though there were forty groups of staff in New Bank with 
gaps below five per cent, and twelve in Global, there were only eight and one groups 
respectively where I was satisfied that no further investigation was necessary. 
All of the gaps in Global were under eleven per cent, as were three quarters of those in 
New Bank. Although there was a difference in the average pay of women and men in 
most groups, it was not necessarily always men who were paid the most. In Global 
there were four groups where it was the women who were the highest paid, and in 
New Bank there were forty four. The range of gaps in New Bank was from eighteen 
per cent favouring women to fifty eight per cent favouring men, however the majority 
of the most extreme gaps were in areas where just one or two people of the 'highest 
paid' sex were employed on salaries that were above the median but below the 
maximum. If I had made the comparisons simply by grade across the whole of each 
company the range in New Bank would have been from four point six per cent 
favouring women to thirty four per cent favouring men; excluding directors the largest 
gap would have been ten point five per cent, and only four out of eleven grades would 
have had a gap exceeding five per cent. In Global, the result of the analysis would 
have been only one grade out of eight with a gap large enough to warrant further 
investigation according to EOC guidelines. 
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My initial analyses, the equivalent of that recommended by the EOC, only compared 
employees covered by the same pay scale (Global) or working in the same department 
(New Bank). I had not included Global employees who were doing jobs with the same 
job evaluation score but in different pay scales (i. e. Grade BU staff with Grade B 
underwriters). I was particularly concerned that this approach meant that the 
secretaries, who were all women, were on-dtted from the analysis. A calculation of the 
pay gap for each grade produced pay gaps very similar in range to those produced by 
the main analysis, however the relatively small numbers of employees in the specialist 
grades meant that their impact on the total salaries in each grade was minimal. My 
solution was to compare the rate at which men and women progressed through the 
grades. This was done by calculating full time equivalent salaries as a percentage of 
the target salary, and then comparing the results for individuals with the same length 
of service and of a similar age. For example, a Grade B secretary with one year's 
service and earning E14,658 was being paid ninety four per cent of her target salary of 
07,425, while a similarly 'experienced' Grade B underwriter on E15,517 was earning 
one hundred and seven per cent of his target salary of 03,905. Even though the 
secretarial scale looks better than the underwriters scale, the male underwriter was 
better off both financially and relatively. I identified sixty six examples where the 
difference was greater than ten percentage points, and in fifty nine of those it was the 
woman who had the lowest relative salary. 
This level of analysis was only possible because the job evaluation and clear pay scales 
in Global gave me reliable data to work with. In New Bank I only had job descriptions, 
which I had narrowed down from two hundred and fifty three categories to eleven, 
and beyond the clerical grades just a minimum salary for each grade. Within each 
grade I compared the length of service of women and men in the same category and 
with similar salaries, and this process also facilitated comparing the length of service of 
sin-dlarly paid employees in different categories. So, for example, I could see that 
female specialists on clerical Scale Point 7 had an average of nine point seven years 
service, men with similar job titles and the same pay, had only two years service, and 
in the 'assistant' category women on clerical Scale Point 7 had six years service, 
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compared with two point nine for men. As in Global, there were examples where 
women seemed to be progressing faster, but in most cases it was men who had the 
shortest service. Although this process did not identify individuals with different 
salaries, it did indicate which jobs needed to be looked at more closely. The greatest 
value of an analysis along these lines must be in organisations where the absence of a 
job evaluation scheme makes the evidence from the straightforward comparison of 
means at best unreliable. From my point of view, in relation to these particular case 
studies, it provided me with an early indication that women were paid less than men 
relative to their level of experience, a theme that will be explored more fully in the next 
section. 
When I reduced the categories for analysis to the equivalent of the four 'general' grades 
across all employees in both organisations, some of the most extreme differentials from 
the initial analysis disappeared. In both cases the clerical graded women earned 
slightly more than men (shown in pink and with a plus sign in Table 6-1), but only by 
one per cent in New Bank and two per cent in Global. The gap for managers was also 
similar, at six per cent and five per cent respectively, but the aggregation of the two 
junior manger and three senior manager grades makes Global appear to have much 
larger gaps (fifteen per cent and fourteen per cent respectively) at these levels than is 
the case in the individual grades or in one of the equivalent grades in New Bank (see 
Table 6-1). New Bank still had the largest grade level pay gap, but the difference was 
less than half the size of the difference in the more detailed analysis. 
As nearly as possible I made the same levels of comparison in both New Bank and 
Global. In both companies the results from the different approaches varied from one 
another, but the variance was much greater in New Bank than in Global. The relative 
consistency of the results in Global demonstrates the value of having a reliable and 
transparent basis for making comparisons; however the variations show that it is also 
important not to rely on a single basis for comparison, but to interrogate the data in as 
many ways as possible. 
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Table 6-1 
- 
staffing complement and horizontal pay gaps in New Bank and Global 
Gr d New Bank a e Women Men Pay gap 
N % N % 
Total 
% 
Clerical 1883 72 718 28 2601 +1 
Junior managers 482 62 302 38 784 
-5 
Managers 190 46 219 54 409 
-6 
Senior managers 50 27 137 73 187 
-27 
Total 2605 67 1376 33 3981 
-32 
Globa l Insurance (Actual Grades, all job ypes) 
Women Men Pay gap 
N % NI - % 
Total % 
A 330 75 108 25 438 
-3 
B 1478 73 555 27 2033 +4 
C 569 55 466 45 1035 
-5 
D 280 32 583 68 863 
-9 
E 93 38 149 62 242 
-2 
F 37 91 130 78 167 +1 
G 13 17 65 83 78 
-5 
H 4 17 20 83 24 
-4 
1 0 0 8 1 8 0 
2804 57 2084 43 4888 
-32 
Global Insurance (New Bank Equivalent Grades) 
Women Men Pay gap 
N % N % 
Total % 
Clerical 1808 73 663 27 2471 +2 
Junior managers 848 45 1049 55 1898 
-15 
anagers 130 32 279 68 409 
-5 
Senior mana ers 17 15 93 85 110 
-14 
Total 2804 57 2084 43 4888 
-32 
Establishing the causes and justification for any pay gaps 
The Equal Pay Act recognises that some circumstances can amount to justification for 
differences between women and men's pay. Such circumstances include different 
levels of experience and/or performance, the vagaries of the labour market and 
historical reasons such as the integration of two or more pay scales following a merger 
or takeover. Such reasons will not amount to justification if, for example, experience 
and/or performance were valued using gendered criteria, the labour market can be 
shown to reflect embedded gender bias, or if the 'pay protection' processes used to 
'phase in' integrated payment structures do not have a clearly defined and/or 
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reasonable time scale. The fourth step of the Equal Pay Tool Kit is concerned with 
determining the extent to wl-dch considerations of this nature influence the size of any 
significant pay gaps in the company, as well as the extent to which pay structures 
contribute to the gaps. My own investigations followed a similar pattern to the EOC 
recommendations, except that I examined pay gaps far smaller than those covered by 
the EOC definition of significance. By plotting salaries against data such as length of 
service, age, performance rating and the original company (of Global employees) I 
identified those apparently unjustifiably high or low salaries that needed further 
investigation by the companies. The majority of the gaps were proportionate to length 
of service, but I also found evidence of inconsistency in the starting salaries of new 
recruits and promotees, even in those cases where pay scales provided clear guidance 
on the correct rate. In the remainder of this chapter I explore in greater detail the 
explanations for horizontal pay gaps in the case study organisations. 
Experience 
In almost every case where I identified a pay gap, I found that most salaries were 
proportionate to the length of service of the employees. This was most pronounced in 
the clerical grades of both companies, where it was also most likely that women would 
be the highest paid. In the clerical grades of New Bank women earned two per cent 
more than men; their average length of service was four point three years, but for men 
it was only one point seven years. At departmental levels as well, comparisons of 
average salaries and length of service show that women's longer service satisfactorily 
accounts for a significant proportion of their higher pay in the clerical grades in New 
Bar& 
The structure of the New Bank clerical grade pay scale allows for this analysis to be 
conducted in detail. Progress through the grade was by way of ten pre-defined steps, 
and each point in the scale was associated with a specific level of experience for the 
particular job. Seventy two per cent of women in New Bank worked in the clerical 
grades, and twenty one per cent had worked their way through to team leader, on 
Scale Point 7 to Scale Point 10. Half of all men in the bank were also in the lowest 
grade, but only nine per cent were earning salaries in the higher scale points. As can 
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be seen from figure 6-1, those men who did progress to the top of the clerical grade did 
so in a much shorter time than most of the women, the average length of service of 
men on Scale Point 10 being less than that of women on Scale Point 5. Although 
clerical graded women have longer service and were paid more than men, in fact their 
salaries relative to experience were actually lower. 
Figure 6-1 
- 
average length of service of New Bank clerical staff 
The ratio of experience: salary in New Bank clerical grade suggests that there could be 
different recruitment practices for women and men, and this was confirmed by the 
analysis of length of service by job category. Out of forty six comparisons, there were 
only five where men had longer average service than women, and in three of those the 
difference was less than one year. Most women started at the lowest scale point and 
progressed through the grade at a rate of approximately one scale point per year, with 
just a few recruited straight into the more highly valued jobs on salaries in the middle 
of the scale. Few men recruited on the lowest scale point remain in the clerical grade 
for more than two years before they move to either another grade or another company, 
and they were more likely than women to be recruited straight into the more highly 
valued jobs. 
In Global there were four groups of staff where women were paid more than men, but 
in three of these it was because there was only one woman, whose salary was above 
the median but well within the scale. The remaining positive gap was in the most 
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heavily populated of the clerical groups, Grade B General staff on the National scale. 
just as in New Bank, women spent longer than men in the clerical grades, with some 
examples in both Grades A and B of continuous service exceeding thirty years. The 
difference in the average length of service for women was not so great as in the New 
Bank clerical grade, but neither was the pay gap. Men's average length of service was 
approximately two thirds that of women and across the whole of grade B women 
earned on average one per cent more than men. As in New Bank, women's higher 
pay may have been accounted for by their greater experience, but the size of the 
reward was not proportionate to the experience. 
Pay on Entry 
The scatter charts that showed me that much of the horizontal pay gap could be 
accounted for by the longer service of the higher paid sex also revealed a significant 
number of cases where new recruits were being paid well above the starting salary for 
the grade. Fluctuations in starting salaries had been predicted in the following 
exchange during the Global Insurance focus group: 
Frank. "I think one of the things there is that we're only recruiting peoplefirom other 
companies, where they're doing the same as us, where they're paying the men more. If 
you want to recruit somebody, if somebody comes in for an interview on fifteen 
thousand you know you're going to have to offer him more money to come, it's the 
same, its just a knock on effect on all the companies that are offering more money, and it 
goes back to the thing that you knowfor a man it's a career, butfor a woman it's a job, 
and it's thefamily cycle again that the woman's sometimes got one eye on thefamily, 
whereas the man's going to be the money earner. He's got to further his career, get 
more money in to thefamily, whereas he's going to be at home, looked oil as to bring up 
thefamily". 
Gladys: "But if you take that, you're a manager say, and you've got three people 
comingfor a job, and you need those three people, and you've got vacanciesfor all three. 
Two of them's female, one of them's male; given the manager knows the market rate, 
right, the market rate in Manchester's a spot rate, he knows that he's going to have to 
pay let's say sixteen grand to get an underwriter in at that level I know I'm going to 
have to recruit at round about the sixteen grand mark. So he interviews, and the three 
comes up to standard, he knows he's going to offer the three jobs to two females and a 
male, do you think that male's going to get more money than the two females? " 
Fiona: "If he stands there and says I need eighteen grand, or I'm not coming". 
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Gladys: "But not automatically, they're not automatically going to give him more 
money, if he negotiates it then maybe yeah, cause you need the staff, but same if the 
woman negotiated. But if the manager's got one eye on his budget, he's going to offer 
each individual as little as possible, he could end up with three people on the same job at 
three different prices". 
Barry: "Which is what I'm saying, under the current system he can actually offer the 
three people the exact same job at entirely different starting salaries". 
Individualised pay was a feature of the pay structure of junior managers and managers 
in New Bank, but the evidence from the pay audit was that it was also occurring by 
default in Global, despite the existence of a clearly defined and potentially transparent 
payment structure. There may, of course be valid reasons for giving managers 
discretion in setting starting salaries, as suggested by one of the New Bank union 
activists: 
Clare. "Depends what skills you've got, if you've got IT skills, or other skills that 
there's a shortage of at the time". 
Both the New Bank Call Centre manager and the Global Insurance Industrial Relations 
manager agreed that it could be necessary to pay above the n-dnimum. in order to get 
experienced staff: 
Nigel: "I think often the real driver at that level is if we're trying to recruit people 
from outside, what are they being paid at that minute, and what is it we'd have to pay 
them to get them to make that move, because most people will not move unless there's 
an increase there". 
Sherina: "Which might account for some of the inconsistencies here, because someone 
isn't going to move if they're going to pay them less than the company where they 
already are". 
Nigel: "Yes, yes, yes that's right and I think it is true that if you have a person that's 
been workingfor you for six months and the market's moved on a bit, you go out it? the 
market and you try and recruit someone in that same job you might be prepared to pay 
them more than the person you've got already because assuming that person you've got 
already is reasonably happy doing what they're doing, you'd think that's not such a big 
risk, whereas you have to pay some kind of premium to actually get the person to leave 
their existing employer and come and work with us". 
The New Bank Call Centre manager also acknowledged that this might happen, 
although his response was more cautious: 
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Paul: "I suppose hypothetically yes, but we are very cost conscious, we'd have to have 
a very good reason to employ somebody at a higher salary 
... 
I think if they have an 
extremely strong, relevant experiencefor the job you're looking at. Iffor instance you 
had a situation where in the call centre where last year we were bringing in a sort of 
sales culture, say you had a section manager vacancy and we wanted to bring in 
somebody who had a particular sales experience, for instance and they came from a 
background where they'd done a lot of sales, then I could see us breaking the rules for 
that, its probably what you'd do if you want to bring in somebody who's new to the area 
where we think we haven't got those skills within the area now, otherwise we have to 
ask the question why haven't we got those skills if its something we should have in the 
first place. So that's the sort of thing I can imagine where you might say right I'll pay 
them a little bit more, to attract that person, but by exception I would think". 
In neither of the organisations was there any formula in place for determining starting 
salaries of experienced external recruits, nor was there any central monitoring of the 
salaries being paid, beyond the requirement for the total departmental salary bill to be 
within budget. Even formulae have the potential to favour one sex over the other, for 
example they might be based on qualifications that are more likely to be held by men 
than women, or if they only take into account recent work experience they n-dght 
discriminate against women who have been out of the labour market caring for young 
cl-dldren. Nevertheless, if these criteria are explicit they can be challenged. When there 
are no formal criteria in place enhanced salaries are only likely to be agreed following a 
negotiation initiated by the interviewees. In such circumstances the potential for the 
results to be biased is even greater, the size of the salary largely detern-tined by the 
negotiating skill of the interviewee. It has been suggested that women have a 
predisposition to underestimate their own ability (Rosenthal et al 1996), and to place 
less value than men on material rewards (Purcell 2002), a combination that n-dght deter 
them from negotiating an increased starting salary, or lead them to be satisfied with 
the salary on offer. 
In 2002, Global Insurance agreed to pay sixty nine per cent of men and sixty two per 
cent of women starting salaries at least ten per cent above the entry level, and in New 
Bank it was twenty one per cent of men and twenty per cent of women. In both cases 
many were appointed at salaries exceeding those of the incumbent employees. 
Although these numbers were high, the relatively even distribution between women 
and men does appear to contradict the suggestion that men are more likely than 
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women to negotiate a higher starting salary. Rather than being a contradiction of the 
previous research evidence, however, I believe my data signals a changing attitude 
among women. Several of the female New Bank focus group participants, all of them 
over forty and, as union activists, accustomed to being forthright with management, 
were quite clear that they would never consider negotiating: 
Evie: "A man has to argue for his family, if he came along on the same job offer, he 
would need, they think he needs more because he's got children, I come along, whether 
I've got a husband beside me or not, children or not, and they automatically say that she 
doesn't need quite as much, and would offer less to see if I would take it. A woman 
would accept it, I would accept it, if it was what I needed, 
... 
It's just male and female, 
its not sex discrimination, that's the way of the world ui! fortunately I think... ". 
Barbara: "Women haven't got the confidence". 
These comments suggest that women's difficulties with the concept of negotiating pay 
are a relic of the "family wage' discourse, from a time when a womaws wage was a 
supplement rather than an essential component of a household's income. Not only 
was it something that women were not accustomed to doing, but it required a degree 
of assertiveness that would have been classed as 'unladylike behaviour' until fairly 
recently (Oakley 1972). It would have required a strong sense of injustice and of self 
worth to overcome the stigma, whether actual or perceived. While this discourse 
lingers among the older workers, it is more than possible that there could be some 
gender differences in pay that reflect recruitment salaries from several years ago. The 
data on recent recruits, together with the following focus group contribution, suggest 
that there is a new attitude among some younger women: 
Mike: "When I was in Personnel I used to interview, and before I came to [New Bank] I 
used to be in Personnel, and women traditionally would not negotiate their starting 
salaries, whether its appointment or promotion, you'd tell them and they'd accept it, 
where men, men don't always negotiate either, but there's a bigger predominance of 
men are negotiating salaries than women. That's just a trait, that'll change, but now, 
where I work now I work with as many bolshie women as I work with bolshie men, and 
the younger ones are not as soft, and they're starting 
... 
that's it, over the years, going 
right back till I was in industry, I never, ever saw women negotiate, its only the last 
two or three years I've seen it". 
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Even if the proportion of female job applicants who are prepared to negotiate starting 
salaries is increasing, this is not a development that will help close the pay gap, but 
rather one that might create a new divide. If it is happening, and salaries are being 
paid which cannot be justified by measurable skills or experience, it will simply add to 
any lack of transparency in the payment systems. Both pay audits provided evidence 
of men and women with less than one years' service being paid salaries well in excess 
of the relevant n-dnimum, but it was most pronounced in New Bank's junior manager 
and manager grades. The main features of the payment system in operation at the time 
of the pay audit were a fully discretionary approach to the determination of salaries 
and an absence of any incremental stages, so that the appointment salary remains the 
rate for the job until the employee moves on to another post. The impact was described 
by one of the focus group participants: 
Bob ". 
- 
because the scale for junior managers for example wen t from fourteen to 
twenty two, me and Lin, junior managers, I could be on twenty two and Lin fourteen, 
you know that, that was the problem there". 
Discretion may not be explicit in Global, or in New Bank clerical grades, but the range 
of salaries paid to new entrants demonstrates that it is exercised. Women recruited in 
Global during the twelve months prior to the audit were earning between eighty six 
and two hundred and fifty eight per cent of the minimum salary for their grades, for 
men the range was between seventy nine and three hundred per cent. In both 
companies discretion is limited only by the line manager's direct responsibility for 
maintaining staffing levels within budget. The pressure to meet budgetary targets 
means that high starting salaries need to be compensated for in other parts of the salary 
bill. The salaries below the minimum were noteworthy because they provided further 
evidence that there had been no systematic monitoring of starting salaries, but not 
sufficiently common to make much impact on the total salary bill. However the 
absence of criteria for calculating appropriate salaries means that it is quite feasible that 
experienced candidates who do not attempt to negotiate were placed on the lowest 
point of the scale. 
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Pay progression 
Discretion 
The rate of progression through a pay scale provides another opportunity for the rates 
of pay of women and men doing the same work to diverge. I have already explained 
that for the junior managers and managers in New Bank this is not a possibility, as 
there were no increments in this pay system. Nevertheless, a comparison of the 
correlations between length of service and notional salary of women and men in these 
two grades suggests that the salaries of male managers and, to a lesser extent, junior 
managers, are more closely linked to length of service than are those of the women in 
these grades. The relationship for all junior managers was significant at the one 
percent level, at point three three six for women and point three five six for men. In 
the managers' group the only significant relationship was point two nine six for men, 
while the relationship between salary and length of service for women was only point 
one five six. This could indicate that in the past men were more likely than in recent 
years to be awarded higher salaries than women for similar jobs; however there is 
another possible interpretation of these correlations. Although there is no formal 
incremental scale, it is possible of salaries to increase because of promotion within the 
grade. Just as with appointments into these grades, the process is discretionary, based 
on the personal opinions of the senior manager in the departments: 
Dora "there has been, we know, money spent on people being promoted 
... 
but not 
against any set criteria, its really been a case of well so and so's really done well, so I've 
given them a bit more responsibility this year, and any manager could go and make a 
casefor anybody to get a bit of money out of the promotions pot" 
The relative informality of this discretionary system could easily mask, as well as 
contribute to, inequalities in pay. For example there is no mechanism to avoid the 
exercise of the 'doppelganger' and the 'crony effect', whereby the predominantly male 
senior mangers would be most likely to promote in their own image or their 
acquaintances. The higher salaries of the men could, therefore, represent a greater 
likelihood of promotion within the grade, rather than, or possibly as well as, higher 
starting salaries. There was no way to deterrrdne the relative impact of these two 
possibilities from the data provided for the pay audit. In order to reliably determine 
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the causes of these gaps it would have been necessary to provide the date each 
individual started in their current grade, and the salary that they started on in that 
grade. I would also need to have known the level of any intervening cost of living rises 
that had been awarded during the interim period. Whilst it is not inconceivable for all 
of this data to be available, my experience shows that companies have difficulty in 
providing historic data. Even if it had been provided, the complexity of the 
calculations would have increased the time and effort needed to conduct the audit, 
making the exercise even less appealing to employers than the basic, EOC model audit. 
Performance and Competence 
In the clerical grade of New Bank, and all Global grades, pay progression is dependant 
on performance. The payment system recently implemented in New Bank means that 
all of the clerical workers progress at the same rate, so long as their performance is 
satisfactory. This meant that the failure of the bank to provide appraisal ratings was 
less of a problem than it would have been in a system where ratings were used as a 
determinant of the size of increments. It also meant that, despite the difficulty of 
making comparisons between departments, the system was sufficiently transparent 
that individuals could easily confirm that they were being paid the correct rate for the 
job. This almost certainly contributed to the appearance of pay parity that the pay 
audit produced for this group of employees, wl-dch was not a surprise to the Union 
official, who noted: 
Gwyn "I'm tending tofind that junior level staff... have a clear understanding of the 
method of pay and because its clear and structured and people understand it, it seems to 
bring decent levels of reward", 
It would, nevertheless, have been interesting to compare the numbers of women and 
men failing to achieve satisfactory performance, and it would also have been useful to 
see the performance ratings of those women who have been in the clerical grade for 
significantly longer periods than most of the men. The unavailability of this data from 
New Bank means that even though there is an appearance of pay equity in the clerical 
grade, there can be no certainty that women and men are treated equally. 
118 
The Horizontal Gap 
Progression within each grade in Global Insurance is based on a combination of 
performance and competence. Two parallel systems for measuring these criteria were 
in the process of being introduced at the time of the audit. Not all of the employees had 
been put on these programmes, and some were on one but not the other, but with 
approximately fifty per cent of staff on each programme, they were capable of 
contributing a significant contribution to the size of the overall gender pay gap. 
The performance measurement process gives only firnited guidance to managers on the 
assessment of their employees' performance so, as with pay on entry, the major 
constraint on the exercise of discretion is the departmental budget. The process results 
in the award of one of four possible ratings, ranging from Level 1 (exceeds 
expectations) to Level 4 (unsatisfactory). Most employees were rated Level 1 or Level 2 
(acl-deves expectations) with only seven per cent on Level 3 (improvement required) 
and only four people classed as unsatisfactory. Seventy seven per cent fell into what 
can effectively be described as the middle category. This overall pattern does not vary 
much when disaggregated by sex, although men were slightly more likely to be in the 
two extreme categories (see table 62). 
Table 6-2 
- 
overall distribution of performance ratings in Global 
R ti Women Men a ng Count % Count % 
1 167 14% 191 18% 
2 975 80% 781 74% 
3 80 6% 85 8% 
4 1 -1 3 
When the data is disaggregated by grade, it is only in the very lowest and the two most 
senior grades that there are greater proportions of men than women receiving Level 1 
ratings (see table 6.3). Most of the Grade A appraisals would be performed by the 
lowest level of supervisor, the majority of whom were women, so this is not an 
indication of 'doppelganger' bias. Five of the twelve men were aged over forty, and 
four of those had been with the company for less than three years. The high proportion 
of Level 1 ratings almost certainly reflects either actual or perceived experience from a 
previous career. In Grades G and H both women and men were more likely to be 
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awarded high ratings than they were in any of the other grades, and the relevance of 
this to the vertical pay gap will be considered in the next chapter. The small number of 
women in these grades means that the disproportion is actually insignificant, as it 
would be reversed if one more woman had been awarded a Level 1 rating. 
Table 6-3 
- 
distribution of appraisal ratings by grade in Global 
Grade Women Men 
(Pay Gap) Count % Count % 
1 16 8.2 12 15.4 A 
2 76% 2 159 81.5 56 71.8 ( 
. 
)
3 20 10.3 10 12.8 
1 52 10 7 5.5 B 
3 58% 2 441 84.8 107 83.6 (- 
. 
)
3 27 5.2 14 10.9 
1 32 13.9 19 11.9 
C 2 176 76.2 124 77.5 
(4.551/o) 3 22 9.5 17 10.6 
4 1 0.4 
1 24 17.3 59 16.8 
D 2 107 77 259 73.8 
(8.6%) 3 8 5.8 30 8.5 
4 3 0.9 
1 23 27.1 26 - 18.1 E 
1 8% 2 60 70.6 ill 77.1 ( 
. 
) 
3 2 2A 7 4.9 
1 13 40.6 38 32.2 F 
2 18 56.3 75 63.6 
3 1 3.1 5 4.2 
1 3 25 21 35 G 
(4 64%) 2 9 75 37 61.7 
. 3 2 3.3 
H 1 1 25 9 52.9 
4.41/6) 2 3 75 8 47.1 
Several of the apparent anomalies identified in the detailed analysis could be explained 
by reference to the performance ratings of the individuals concerned, and in those 
grades where women earned more than men they also received more of the Level 1 
ratings. However the reverse was not necessarily the case. The only grade where the 
overall pay gap was large enough to be considered significant according to EOC 
guidelines was Grade D, in which the proportions of women and men receiving Level 
120 
The Horizontal Gap 
1 ratings were almost identical, at seventeen point three per cent of women and sixteen 
point eight per cent of men, and more women than men were awarded Level 2. 
The lack of consistency in the proportions of each rating awarded within each grade, 
suggests that managers have sufficient flexibility to award ratings based on their 
interpretation of the assessment criteria. Although this is more likely to promote 
confidence in the system than if it was constrained by quotas, it could also mean that 
assessors could be less rigorous than they might otherwise be. Nevertheless the 
pattern of distribution provides no evidence of intrinsic bias in the rating process. 
There is some research evidence of bias in the translation of ratings into pay 
(Anderson, Forth, Metcalf, & Kirby 2001), and it would have come as no surprise to the 
industrial relations manager or to the focus group participants if I had found the same: 
Nigel: "We've got other staff in the business who are on performance related pay, 
based on appraisals, and I personally think that that is a problem, with consistency". 
Barry: "... and [pay gaps] will be perpetuated is when you go onto performance 
management, where managers have actually got discretion as to how much people 
actually get". 
However the industrial relations manager was careful to point out that inconsistency in 
exercise of discretion would have more to do with the economic law of supply and 
demand than with gender bias: 
Nigel: "... the going rate, or the pressure on salaries, in say Morecambe or Darlington, 
is lower than the pressure is in say Reading, therefore, even if the pay rates, ranges 
might be the same, pressure to push people along faster will be greater in Reading, 
because if we don't, we'll lose them, whereas in Darlington or Morecambe we may be 
the biggest employer around, so those would befactors". 
I was unable to assess the impact of geographdcal pressures in any detail, as I did not 
have the size of the most recent increments, and the data I had been given only allowed 
discrimination between employees in London and those in the rest of the country. On 
those criteria, however, the main distinctive feature of Table 6-4 is that men in London 
were more likely than those elsewhere to be rated at Level 1. This is not the case for 
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women, amongst whom the regional distribution of ratings is almost identical. The 
inference from Nigel's comment is that retention is most problematic in relation to 
male employees in London. 
Table 6-4 
- 
percentages of women and men receiving each appraisal rating, by location 
1 2 3 4 
Region Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
London 8.24 15.00 69.41 65.00 7.06 5.00 
. 
National 8.67 6.98 70.54 
1- 
72.81 
-m-A 
6.51 
- 
5.21 0.9 0.4 
The impact of performance appraisal on salary is cumulative, and there is no guarantee 
that an employee will be awarded the same or even a similar rating every year. Ideally 
a pay audit would include all appraisal ratings since appointment to the current grade, 
and at least the previous year's salary so that increments could be calculated. In this 
case I only had the most recent appraisal rating, and could not ascertain the level of 
each individual's pay award. Nevertheless I would have expected to find a 
relationship between high performance and high salaries when controlling for length 
of service. To simplify the analysis I used the calculated variable, 'notional salary as 
percentage of entry-level salary', so that I was able to represent all employees who 
were in the performance management process in the same exercise. In fact I found that 
there was a small, but statistically insignificant, negative correlation of point one zero 
three between notional salary and performance rating for the one thousand eight 
hundred employees in the performance scheme. As in most statistical analyses there 
were a few 'outliers' at both ends of the scale, but these extreme cases could not 
account for the counter-intuitive result, or for the fact that the gap between the pay of 
women and men in this group was thirty five percent, three percentage points higher 
than for all employees, 
The absence of a direct relationship between current salary and current performance 
has a number of underlying causes. The discretionary element means that appraisal is 
neither transparent nor consistent, and that lack of consistency detracts from the 
integrity of the system so that its value in underpinning a meritocratic payment system 
is at best limited. Ratings can fluctuate from year to year, but there were no 
procedures for determining whether the fluctuations were due to different 
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interpretations of the performance criteria by different assessors, or to genuine 
fluctuations in performance. The acquisition of skills, however, is a linear process, and 
it is unusual for them to be lost while people continue to do the work for which they 
are relevant. 
Competencies 
Performance assessment measures the quantity of work produced, but a competency 
system is concerned more with quality. It rewards the acquisition of job related skills 
with pre-specified increments within the relevant pay scale, resulting in a similar pay 
system to that in the clerical grade of New Bank. The competency framework in 
Global applied to ninety one per cent of employees in Grades A-D; approximately half 
of the same group were also on the performance management system, having achieved 
the highest skill level applicable to their job. The framework sets out detailed 
standards of skills and knowledge, including the level of supervision required at each 
level in each job role covered by the system, and explains what the employee needs to 
do to prove that the competency has been acquired. Pay increments can be awarded at 
any time during the year, and in theory an employee could achieve several competency 
levels during a single year. 
The distribution of skills between women and men is roughly in proportion with their 
distribution in the workforce, except for the highest Skill Level, 6, wl-dch were mainly 
held by men. If competencies truly reflect the job related skills of the employees, it 
would be reasonable to expect the higher skill levels to be found in the higher paid 
grades. As predicted, nine of the eleven men with this competency were in Grade D, 
and the other two in Grade C, however two of the three women on Level 6 were 
general staff in Grade A. The advantage of a competency based system is that it 
provides a mechanism for recognising and rewarding employees' skills, yet these two 
women were both earning salaries below the entry level of Grade C. It is possible that 
the women in Grades A and B with long service remain in those grades from choice, 
but when they also make the effort to acquire skills that are not required in their 
current grades they must surely do so in order to progress. An effective equal 
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opportunities monitoring process should have identified these anomalies, and ensured 
that the women were directed to jobs where their skills could be fully utilised. 
The focus group participants had predicted that I would not find a significant pay gap 
for those employees who were on the competency system: 
Barry "... in the main, you will find that where there are sAdIls ladders there will be 
less of a pay gap" 
Andy: "because it is set, set wages for each level actually on basic pay until you've 
reached [the performance system], and then you are at a level of discretion ". 
Table 6-5 
- 
Global pay gaps by method of calculating increments 
Grade se 
Total In grade Performance 
x 
Count Gap% Count Ga 
A women 330 195 
_men__ __ 
108 
3 
78 
2 
_ 
women 1478 520 1 
men 555 
+4 
128 
+ 
C wo en 569 
men 466 
5 10 
D women 280 9 139 
men 583 351 
7 
E women 93 2 85 
men 149 144 
2 
F women 37 +1 32 
men 130 118 
+2 
G women 13 6 12 
men 65 60 
6 
H 4 
F- 4 
1 20 
4 
17 
4 
Count Gap' 
99 2 
16 
1030 
+2 
408 
326 6 
220 
106 10 
189 
At sixteen per cent, the overall pay gap was indeed lower for this group of employees, 
than the thirty two per cent for the total population. This was partly because the 
competencies group did not contain any representatives of the four most senior grades, 
where women were significantly under-represented and differentials were most acute. 
Although the correlations between notional salary and competency was quite small at 
point three zero eight, it was positive, and larger than that for performance. Table 6.5 
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shows that the pay gap for employees in the competency pay scherne is also much 
closer to the overall pay gap than was the case for performance pay. In Grades C and 
D it is one percentage point higher than the overall figure, but in both of these grades 
approximately one third of the men are in both schemes, compared with less than 
twenty per cent of the women. 
Pay Protection 
Both the performance system, and the competency framework in Global were 
implemented on top of the existing pay structures, so however fair their design and 
implementation, any existing inequalities would have been perpetuated or even 
magnified. Global Insurance was an amalgam resulting from a series of mergers and 
takeovers. Nigel explained how the current payment system was the result of 
amalgamating not just payment systems, but different attitudes to pay, and different 
ways of working: 
Nigel "you've got a situation where there was a big organisation, 
..., 
that was taken 
over by a smaller organization in the UK, and Global in turn had been the 
amalgamation of two smaller organizations in the UK only a year or two before, so as 
you can imagine there were different pay systems, different ways, different views, 
different specialisms, different locations, all of which had historic influences on pay, and 
the different pay stance as well, because Global's pay stance certainly used to be to aim 
for the lower quartile in terms of salaries, and offer more in terms of incentives. 
... 
the 
other, the bigger employer's tance was median, market median and big bonuses. Upper 
quartile salaries in some cases, but that tended to be in the like management grades. I 
would say that [XXXI was quite a big payer, heavy payer, and Global was quite a light 
payer, so you put those two things together and you have inequalities, and you just 
can't sort out so quickly. " 
There are always going to be difficulties in bringing together such diverse salary 
structures, and in the guidelines to the EOC review kit it is recognised that there may 
be justification for 'red-circling' the pay of some individuals who are above the new 
rate for the job. The view of the focus group participants was that the process had been 
more haphazard than red-circling, and effectively involved broadening bands to 
incorporate all levels of pay: 
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Barry: "The reason you'll find a pay gap at Global is relatively simple and straight 
forward, its purely historical, every time there's been a merger, although they've done 
new job evaluation schemes and got it felt fair, that way round, what we've done is 
we've always transposed where people were on their existing salary grades into quite a 
broad band salary structure. So all the discrimination that was in the [previous] system 
is still within the Global Insurance system". 
Andy: "With engineers there's a discrepancy irrespective of whether you're male or 
female, and that's because of what Barry was talking about earlier on, nobody brought it 
together when we merged" 
Table 6-6 
- 
average salaries of employees from constituent companies of Global Insurance 
original company Sex Average salary pay gap 
Female 13751.83 
ABC Male 16426.85 16.28 
Total 14286.83 
Female 14517.16 
DEF Male 20803.17 30.22 
Total 17055.16 
Female 16406.06 
GHI Male 18707.11 12.30 
Total 17212.16 
Female 19026.37 
JKL Male 26621.02 28.53 
Total 22765.9 
Female 18615.97 
MNO Male 27169.88 31.48 
Total 24232.17 
Female 11930 
PQR Male 22157 46.16 
Total 17043.5 
Female 16994.67 
STU Male 28892.06 41.18 
Total 22515.06 
Female 16013.34 
VWX Male 28091.5 43.00 
Total 19966.19 
Female 15780.33 
YZA Male 30448.71 48.17 
Total 27860.18 
Female 36666 
BCD Male 58501 37.32 
Total 47583.5 
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My analysis confirmed that there were pay differences that appeared to be related to 
this historical factor. There were a total of ten different companies involved in the 
amalgamation, and I was able to compare the average salaries of women and men with 
a background in each of them. The gender pay gaps in this disaggregation ranged 
from twelve point three to forty eight point two per cent (see Table 6-6), and the largest 
pay gaps were for people who had worked for companies that paid the highest 
salaries. 
Despite these variations in the pay gap, there was little difference in the numbers of 
men and women who were earning above the maximum salary for their grade. In all 
there were seventy six women and eighty six men in this position. More than half of 
these (forty one women and forty seven men) had joined the company since the latest 
merger, and have therefore already been discussed in relation to 'pay on entry'. Of the 
remainder all but eight women and eleven men were within ten percentage points of 
the maximum salary. These are likely to be back within the range in three or four years 
if their salaries remain frozen and scale maxima continue to increase at about two point 
five to three percentage points per annum. However there were also eight women and 
eleven men earning between one hundred and eleven and one hundred and seventy 
four percent of the relevant maximum salary. The chances of any of these salaries 
coming within the relevant salary scales in the foreseeable future are at best remote. 
There are alternatives to protecting the highest salaries in a merger. It n-dght be 
possible to promote the employees to roles that are consistent with their salaries, but 
that depends on the employee having the appropriate skills. It might be possible to 
offer a severance package, but for the longer serving members that could be more 
costly than continuing to pay the high salary. The option to use the highest salaries as 
the benchmark rate for the job is unlikely to be considered a practical solution, 
especially as mergers are often motivated by a desire to cut costs, so normal practice is 
to protect the salaries that are over scale. For 'red-circling' to be a valid justification for 
unequal pay, however, the protected salaries should be clearly identified, and the 
process should be time-lin-tited, and accompanied by a plan to achieve parity within a 
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reasonable and defined time period. I asked the Industrial Relations manager what the 
timescale was for removing the differences in Global Insurance: 
Nigel "Don't think we have really, we've got a timescale that says gradual, but another 
factor is business performance has not been good for the last two or three years, its not 
been brilliant at all since the merger, so, if you're making loads of motley, you call say 
right I'm going to take this problem on board and I'm going to deal with it. If you're 
actually backs to the wall and you're not making lots of motley and you're trying to 
squeeze budgets and costs by about twenty per cent, which is where we are now, trying 
to reduce it by twenty per cent, reduced it by twenty per cent this year, then people say 
we can't do that, we can't devote motley to doing that, and even if you might believe 
there's a longer term advantagefirom doing it its easy to say it's a long term advantage 
but people will say we need the money this year, if you don't save the motley this year 
we won't be here next year or the year after, so it doesn't really matter about the longer 
term advantage, and that's certainly the position we've been in recently... ". 
This vague approach to dealing with pay protection is not uncommon in the industry. 
Employer participants in a finance sector seminar on equal pay admitted to having no 
procedure for the central monitoring of protected pay, yet the industry continues to be 
highly susceptible to mergers and takeovers. The worst case scenario is that, without 
adequate documentation, anomalies will be carried forward into future amalgamations 
or company restructures, and the difference attributed to the most recent change, thus 
prolonging the period of protection. Monitoring of pay protection, as well as 
performance pay and pay on promotion, can be included in an annual pay audit, by 
the relatively simple method of recording previous salary, date of last increase and 
reason for last increase and including these in the data to be analysed. 
Market factors 
- 
horizontal segregation 
The different salary scales for General staff, Underwriters, IT staff and Secretaries in 
Global provide an example of enhanced salaries being paid for jobs with the same job 
evaluation score. The economic explanation is that where skills are in short supply it is 
necessary to offer higher salaries to attract sufficient staff. The impact is that the most 
remunerative jobs have the largest proportions of men. Figure 6-2 shows how this 
works for Grades C and D in Global. Women, represented by the bar chart, were in the 
majority in Grade C General and Underwriters, and in these grades both the average 
and the maximum salaries were almost identical. The rate of female employment 
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decreases with seniority, and it is smallest in the U grouping, which has a significantly 
higher maximum salary than either of the other grades. 
Figure 6-2 average salaries of junior managers in Global and percentage of women 
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In the 1950s the emerging IT profession was regarded as an ideal opportunity for 
women, who then constituted almost fifty per cent of programmers and systems 
analysts. It required skills, such as problem solving and communication, which were 
seen as being gender neutral, and as an emerging occupation it was considered to have 
no cultural baggage (Buchanan 1993). By the 1990s this opportunity for desegregation 
of the labour market appeared to have passed by; women were working with IT, but 
most were using the low level skills such as data entry that were replacing the 
traditional pen and paper or typewriter based clerical operations. Training for the high 
level skills that command the high salaries was mainly being undertaken by men, and 
as a result Rees was able to state that "... whereas horizontal and vertical segregation 
by gender in other sectors is declining or at least steady 
... 
it is increasing in IT 
occupations in the UK" (Rees 1992). By the time I conducted these audits the 
proportions of women working in IT in both Global and New Bank were just thirty per 
cent, halfway between the national estimates of twenty two per cent by the US (Bevan 
et al. 1997)) and thirty eight per cent by Wilson et al ( 2004). There were also more than 
four times as many young men as women studying Computer Science at University 
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(EOC 2004), an improvement since 1994 when only fourteen per cent of the students on 
IT related courses were female (Rees 1992), but still extremely low. Somehow, despite 
the efforts of government agencies, schools and universities, Information Technology 
has become a 'male' occupation, but was this because the pay was relatively high, or 
has the pay become high because the occupation has become male? 
There is evidence of a change occurring in Global Insurance, where the length of 
service data indicates that they have recruited similar numbers of women and men for 
the last six years. There is no sign of a similar trend in New Bank, so this probably 
reflects the greater competition for IT staff in the region where Global is based than in 
that where New Bank has its head office. It could be an early indication of the 
fen-dnisation of the IT profession, but as yet there has been no reduction in the level of 
pay available for the role. 
The most obvious example of horizontal segregation is the secretaries in Global 
Insurance. There were no male secretaries in Global, and they have their own salary 
scales in which the maxima were even higher than those for IT staff, and in each grade 
the average salaries were higher than those for either the men or the women in the rest 
of the same grades. The difference between the secretaries and the IT staff was that the 
secretarial grades stop at Grade C, and further promotion requires a change of 
occupation. The ceiling on secretaries' promotion opportunities reinforces the 
conception of women's jobs as inferior to men's, as does the absence of any men in the 
lowest IT grade. The majority of IT workers were in Grade D, where they were 
earning considerably more than any of the secretaries, and can aspire to at least 
another four promotions within their chosen specialisation. 
Most of the Grade C secretaries, especially those based in the London Head Office who 
were likely to be the secretaries of senior men, were being paid well above their target 
salaries, and close to the maxima, suggesting that in practice, if not in theory, they were 
valued more highly than the job evaluation process was designed to recognise. In the 
IT groups there were only two staff employed at Grade B, both of them women. It was 
suggested to me by the industrial relations manager that these two women were 
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probably incorrectly graded admin staff working in an IT department. One of them 
was earning more than most of the staff in the next IT grade, and was very close to the 
maximum salary for the grade. Her value to the department was apparently much 
greater than the evaluation system would acknowledge for the stereotypically female 
adn-dn classification. 
This comparison between the salaries of secretaries and IT staff in Global highlights the 
possibility of gender bias being reflected in job evaluation, and also shows how 
managers can avoid the rigidity of the system by using what discretion they have to 
pay some of their staff above average salaries. In the instances I have just described it 
was women who benefited from that discretion. These particular women stood out 
because they were in grades with very small populations, but the importance of the 
finding is that it demonstrates how individualisation can happen even in an apparently 
well-regulated system. In New Bank there was little regulation and no formal job 
evaluation, so the only bases I had for comparing jobs were the job titles. When I 
compared the average salaries of women and men in those jobs that had more 
members of one sex than the other I found that most of the female dominated jobs in 
the junior manager grade had average salaries lower than most of the male dominated 
jobs, and all of the female don-dnated manager roles were paid less than the men. I 
identified four jobs that had a relatively large numbers of both men and women in two 
grades. Three of them Underwriter, Co-ordinator and Business Development 
Manager were populated with mainly women in the junior manager grade, but mainly 
men in the manager grade, all of the Customer Sales Advisers were women in both 
grades. Table 6-8 shows the average salary and the percentage of employees that are 
women in each of these job categories. The average salary of manager grade 
underwriters and co-ordinators is double that of their junior manager colleagues, the 
salaries of the Business Development Managers (BDMs) only increased by thirty per 
cent in the higher grade, but the junior manager BDMs were the most highly paid 
women in the grade. Customer Sales Advisor, the one job that was a 'woman's job' in 
both grades was the third highest paid junior manager job but tile second lowest in tile 
manager grade. 
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Table 6-7 
- 
average salaries of jobs that occur in two New Bank Grades 
Junior Managers Managers 
Job title % Women Average salary % Women Average salary 
Underwriter 55 14847 14 29302 
Co-ordinator 100 15801 10 30384 
Customer Sales Advisor 100 17533 100 21477 
Business Development 
'Manager 
85 
I 
20978 
I 
39 
I 
27394 
I 
The large pay differential for underwriters can be explained by the company's policy of 
'growing their own' specialists, particularly if the junior manager grade represents the 
training stage. The Risk Department manager explained to me that they have only once 
recruited an experienced underwriter, as they prefer to recruit suitable candidates 
internaRy and train them in-house: 
Paul: "We've always looked round and thought that we could develop from within 
people who knew New Batik methods, rather than, groom thetn to have underwriting 
skills, rather than going outside, getting someone with underwriting skills and 
grooming them to the New Batik way of doing things". 
This policy has opened up a traditionally 'male' job to women, and a recent 
recruitment drive has resulted in twice as many women starting out on this training 
programme than were previously in the department. They are paid the minimum 
salary for a junior manager, but so are the men who were taken on by the same means. 
Even so the salaries of the trained, and mainly male, underwriters are very high 
relative to all of the female don-tinated manager roles. By comparison, the separate pay 
scales for underwriters in Global have almost the same ranges as the General scales, 
and women are represented in both groups in similar proportions. The fact that Global 
has these two separate but similar scales suggests that at one time there was a more 
significant differential, but that salaries have grown closer together as women have 
gained access to the job. If there had been an equivalent reduction in salaries when 
'womeWs jobs' become available to men, it might be possible to infer that the increased 
availability of underwriters was the reason for the relative reduction in their wages, the 
price of labour going down as the supply increases. Instead, it looks more like 
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confirmation of the hypothesis that the entry of women into an occupation results in its 
devaluation. If this is the case it highlights a particular 'Catch 22' situation in relation 
to equal pay. In its checklist for market factors, the EOC Equal Pay Tool Kit warns 
against continuing to pay 'outdated market pren-da', but when the reason for those 
prernia becoming outdated is that women have gained access to the job, ceasing to pay 
them contributes to the apparent devaluation of the job. As women are becon-ting 
better represented in the underwriting role in New Bank and in IT in Global it would 
be informative to monitor the relative pay differentials over a period of time. As with 
the monitoring of protected pay, comparisons of this nature are another example of the 
potential value of regular equal pay reviews over and above identifying the locus and 
cause of pay gaps. 
Conclusion 
- 
the payment systems 
Between them New Bank and Global provide examples of a wide range of 'new' 
payment systems 
- 
in Global the combination of performance related pay and 
competencies operate in a broad-banded set of pay scales determined by the use of 
analytical job evaluation and with reference to market forces. Despite the number of 
elements involved in the total package, it is clear and easy to understand, and has 
potential to be a transparent payment system, except for two drawbacks. Firstly, it was 
implemented before the pre-existing payment structures had been audited, so that the 
all the faults and inconsistencies of those systems have been perpetuated, and secondly 
it allows for an element of discretion in the setting of starting salaries and 
determination of performance awards, without providing clear guidelines or a process 
for monitoring the results. There was no systematic job evaluation in New Bank, 
however the new broad band clerical grade in which employees were paid the rate for 
the job and progressed in pre-determined steps was not only transparent, but 
preparation for its implementation had included bringing current salaries into line so 
that gendered pay differentials were all but elin-dnated. In the old system that was still 
in operation for New Bank managers and junior managers, there was no job evaluation 
and wide ranging managerial discretion. The system was too opaque to reliably 
detern-tine whether there were pay gaps, let alone their extent or the manner in which 
gender bias still flourishes. 
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The biggest advantage of having so many different payment systems to analyse was 
the opportunity it gave me to experiment with different levels of analysis, and to 
explore the potential for interrogating the type of data that can be supplied by 
employers. In particular I was able to show that it is inappropriate to claim that a pay 
gap, however small, is insignificant merely on the basis of a comparison of means. The 
new payment systems that have been implemented in Global and New Bank may 
appear to be operated fairly, with no evidence of any systematic gender bias, but the 
most important message from the audits is that even in the best regulated of payment 
systems things can go wrong. It is not enough to be confident in the fairness of a 
system; it is also necessary to check that they are operating correctly and remedy any 
deviations before they get out of hand. 
134 
The Vertical Gap 
Chapter 7. The Vertical Gap 
U... occupational segregation by sex is detrimental to women. It has an 
important negative effect on how men view women and on how women view 
themselves. This in turn negatively affects women's status and income and, 
consequently, many social variables such as mortality and morbidity, poverty 
and income inequality. The persistence of gender stereotypes also has negative 
effects on education and training and thus causes gender-based inequalities to 
be perpetuated into future generations". 
(Anker 1997: 315) 
Like Blackburn (2002), Anker stresses that the impact of segregation is much wider 
than just pay inequality, and that there are many other causes of pay inequality than 
just occupational segregation. Nevertheless segregation is a highly visible aspect of 
women's employment, and as such it provides the stereotypes that influence their 
expectations; this propensity for self-perpetuation means that segregation must not be 
overlooked as a major contributor to pay inequality. 
The previous chapter identified the ways in which it is still possible for women to be 
paid less than men for jobs that have the same intrinsic value. Where such differences 
can be identified and shown to be unjustified the affected women have a remedy in 
law under the Equal Pay Act. Employers are being encouraged by government to use 
pay audits to identify and remedy problems of this nature. The EOC's "Business Case 
for Equal Pay (EOC 2004) emphasises the importance of meeting (and exceeding) 
statutory obligations and reducing the risk and cost of litigation, but makes no 
reference to vertical segregation as a cause of unequal pay. It does, however, include 
employee motivation and retention as reasons for having a "transparent and equal pay 
systemý, benefits that I would contend are at least as likely to accrue from ensuring 
women have the same opportunities as men to work at all levels in an organisation. 
In this chapter I will be exan-dning the personnel and payroll data gathered for my 
equal pay audit to discover how its use can be extended to locate and explain the 
crowding of women into the lowest paid jobs. If women are deliberately kept out of 
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the best paid jobs because employers believe their domestic responsibilities detract 
from their comn-dtment and reliability, they may be able to use the Sex Discrimination 
Act for a remedy, but in most cases the rationale for the 'crowding' is not that obvious. 
If Catherine Hakim is to be believed, that women 'prefer' these jobs because they fit 
better with their domestic responsibilities, then there can be no redress, and there is 
unlikely to be a change to this distribution. I suspect that for most women the reality is 
somewhere in between these two extremes, at a point wl-dch varies over their life- 
course. I will be looking for patterns in the distribution of women and men on the 
hierarcl-des of the two case study organisations, and seeking to use a combination of 
the data from the pay audit and that from the qualitative interviews and focus groups 
to explore how much of that pattern can be attributed to organisational structures, and 
how much to the individual agency of women. 
Distribution patterns of women and men 
The grading structures of both Global and New Bank have been flattened by recent 
restructuring exercises, so that at the time of the audits there were nine grades in 
Global and just four for the majority of employees in New Bank. For the purposes of 
comparison I have condensed the nine Global grades and seven New Bank sales grades 
into the equivalent of the New Bank general staff structure, and will use the categories 
clerical, junior managers, managers and senior managers for most of the analysis in 
this chapter. 
One impact of the flattening of organizational hierarchies is a reduction in the 
opportunities for promotion. With sixty five per cent of all employees in New Bank 
and sixty nine per cent in Global working in the clerical grades, at the very best there 
can be management opportunities for no more than half of them. As both companies 
recruit directly into the senior positions, as well as promoting internally, the realistic 
expectations of clerical staff are even lower than that. Assuming that the original 
recruitment criteria are the same for women and men, the relative proportions in the 
higher grades should at least resemble the proportions in the clerical grade. 
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The actual distribution of women and men between the grades is shown in Table 7-1. 
It follows a similar pattern in both organisations; the largest numbers of both men and 
women are in the clerical grades, but although that is less than half of the men, it is 
over sixty per cent of the women in New Bank, seventy five per cent in Global. New 
Bank still has slightly more women than men at junior manager level and not many 
less in the manager grade, but in both cases the representation of women is vastly out 
of proportion with their numbers in the clerical grade. 
Figure 7-1 
- 
distribution of women and men in New Bank and Global Insurance 
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New Bank Global 
The uneven distribution means that only twenty five per cent of Global women and 
thirty eight per cent of those in New Bank are likely to have any chance of being 
promoted to any level of management, compared with more than ninety per cent of the 
men. This was identified by the interviewees at New Bank as a major reason for the 
pay gap: 
Bob: "... it is traditionally a male dominated company, it always has been, I think for 
thirty odd years it has been, the higher you go there's very few senior managers, 
assistant directors, directors and nobody above director level, possibly two female 
directors, no executives 
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Alan: "... we've only had one female on the board of the company in fifty years, and 
she's since left... " 
Similar remarks were made by Global contributors and, as the industrial relations 
manager pointed out, this is not only a direct cause of the pay gap, but the absence of 
role models to encourage women to seek promotion is also likely to have an indirect 
impact on the numbers of women in management. 
Nigel: "... it would be really great if this company had a female member of the 
executive, and it doesn't have, and it hasn't had for three years, there was one once, 
three years ago, and after a short time she left and there hasn't been a female member of 
the management board infactfor that time, and that doesn't send the right signals". 
There were departmental fluctuations in the distribution pattern. Three quarters of the 
Global general staff were in grades A to C, and more than two tl-drds of those were 
women, but most of the underwriters and IT staff were in Grades C and D, with the 
number of women only exceeding the men in the Underwriters Grade C. The charts in 
figure 7-2 represent the gender distribution in the two New Bank departments where I 
was able to interview the managers. In the call centres the hierarchy is relatively flat. 
Although the proportions of women and men in each grade are similar, at f to two in 
the clerical grades and three to one in the manager and senior manager grades, eighty 
seven per cent of all staff is in the clerical grades, making the opportunities for 
promotion within the same department even more remote than in the wider bank. Of 
the fifty two departments in New Bank, forty one had at least fifty per cent of their 
clerical jobs filled by women. In seventeen of these at least seventy five percent of all 
jobs were in the clerical grade and only in eleven were less than thirty three per cent of 
employees in the lowest grade. Even where the statistics suggest there should be the 
opportunity for promotion women are less likely than men to become managers. In 
the Risk Department, only forty per cent of employees were in the clerical grades, so it 
should have been possible for all of them to aspire to at least a junior management role. 
Nevertheless there was only one more woman in the three management grades than in 
clerical, but more than twice as many men. 
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Figure 7-2 
- 
distribution of women and men in two departments of New Bank 
Recruitment 
At one time banks and insurance companies specifically recruited two different classes 
of employee into their clerical grades. The largest group were predominantly women 
with GCE '0' level qualifications, destined to spend their careers in the lower grades, 
and the second predon-tinantly young men with 'A' levels, who could expect 
eventually to reach management grades. Any distinction between the levels of 
qualifications sought now is dependent on the requirements of the job that candidates 
are recruited for, rather than their future prospects. Neither company published 
minimum educational requirements in their job advertisements, but New Bank did 
make a commitment in its Corporate Social Responsibility Report, that under qualified 
but otherwise suitable candidates could be considered, but would be offered a lower 
salary. Although none of the clerical employees was earning less than the minimum 
for that grade, there were several jobs where new recruits had been appointed on lower 
scale points than the majority with the same job description. Without information 
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about the qualifications of all employees it is difficult to draw many reliable 
conclusions from the data. However, in the customer service assistant job description, 
there were three hundred and twelve new recruits who went straight onto Scale Point 
2, but five women and two men started on Scale Point 1. Although these numbers are 
small, they are indicative that people, mainly women, are still being recruited with less 
than the usual level of qualification. If these employees then have exactly the same 
prospects within the company as everyone else, then it should not be a problem, but 
they could be forming an underclass of workers with limited prospects because of their 
inferior qualifications. 
I asked both of the departmental managers how much attention they paid to the 
potential of job applicants over and above their ability to perform the task for wl-dch 
they were being interviewed. The responses reflected the relative potential for 
advancement. While he did not go so far as to say he would be looking for people with 
limited aspirations, the call centre manager made it clear that suitability for 
progression in the job was not an important criterion: 
Alan: "I think on balance if it was just a clerical grade it would be much more to do 
with can they do the existing job, but I would say, if we ask thein questions about 
aspirations and the potential they have to go ahead, people would say anything they 
think you want to hear really". 
This approach was reflected in the response of the Global industrial relations manager, 
in relation to appointments to the lowest grades. His attitude reflects recognition that 
the flatter career structures of the modern finance sector mean that for most people 
there is no career structure. Instead of the relative certainty for a select few that 
management opportunities will arise, the possibility of promotion is more like a lottery 
for all- 
Nigel: "I think it's the job that's here and now, rather than the fit ture, at that level I 
think that's the primary criteria, 
... 
the main role at grades A and B is to say we nced a 
certain amount of people to do a certain amount of work, 
... 
and if we get enough of 
those people there will be sufficient in there, there'll be people in there that we can pick 
out, so we go out with a big net and get loads of these people in and then we pick- out 
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when they're working the people that we can push forward, it will be the people that 
make team leaders and thefuture managers". 
In the Risk department of New Bank, however, where there are far more opportunities 
for advancement, the manager's response showed that there is at least an element of 
selection for future potential: 
Paul: "Well what we don't want to do is to recruit someone to a job and [for them] to 
stay in itfor the next twenty or thirty years so the idea would be to develop these people 
through, 
... 
the idea isn't just that they stay at the one level, its to move them through". 
The proportion of women who are managers is considerably larger in the Risk 
department than the call centre, yet it is still much smaller than the proportion of men 
who are managers in the same department. There are more employees in management 
grades than in clerical, and the potential to progress is a criterion in the clerical staff 
recruitment procedure, so promotion should be a reasonable expectation for all clerical 
workers, yet women are far less likely than men to proceed beyond the most junior 
management level. 
Even in the Call Centre, where women and men appear to progress at the same slow 
rate, a more detailed analysis shows a different picture. Eighty six per cent of the men 
in the clerical grade have less than five years service, and only one man has been with 
the company for more than ten years. Only fifty eight per cent of the women have less 
than five years service, and eighteen per cent have between ten and twenty six years. 
As none of the men in the junior manager grade has more than eight years' service in 
the company, it seems likely that the fourteen per cent in the clerical grade, together 
with most of the women, are destined to remain there until they leave the company. 
This picture is similar in the clerical grades of both companies, and in all departments. 
In the previous chapter I showed how longer service accounts for the higher average 
pay of women compared with that of men. This interpretation overlooks the 
underlying question, of why women in the clerical grades tend to have longer service 
than do men. It could be used to support Catherine HakinYs thesis that most women 
opt out of the linear career pattern, whether from 'preference' or from a tendency to 
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'drift' (Hakim 1996b; Hakim 1998; Hakim 2002). It is certainly the case that most 
women worked in the seventeen New Bank departments where the hierarchy had been 
flattened to the extent of having more than three quarters of their staff in the lowest 
grade, and that most of the employees in those departments were women. However 
there were also fourteen departments with a more traditional 'pyramid' shaped 
hierarchy, with less than half of their staff in the lowest grade and therefore offering 
the opportunity for a linear career, where most employees were women. They are 
being recruited into departments where there are opportunities for promotion, but it is 
taking them longer than the men to achieve the higher grades. The pattern could be a 
reflection of Joan Acker's contention that all organizations are intrinsically gendered 
(Acker 1990), and that the barriers to advancement are far greater for women than for 
men. 
Promotion 
There are several possible reasons for women staying longer than men in clerical 
grades. These include that they do not have the skills for the senior roles, that they are 
not being promoted as quickly, or that they are less likely than men to seek alternative 
employment, whether because they are more likely to be satisfied with the company or 
because they expect their opportunities in the external labour market to be limited. In 
the previous chapter I presented an analysis of the performance and competence data 
from Global which showed that the proportion of women and men with the highest 
levels of perfon-nance and skill are very similar. There were actually one hundred and 
twenty nine women who had achieved the two highest skill levels, but only ninety 
three men, however in Grade E, the first manager grade, there were ninety three 
women and one hundred and forty nine men. Even discounting the skill levels of 
those employees who were not at that time covered by the competency system, there 
were enough women with the appropriate technical skills for the same proportion of 
women and men to be promoted to management grades. 
The rates at which women and men are promoted can be determined with reasonable 
confidence from the data. According to a recent analysis of the General Household 
Survey, full time women in Britain are as likely to be promoted as men, (Booth et al 
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1998), and similar results have been found in the banking industry (Buttigieg & Walsh 
2000). Although these reports are counter-intuitive, there is no recent evidence to the 
contrary, although it should be stressed than in both studies the results were different 
for part time women, and women did not benefit financially from their promotion by 
anywhere near as much as the men. The overall evidence from my case studies is 
contradictory. Although specific data about promotions was not available, I deemed it 
reasonable to assume that those employees with less than one year in their current job 
and more than one year in the company had been promoted during the year. Using 
that presumption, in New Bank sixty five per cent of women and sixty per cent of men 
changed jobs either within or into their grade during the year, but in Global Insurance 
it was thirty seven per cent of women and forty seven per cent of men. Although these 
were not necessarily all promotions, it is probable that the majority involved at least an 
improvement in earning potential. Booth et al were working with the British 
Household Panel Survey, so their findings could not take full account of organisation 
specific characteristics. With access to the whole personnel file, it has been possible to 
relate the number of movements within or into each grade with the total number of 
women and men employed in that grade. 
When the'promotion' figures are disaggregated. to grade, figure 7-3 shows that in most 
grades there is far more career mobility among the male employees than the females. 
At no point have more than forty five per cent of women in a grade changed jobs in the 
past year, yet sixty eight per cent of the male managers in Global, and at least sixty 
three per cent of all employees outside the clerical grade in New Bank have been in 
post for less than a year. The only classification where women seem to be overtaking 
men is from clerical to junior manager in Global, but this is also the first point where 
there are more men than women in the grades, so although the percentage of promoted 
women is higher, the actual numbers are half those of the men. 
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Figure 7-3 
- 
2001/2 career mobility of women and men as % of totals in grade 
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Global New Bank 
Geographical mobility 
The main reason advanced by New Bank focus group participants for the under- 
representation of women in senior grades was women's comparatively reduced 
mobility. Mobility is no longer an explicit term of many employment contracts, even 
though the Global staff handbook states that it might be in certain cases. There is, 
however, a new emphasis on flexibility, which is a portmanteau word that can easily 
incorporate mobility. 
Dave: "It's mobility isn't it 
... 
I started as a branch manager as grade 7 moved to a 
Grade 8 and moved on to a Grade 9, so that I got promoted 
.--" 
Anna: "But each time you had to geographically move... " 
Dave: "Yeah that's right, from Scotland to England 
... 
not many women have been 
able to take the same route". 
Anna: "Its just the way women aren't prepared to move, its not as easy for women 
with a family 
... 
if the husband gets a job chances are the wife's either part time or in a 
lower paid job and it's a lot easier to uproot her and her kids than if she gets promoted 
and he's not prepared to move, that's why, that's just the way it is, for men and women 
144 
The Vertiral Gap 
Charlie: "... over the years I've noticed, I've been twenty one years, there've been very 
fewfemale employees moving around to become branch managers 
... 
" 
The New Bank staff handbook states, "The development of certain careers with New 
Bank will involve moving home", however I was informed that a contractual 
requirement for geographical mobility applies only to graduate trainees (Henderson 
2003). Most bank branches employ fewer than ten people, and branch closures mean 
that in most geographical areas the nearest branch is several n-dles away, so for most 
people promotion is synonymous with either moving house or travelling relatively 
long distances. In the branch network in particular, there are limited opportunities for 
promotion that do not involve a move. There are several reasons why women may 
find additional travelling problematic; they are more likely than men to have children 
to pick up from childn-dnders, and elderly relatives to cook, clean and care for. If the 
fan-tily has only one car it is likely to be the higher paid partner who has priority over 
its use; low paid workers, especially part-timers, may find the financial burden of 
using pubEc transport too great. They are even more likely than men to be engaged in 
further education in their own time (Callender & Metcalf 1997, Joss 2004), a 
commitment that is far more difficult to re-arrange than are social and sporting 
activities. In a survey of finance sector workers conducted for Unifi thirty two per cent 
of all branch based women who had not been promoted in the last five years believed 
that they needed to be able to travel further in order to get promotion, compared with 
just sixteen per cent of men Goss 2004). 
New Bank has an extensive branch network with offices from Aberdeen to Brighton, 
most of which employ fewer than ten staff. From figure 7.4 it is clear that the hierarchy 
has an even broader clerical base than does the Savings call centre, with seventy five 
per cent of employees in the clerical grade. Women hold approximately the same 
percentage of manager grades in the branches as in the whole company, but they 
occupy ninety per cent of the clerical and seventy seven per cent of the junior manager 
roles. The average length of service of clerical women in the branch network is twice 
as long as in the rest of the bank, which is itself twice as long as the length of service of 
male clerical workers (see Table 7.1). In the whole of the Retail Sales Division there are 
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only forty nine male clerical staff, however there are sixty nine male managers, 
suggesting that the company looks outside the branch network for a large proportion 
of its managers, even though it has a pool of highly experienced women and professes 
to operate a 'grow our own' policy. Clearly, women in the branch network are not 
being promoted, and an important contributory reason is that they do not consider 
themselves to be in a position to either move or to cornmute to a more distant office. 
Figure 74 
- 
representation of women in two departments of New Bank 
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Table 7-1 
- 
clerical grade service in New Bank Branches compared with the rest of the bank 
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Global respondents also identified travelling as a barrier to promotion for women, 
whom they felt would be less able to comply with the requirement than men, in 
whatever area of the bank they worked: 
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Frank., "The higher up the scale you go in [Global] you're obviously CMayfi-oln 
home more and more, and that's obviously a male thing". 
However they were also aware that women are just as likely to suffer from 
stereotypical perceptions of the impact of family responsibilities on their commitment 
to work. Charlie from New Bank had no substantive grounds on which to base his 
claim that a colleague was consistently failing in her attempts at promotion because 
she might soon become pregnant. However this is the sort of conclusion that most 
people would make, so that even if it were not true it might discourage many women 
in similar situations from applying for promotion. 
Charlie: "To give an example, I've got a colleague, talk about the old Star Chamber 
treatment, 
... 
for the last thirteen orfourteen months she's been in for three area sales 
manager jobs, on all three occasions he's been short listed down to three people, so 
you'd think that thefirst job like she might have missed out to other people, the second job, she was the only one that's been prepared to move geographically over a wide area, 
and each time she's been knocked back, she's thirty three years old, she was married 
recently, she knows what the reason is". 
Dora: "What's that, she'll become pregnant"? 
Charlie: "That's what the reason is". 
Evie: "That's what the reason'll be but they'll be careful not to say that". 
Charlie: "She knows it's the reason, you know the reason, I know the reason, and this is 
2002, and we're still coming across at [New Bank] as extremely chauvinistic". 
Flexibility 
- 
the 'long hours culture' 
The emphasis on the need for flexibility in the 'new workplace' is one that requires the 
employees to be flexible, in the time they spend at work and what they do there, as 
well as the time they spend getting to and from it. It differs completely from the 
concept of flexibility that women with children or elder care would find a valuable aid 
to managing the conflict between their responsibilities. It is this conflict that was seen 
by Barry from Global as being a significant criterion for senior managers involved in 
the selection process: 
Barry: "... through hypocrisy of senior managers, where you've got, well, 'I've got izvo 
applicants for this job, the likelihood is that I will need thent to 7vork- from 6 in the 
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morning to eight o clock at night for three months of the year, or when its really busy 
when the brown stuffs hitting thefan, and I'll not be sure that a woman call do that, 
given that she may have children, or she may have caring responsibilities, she may have 
grand-children to look after'. again its just down to immature hypocrisy and lack of 
understanding aboutflexible working, work life balance 
... 
". 
The Industrial Relations manager did not disagree that decisions may be made in this 
way, although he made a valiant attempt to defend senior managers by suggesting that 
any discriminatory decisions were made unconsciously, implying that any blame 
should lie with the organisational culture rather than the individual managers: 
Nigel: "... it's a kind of traditional industry and probably a lot of people are 
unconsciously discriminating when they make appointments, they think woman, mail, 
and make some kind of decision on that when promoting people to be like team leaders". 
Nigel went on to suggest that women have been actively rejecting the prospect of 
promotion because the demands of the job have become incompatible with their other 
priorities: 
Nigel: "... certainly in the last few years, being a team leader or a manager in this 
company has been very, very hard in terms of commitment, the hours people tend to put 
in and all the rest of it, I would suspect there's an awful lot of women who still in 
society bear the most of the kind offamily commitments are saying we're not getting on 
that train, sorry we're just not, I'm not going to work twelve hours a day and go home 
and do all this, I'm just not going to do it". 
Nigel's observation that team leaders and managers in the company are working 
twelve hour days mirrored the comments of the personnel manager from New Bank. 
Maureen was insistent that in New Bank it is possible to succeed without participating 
in the'long hours culture'. She cited her own success as a personnel manager who had 
decided to work strictly within her contractual hours on becoming a mother. Her 
argument would have been more persuasive had she not worked in the one 
department in the organisation that would be fully aware of the flexibility debate. 
Nigel's concerns that the culture is entrenched and will need a tremendous effort in 
order to achieve change are probably more realistic if less encouraging: 
Nigel: "I still think there's an undercurrent in the business and I'm not sure how easy 
it will be to overcome, that equates hours spent at work with performance as opposed to 
148 
I'lie Vertical Gap 
delivery of performance, and that's quite endemic in our society, so its going to be quite 
hard to overcome". 
The union activists on the Global focus group were actually more optimistic than 
Nigel. They thought that the attitudes of managers are changing, and that most are 
now responsive to challenges to the 'long hours culture'. Even so, Gladys felt that 
those who are seen to work long hours are still assumed to be more committed to their 
work: 
Barry: "I think there's a change, in a number of the managers that I speak to anyway, 
and I'm saying that, you know, you really have to challenge the managers that have file 
perception that you need long hours to do thejob". 
Gladys: "Yeah but I think there's a dfference between needing and taking 
... 
I think 
managers are impressed, and I know for a fact that a member of staff was quoted to me 
as 'after all she's still here at six o clock'". 
If there is a conflict between written policies and practice, most people will believe 
what they see happening rather than the policies. Women might be more likely to 
apply for more senior roles if there are role models demonstrating that working 
contracted hours is acceptable. Advertisements for graduate opportunities in New 
Bank stress that the bank has been classified as the sixth best employer for work life 
balance and promise '... a truly supportive working environment', yet there was a 
perception among the focus group participants that flexible working options do not 
apply to managerial staff: 
Clare: "... the cut-off is that matiagers are iiot eiititled to use theflexi Him systeiii 
Charlie: "... That's what they say, but they can't substantiate it because there's nothing 
in procedures aying you dont get paid 
... 
there's nothing to back this... " 
It is not enough to non-dnate a senior woman to act as a role model unless she is 
genuinely committed to the cause. The most prominent woman in Global Insurance 
has the role of 'gender equality champioW in her portfolio, and in that role identified a 
problem with meetings being held out of hours, yet called a meeting at her own house 
while she was waiting to go into the labour ward. As Andy said: 
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Andy: "what [she] did was identified a probleni, an issue, but didn't address it, and 
perpetuated it herseV" 
A realistic solution requires even more than senior women demonstrating a common 
sense approach to work. Just as: "equal pay for women 
... 
will be secure only when its 
justice is adequately understood and practiced by men" (Wedderburn 1986: 503), while 
it is mainly women who leave work on time to collect their cl-dldren, take their full 
allowance of parental leave and require working hours that are compatible with other 
calls upon their time, then such behaviour will continue to classify them as second 
class employees. Charlie explained that in New Bank there are men who want these 
opportunities, but that in practice they are treated differently from women in relation 
to work-life balance options. His concern was for the men, not just that they should be 
able to participate fully in family life, but also because women on flexi-time can refuse 
to work additional hours without pay, whereas men are expected to work unpaid 
overtime: 
Charlie: "... one of the biggest rows in [New Batik] at all is at Head Office, where 
they've refused to allow sections of staffflexi-time and this is causing major problems 
cause there's guys we work with take their kids to work-, collect their kids from school 
and such like, and they're being told absolutely ou can't haveflexi-tinle, but not across 
the board, the women have flexi time, we expect the men to work- overtime unpaid, 
except we have to pay women. Those sort of stupid things go on so yes there needs to be 
work life balance in more than one, across both sexes, because we've got as many nien 
now, sharing their lifestyle with their wife, sharing their work-load 
... 
" 
Part time work 
The conventional method of resolving the work life balance problems of employees is 
to offer them 'part-time' employment. Table 7-2 details the distribution of part time 
and full time staff between the grades in Global and New Bank. In both organisations 
the vast majority of part-time employees are in the clerical grades, and more than 
ninety per cent of them are women. Although there is little if any difference in the size 
of the pay gap for part-timers compared with full-timers of the same grade, the gap 
between the average full time equivalent salaries of part time women and full time 
men was forty per cent in New Bank and forty two per cent in Global. This was 
because only twelve per cent of New Bank part-time workers were outside the clerical 
grades, compared with thirty three per cent of full time workers, and in Global it was 
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only four per cent part time and twenty per cent full time. In almost every case the 
average length of service for part-timers was longer than it was for the equivalent full 
timers, suggesting that part-time work is effectively a ghetto, in which women's 
opportunities for advancement are at their lowest. 
Table 7-2 
- 
distribution of full and part time staff in New Bank and Global Insurance 
New Bank G lobalInsurance 
N % of all in 
grade 
%of all 
employees 
N % of all in 
grade 
%of all 
employees 
l full time i 1967 76 49 2715 80 68 ca ýart time 
[ 
er 635 24 16 699 20 18 
unior 11 time 1 725 92 18 839 97 21 lager 
M art time 59 8 1 22 3 1 
11 time 391 96 10 392 98 10 
manager part time 18 4 0 7 2 0 
Senior full time 182 97 5 246 100 6 
FnanaLer part time 5 3 0 0 0 0 
Alan, the manager of the New Bank Call Centre, believed that the part time workers in 
his department were content to be confined to the clerical grades, and put this down to 
their personal choice: 
Alan: "I think if you work in a part time job, you're not really looking at career 
movement as much as looking at your personal circumstances. Tile job wasn't what 
you were looking for, the job fits your life rather that the other way round sometimes, 
and perhaps that led to them being more satisfied with what they were doing, or willing 
to put up with it, is the other side of it, and therefore they stay longer, they're not as 
keen to move to the next job to get a career, what they really want perhaps is to get a 
job thatfits the rest of their life". 
One of the Global union activists shared AlaWs interpretation that women who work 
part time also choose to remain in the clerical grades. However her reference to the 
stress of working as a team leader introduced an explanation for those choices that 
goes beyond Alan's suggestion that it is simply a case of not wanting a career. A desire 
not to be subjected to unnecessary stress is a reason that might apply to people of 
either sex, but conventional attitudes to women and men at work mean that it is far 
easier for women than men to resist it. 
Harriet: "I think a lot of people go part time because they feel that's the most 
commitment they want to give to the job, and to be a team leader or something, it would 
be very stressful to try and do it in these days" 
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For most of the focus group participants, however, the relevance of part time work to 
the gender pay gap was that, whatever the reasons bel-tind the decision of women to 
work part time, they could not do so unless they stayed in or returned to the clerical 
grade. Bob had attended a work life balance focus group held by New Bank, where a 
woman manager had said about part-time workers: "I just won't entertain them, there 
is no way I'll have a part time team leader". He succinctly summed up the consensus 
of opinion: 
Bob: "There's not enough opportunities for part time people to be promoted into jobs, 
there isn't enough flexible working, and until you get reasonable job sharing you'll not 
start to close the gap". 
In New Bank there were at least efforts by management to publicise their work life 
balance policies, however unsuccessfully. Andy, a Global activist, doubted whether the 
insurance company had ever seriously considered the potential benefits of offering 
part time contracts outside the lowest grades: 
. 
Andy: "I don't think the company has necessarily at any stage explored whether some 
of the more senior jobs could be done part time, that from a cost savings poin t of view 
might actually might have been a good idea, to have done, do we need five day team 
leaders, or do we need five day business development managers, could tile business 
manage with possibly a three day job in some branches ".
Few women actually start their careers as part-timers; Seventy five per cent of the part 
time workers in Global are aged between twenty and forty, compared with sixty three 
per cent of the full time staff, adding weight to the assumption that the majority take 
that path following childbirth. For most the transition is not permanent either, but 
even if they return to full time work once their other responsibilities permit, they may 
well have blighted their future career prospects. In figure 7.5 1 show the age profile of 
all employees in the first management grade of Global. Forty six per cent of these 
workers are aged between twenty five and thirty five, a pattern that is almost identical 
to that for part time workers. At the point in their careers when women with 
promotion potential could expect to be entering on a management career, they are 
likely to be working part-time, and there are very few opportunities for part time work 
beyond Grade C. 
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Figure 7-5 
- 
age of Grade D employees and part time workers in Global 
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Sheena, the assistant to the Industrial relations manager in Global, was confident that, 
wherever possible, the family comn-dtments of their employees are accommodated, but 
the statistics in table 7.2 make it clear that this does not extend to enabling part time 
workers to hold managerial positions. This may well account for the situation that 
Nigel considered to be central to the problem of vertical segregation in Global Insure: 
Nigel: "One of our biggest problems is that we do not have good role model., at senior 
manager levels of women who have hadfamilies and come back". 
The ability to analyse the data at departmental level in New Bank reveals some striking 
exceptions to the general distribution of part time staff. In Risk and Lending there are 
a total of fifteen part time staff out of sixty-seven women, including a senior manager, 
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six managers and two assistant managers. When asked why this department was 
willing to entertain the idea of part time managers, the departmental manager 
explained: 
Alan: "[They] were previously full time employees 
... 
their circumstances have 
changed and they could no longer workfull time. As they liked the role they were Joing 
and we needed continuity we revised their job description slightly so that they could 
carry out the role on a part time basis". 
The main difference between these workers and those in much of the rest of the bank is 
the cost of replacing experienced staff. The pool of clerical staff from which managers 
can be drawn has only half as many clerical staff as non-clerical, significantly smaller 
than in the Savings Call Centre for example, where three hundred and fifty two of the 
four hundred and five staff are in the clerical grade (see figure 7.2). In addition, the 
technical nature of the work involves a much longer period of training. 
Paul: "... the idea would be to develop these people through, they come in as 
underwriters, then become senior underwriters, then principal underwriters, so the idea 
isn't just that they stay at the one level, its to move them through 
... 
we use on the job 
training, and we do a number of others (sic) training where they move to the next level, 
so we sit down with people where they attend forinal courses which we run in house 
Global also has some part time underwriters above the clerical grades, but only five, 
and all of them in the lowest management grade. Unlike New Bank, it is able to attract 
experienced, full time, staff from the external labour market, so does not need to make 
special arrangements for women who want to work part-time. The example of New 
Bank shows that when the part-time opportunities are provided, women are willing to 
undertake managerial roles at the same time as they are allocating some of their time to 
family responsibilities. There may be some women who do not want the additional 
stress, as indeed there are some men, but if they are not given the opportunity it is not 
appropriate to suggest that the decision to work part-time in a clerical grade is the 
exercise of a preference. 
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Figure 7-6 
- 
part time employment in New Bank clerical grade 
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At the other extreme of part time employment is the branch network. Forty eight per 
cent of all clerical grade women employed in the branches work between fourteen and 
thirty three hours a week (see figure 7.6), yet there are only seven part-time assistant 
managers and one part-time manager. The average length of service of the part time 
clerical staff is two point three years longer than their full time colleagues, so they are 
even less likely to seek alternative employment than their full time colleagues. In their 
research into careers in (inter alia) a retail bank, Halford et al suggested that the 
introduction of part time work has formed part of a "... new way of policing 
promotion" (Halford, Savage, & Witz 1997: 125), to replace the explicit exclusion of 
women that was possible before the 1970s. In the branch network in particular, a 
relatively large workforce of clerical and junior management grades is required to 
operate the branches, compared with the size of the management group. It is not in the 
interests of the business to have either a dissatisfied workforce or a high staff turnover 
rate, so they need to be able to manage the expectations of this important group of 
workers. The provision of part-time opportunities helps to retain experienced women 
who n-dght otherwise leave the bank following childbirth, and if they subscribe to the 
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mobility discourse, they are unlikely to have expectations of furthering their career in 
the short term. 
Feminisation and devaluation 
The analysis of New Bank employment by job description reveals just five jobs where it 
is possible to easily identify the opportunity for linear progression in the same role. In 
three of these jobs the patterns of women and men's employment is similar. In Table 
7.3 there are two jobs in which women are dearly in the majority, sales manager and 
team leader. These are predon-dnantly based in the hIgIdy feminised call centres, where 
the flattened hierarchy provides few opportunities for advancement into these grades, 
but women fill most of those that do become available. In both of these roles the grade 
of the majority of the incumbents belies the status conveyed by the job title. Sixty-four 
of the ninety one Sales Managers are graded junior managers, and two hundred and 
three of the two hundred and twenty two team leaders are in the clerical grade. In 
total there were three hundred and six jobs in the junior manager grade designated 
'manager' and two hundred and ninety eight in the manager grade. Women were in 
four fifths of the junior manager posts, but less than half of the manager grades, 
making it difficult to resist the conclusion that women are being given management 
jobs in name, and probably responsibility, but without the appropriate financial 
compensation. 
Table 7-3 
- 
jobs with potential career progression in New Bank 
job Business 
description Sales manager Team leader Analyst Development Undenvriter 
Ma ger 
Grade Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men 
Clerical 7 3 145 58 10 16 3 1 
jw-dor 
manager 
48 
-I 
16 11 
I 
4 72 155 
I 
11 2 12 9 
Manager 5 2 2 2 5 5 36 -47 12 12 
Senior --- 
manager 3 12 
The representation of women among the New Bank analysis is quite high for In 
Information Technology based job, but it appears to be a role where there is little or no 
opportunity for progression, with just a few trainees in the clerical grade and five 
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managers of each sex. The pattern is very similar in Global, where there were similar 
numbers of women and men in the lowest grade, but most of the employees were male 
junior managers. in Global, however, there were a larger proportion of managers than 
in New Bank, and two thirds of them were men (see Table 7-4). The skill levels of the 
Global women give a clue as to why they were less well represented than men in the 
higher grades. Ten of the Grade C women and eleven of those in Grade D had not yet 
acquired any skills, and most of the rest were still on the lowest three rungs of the 
ladder, suggesting that they were new to the role, and that this was an area that was in 
the early stages of fen-dnisation. This interpretation gains additional Support from the 
performance ratings of the more experienced women. For women to survive in a 
'male' occupation, they need to perform at least as well as the men. From Table 7-5 it 
can be seen that in this case their performance was significantly better, with twenty five 
per cent of them gaining Level 1, compared with just fifteen per cent of the men. 
Table 7-4 
- 
employment distribution in Global Insurance specialist roles 
Grade Underwriters IT Staff 
Women Men Women Men 
Clerical 227 201 19 25 
junior managers 58 115 25 86 
Managers 13 62 14 38 
Senior managers 4 21 0 6 
Table 7-5 
- 
performance ratings of Global specialists 
Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
rF Women 9 24 2 1 
Men 10 49 3 1 
Underwriters Women 15 90 14 1 
Men 49 168 21 
Underwriting in New Bank is another area that is becoming feminised. Even though it 
is a n-dnority occupation in the bank, the scarcity of appropriate skills in the local 
external labour market has led to them 'growing their own'. Whilst this policy is not 
designed specifically to benefit women, it does tend to have that effect, as the clerical 
work force from which the labour is drawn is predon-dnantly female. In Global, 
underwriting is one of the major job roles, and most of the junior Underwriters are 
women, so despite the relatively low numbers in the senior grades it is not so likely to 
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be regarded as a 'male' job as it had previously been in New Bank. The performance 
ratings in Table 7-5 suggest a possible reason for the under representation of women, 
as their overall performance is below the average for the company, with only twelve 
point five per cent on Level 1, compared with over twenty per cent of the men. 
However, the more objective competency system seems to contradict these results, as a 
much larger proportion of women than men are climbing the skills ladder. 
Promotion of Business Development Managers in New Bank is dependent on 
achievement of targets. Out of concern that there might be equal opportunities issues 
in the system the union has monitored its operation since it was implemented early in 
2001. The only problem they identified was that Business Development Managers in 
affluent parts of the country could meet their targets more quickly than colleagues in 
North East, because of the relative size of mortgages. This was tile only group of 
employees in the bank that had clear criteria on attainment of which they could be 
certain of promotion, so long as it is carefully monitored it should provide equal 
promotion prospects for men and women. It is a situation that could be replicated for 
all staff in Grades A to D in Global, if the competency system %vas linked in to 
promotion as well as to work and wages. Instead there were three hundred and 
twenty seven women in Grade B, who had obtained skills in excess of those required 
for their current jobs, yet there were only thirty nine in Grade C with those 
competencies. As yet the system is not delivering its potential to reduce the impact of 
vertical segregation. 
Although I do not have specific data on attitudes and preferences, the overall picture of 
vertical segregation suggests that, contrary to HakinVs suggestion that women prefer 
to stay in the lower grades, where they are given the opportunities together Nvith 
appropriate training, women take them. However the advance of women into more 
senior positions of New Bank has not necessarily been as advantageous to women as 
the statistics might imply; in the branch network in particular both full time and lay 
union officials suggested that the management roles which women moved into were of 
a lower status and commanded lower salaries than those typically occupied by men: 
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Charlie: "... over the years I've noticed, I've been twenty one years, there've been very 
few female employees moving around to become branch managers, they've always 
tended to get to the level of assistant manager as it was then, before they became 
customer service managers, and therefore that level of pay's lower than what you'd find 
in respect of the male counterpart would be on being a branch manager... " 
Rob: "... towards the latter part of the eighties, the traditional branch manager role 
disappeared to be replaced by customer service manager roles, which I've found it very 
hard to come across a man in that position, and what you've then got there is that 
culture started to spread to the head office departments and as certain previously senior 
roles disappeared and weren't replaced, slightly junior strata of managers assumed their 
responsibilities, and they were predominantly women ". 
Gwyn: "... its coming across more and more that a branch manager tends to be female, 
she may well be at the lowest level of junior management pay, and she'll have a team of 
at least five or six or more to manage. She's got all the different strands of sales, 
recruitment, staff recruitment this is, of looking after the premises, the cash, the 
coaching of staff and everything else and is still being paid at the low end of the pay 
scale... ". 
Although I did not have data on the responsibilities of each of the managers and junior 
managers in the branch network, I have been able to make a rough comparison of the 
status of male and female branch managers. In table 7-6 the number of staff is used as 
a gauge of the size of the branch, and the matrix details how many of each size branch 
are managed by each category of junior manager or manager. 
Table 7-6 
- 
New Bank branch management 
Number of staf f in branch 
men 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 14 17 total 
kiniol 
i nagerý 
E 
junior manaLers 2 1 
, 
3 2 2 3 1 13 
sd Managers 1 1 1 1 2 4 13 
There were a total of one hundred and thirty Customer Sales Managers in New Bank, 
thirty seven men and ninety three women, but only seventy eight branches. In those 
cases where there was more than one manager in the branch, the grade of the most 
senior manager was used. As predicted by the interviewees, women managed most of 
the branches, yet more than three quarters of those women were in the junior manager 
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grades, compared with only half of the males. Four of the female assistant managers, 
and five of the managers were managing larger branches than any of the men, and 
there were no women in the most senior manager grade. 
This chapter has shown that both organisations still reflect a distinct vertical 
segregation between the sexes, which contributes a significant proportion of the gender 
pay gap. I have found examples of women moving into some areas that were 
previously male enclaves, but mainly in circumstances where the move is beneficial to 
the economic interests of the organisation, and sometimes accompanied by a 
devaluation of previously high status roles. 
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Chapter 8. Discussion and Conclusion 
In Chapter One I posed the three questions to be addressed by this research: 
9 Does the use of 'objective' criteria for assessing performance help mitigate pay 
differences for jobs judged to be of equal value? 
Does the introduction of 'meritocratic' payment systems facilitate the entry of 
women into previously male don-dnated grades and roles? 
Are Pay Audits capable of fulfilling the role set out for them? 
In the previous two chapters I have described the results of my research into the pay of 
women and men in Global and New Bank, and made some prelin-dnary observations. 
In this chapter I expand on those observations and discuss them in relation to the three 
research questions and the existing knowledge in the field. I conclude with 
recommendations for further research, and practical measures that can be taken by 
employers, trade unions and the state. 
jobs judged to be of equal value 
In Chapter Three I described the development of career structures in the finance sector 
from those in which all employees of the same sex followed the same career path, 
acquiring experience in all elements of the business, to a situation where employees 
now specialise in specific aspects of the business, with no guarantee of advancement 
regardless of sex. In the original structure it was reasonable to assume that individuals 
with the same length of service were performing similar roles, so pay scales were 
related to age or seniority. Specialisation meant that this assumption was no longer 
reliable, and most of the employers in the industry began to use formal job evaluation 
systems to determine the relevant salary scale. The potential for these systems to 
produce gender neutral evaluations is disputed (Mcnally & Acker 1984; Acker 1990; 
Steinberg 1992; Hastings 2000), but they do provide a framework on which to base 
comparisons. This framework was only available to me in Global, with a less 
formalised system being in place for some grades in New Bank, and the remainder 
being subject to personal contracts. In the latter case the judgement of equal value liad 
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to be made by me on the assumption that similar job descriptions represented similar 
jobs. For these it is clear that my judgement could be faulty but, in keeping with Joan 
Acker's reservations, all of my findings about the size of the horizontal pay gap must 
be subject to the caveat that the assumption of equal value is not proved. 
The first question asks whether the use of performance measurement to determine pay 
helps mitigate gendered pay differentials. Although there is nothing new about 
payment by results, until recently it was a system used primarily in the manufacturing 
industry, where output is tangible. In such cases the process of measurement, whether 
or not approved by the workers, is likely to be sufficiently explicit to allow them to 
understand and check the calculations. Individual performance related pay as 
introduced into the finance sector in the 1980s is often associated with relatively 
intangible outcomes, such as customer service or dealing with change Even when tile 
criteria are apparently clear, such as the value of sales, they may be considered unfair 
according to the context in which they are viewed. For example, the New Bank trade 
union activists explained how bonuses based directly on the monetary value of 
mortgage sales discriminate in favour of agents in London and the South East, where 
house prices are highest. No doubt the agents in London and the South East would 
justify the larger bonuses on the grounds that they have to live in the region and pay 
the higher prices. Whether justified or not, inequalities of this nature affect women 
and men equally, and if the outputs to be measured are directly related to the work 
individuals were appointed to perform, women should be as capable of achieving 
them as men. The appraisal process used in Global to determine some clerical and 
most management pay awards assesses the achievement of individual objectives, 
agreed in advance by the employees and their managers, and directly related to cacti 
individual's job. If operated as intended it is sufficiently flexible to reward everyone 
fairly, however the element of flexibility in both the appraisal and award process, 
allows for the possibility of bias to emerge. The competency system also has a certain 
amount of flexibility. Based on the observation and testing of practical skills relevant to 
the next level of the job, there is no compulsion on employees to acquire additional 
skills, and no theoretical restriction on the speed they are acquired. The acquisition of 
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specific skills is rewarded by a pre-determined salary increment, so each employee 
covered by this system knows what they need to achieve and how they will be 
rewarded. As with job evaluation there is scope for the skills traditionally associated 
with men to be valued more highly than those associated with women, but with that 
caveat there is little room for the exercise of discretion in the process. However, the 
emphasis on individual responsibility for self-development, and the need to take time 
out for training, can present an additional barrier to those (mainly women) employees 
who are unable to be flexible in their working hours. The procedure used by New 
Bank for clerical workers combines elements of performance and competency with 
seniority based increments. Employees are assessed annually on their progress in 
acquiring the necessary skills for their job, and success in reaching the expected 
standard is rewarded by a fixed rate annual increment. 
In summary then, all of the clerical staff in New Bank and the majority in Global have 
their salary increments determined according to explicit fixed criteria, but there is 
flexibility, and therefore a much greater degree of subjectivity, in the process used for 
some Global clerical staff and all of their managers (New Bank managers do not 
receive salary increments). The gender pay gap is proportionate to the level of 
subjectivity; it is smallest for New Bank clerical staff, slightly larger for Global clerical 
staff and largest in the manager grades. There are exceptions to these general trends, 
including several groups of clerical graded women who earn more than their male 
colleagues, but on the face of it, even though there was no evidence of systematic 
gender bias in the award of appraisal ratings, the answer to the first question is yes, the 
use of clearly deftned performance criteria, such as competencies, does appear to be 
associated with a reduction in the size of the gender pay gap. 
However, performance is not the only influence on the level of pay, and my analysis of 
the horizontal pay gap revealed two others that have the potential to contribute to 
differences in the pay of women and men. The element of performance that 
contributes most to pay differences is management discretion, particularly in the 
calculation of salary increments. Discretion is not confined to the appraisal process; it 
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is an element in most aspects of salary determination, including the level of starting 
salaries, and in decisions to protect the pay of 'over-scale' employees following 
restructuring exercises. 
The calculation of starting salaries 
I have shown that there were wide variations in the salaries paid to new entrants and 
that, although there was no obvious gender bias to these variations, they severely 
reduced the transparency of the payment systems, and consequently obscured the 
results of the pay audits. Before the 1970s the majority of new recruits to the industry 
went straight from school into the trainee grades, and would remain with the same 
company for as long as they remained in the industry, so it was only in exceptional 
cases that there was any variation in the initial salary paid. This 'balkanization' of the 
sector meant that there had not been any need for industry wide conforn-dty of job 
descriptions with skills, or any common system for measuring skills and experience. 
The abandonment of the traditional 'no-poaching' agreements meant that it became 
possible for experienced workers to migrate between employers, and the increasing 
specialisation of finance sector employees made this possibility an attractive option, 
opening up a wider range of opportunities. There is no longer any limit on the number 
of entry points into an organisation, and therefore employers increasingly have to 
calculate starting salaries that reflect experience and skills gained elsewhere. 
With no common grading or qualification systems employers are dependent on job 
candidates' own account of their abilities, in application forms and interviews. The 
result is that the salaries of successful candidates are more likely to reflect their skill in 
completing application forms and negotiating in interviews than job related skills. The 
Finance Sector Skills Council (FSSC) has among its objectives the promotion of "the 
development of an integrated national standards framework for financial services", 
and publishes a list of 'appropriate exan-dnations' on its web-site (FSSC 2004). These 
include a range of specialist National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs) as well as more 
general qualifications where appropriate, and extend to degree level and beyond. The 
FSSC recognises that several finance sector companies, like Global, have developed 
, 
their own competency systems, which relate just to the requirements of those 
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companies, but suggest that the national standards can be used to complement the 
custorrdsed. versions, citing among their uses "Recruitment and SelectiW and 
"Designing Reward Systems". As Rees explained, with reference to training for the 
"new information technologies', the external systems '7end to produce highly 
transferable skills: in-firm training is more context specific" (Rees 1998: p112). There 
are problems with the NVQ system (Eraut 2001), not least the lack of a systematic 
requirement for regularly updating the assessment of skills (Kidd 2003), and the 
finance sector has been slow to take them up, (Blakely 2004) but if they were adopted 
across the whole industry these could be overcome, providing common criteria for 
determining starting salaries of experienced new recruits. When I conducted these 
audits New Bank had started to encourage Customer Service employees to take the 
relevant NVQs, and they were evaluating the Call Centre NVQ; by the time I wrote this 
paragraph, the FSSC was in the iniddle of a drive to recruit affiliates from the employer 
community, but few companies had agreed to participate (Blakely 2004). 
Resolving the pay protection conflict 
A solution for 'red-circling' that satisfies all parties is less easy to identify. The 
changing shape of the finance sector, which I discussed in Chapter Three, is the result 
of mergers and takeovers, as well as internal re-organisations and a re-alignment of 
business objectives from service to profitability. The main purpose of these exercises is 
to cut costs, and therefore the integration of payment systems almost always results in 
the lower pay scales being adopted when there are differences. In any payment system 
there will be a number of employees who are paid at the top of the scale, and who will 
therefore become 'over-scale' following such integration. It is likely that most of the 
highest paid employees are male, contributing to an increase in the gender pay gap, 
but even if they are not, these relatively high salaries distort the overall pattern of pay 
and add to the opacity of the payment systems. The normal method of dealing with 
such cases is to freeze the salaries until the new scales catch up with them. The 
alternatives present both employers and trade unions with conflicts of interest. 
Reducing the individual salaries would resolve the pay parity issue but, to be 
acceptable to the affected employees, the size of any one off financial compensation 
would need to be a realistic compensation for loss of future earnings, and would 
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therefore represent a large financial outlay for the employers. Placing the employees in 
jobs that command their salaries in the new scales, even if they have the relevant skills, 
is likely to give offence to other employees, who might be equally or better qualified, 
and is also likely to be in contravention of equal opportunities practices. It may not 
even be in the company's financial interests to offer voluntary severance, as many of 
the affected employees will have sufficiently long service to command maximum 
severance payments. 
Three years after the most recent merger there were still over seventy employees in 
Global whose service pre-dated the most recent merger and whose salaries were in 
excess of the new scale maxima. Nevertheless the company had no realistic plans to 
deal with the problem and no process in place for monitoring it. Red-circling of itself 
need not be a problem and properly implemented it can be a material factor in defence 
of an equal pay claim. However, even with the inadequate monitoring at Global, it is 
the most visible example of inequalities resulting from restructuring. Both union and 
management representatives acknowledged that insufficient attention had been paid to 
equality during the integration process and, as the union representative explained, the 
result was that "when [Global] came about you'd actually got seven or eight historical, 
discriminatory pay structures con-ting together as one, and what we've never done is 
wiped that out". There are likely to be more mergers in the near future (Walter 2004), 
and in all probability the further integration of disparate pay scales will produce more 
examples of this nature. If the management of red-circling continues to be as vague as 
is generally the case currently, the problem will be compounded and attempts to 
increase the transparency of payment systems frustrated. 
Prior to restructuring its clerical grade, New Bank had reviewed the salaries of all 
clerical staff in each department, and made funds available to departmental managers 
for "'exceptional increases" if any salaries were found to be out of line with those for 
similar jobs. This exercise was admittedly less complex than a merger, and it was not 
specifically aimed at elin-tinating gender inequalities, nevertheless, it appears to have 
achieved pay parity for the largest group of employees in New Bank. The 
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identification of inconsistencies was left to departmental managers, so inter 
departmental variations would not necessarily have been identified but, in the absence 
of an analytical job evaluation system, the process was the best possible way to ensure 
that the new structure was free of any form of bias at the outset, making it easier to 
identify the reasons for any subsequent differences. It also demonstrates that 
preparation of this nature is not only possible, but effective. There is a cost implication, 
but early identification of problem areas should enable those costs to be managed, and 
evidence of a properly researched and managed programme would provide a defence 
to a claim under the Equal Pay Act. 
Women's access to 'men! s jobs' 
One finding from my pay reviews that has been common to most of those reported to 
date (Neathey et al 2003; Brett & Milsome 2004), is that in the lowest paid grades pay 
gaps are very small and often it is the women who earn the most. However, rather 
than this being an indication of progress towards elin-dnating the pay gap, cross- 
tabulating the pay data with length of service showed that this finding had more 
relevance to my second question than to my first. If length of service can legitimately 
be used as a proxy for experience, the salaries of men are generally higher than those of 
women relative to their experience, at all levels in both companies, and the experience 
level of women in the clerical grades was significantly greater than that of their male 
counterparts. It was clear that clerical graded women's salaries were higher than 
meWs because they were less likely to be promoted out of the clerical grades into 
management or technical roles. 
The second question introduced in Chapter One was based on the hypothesis that tile 
use of meritocratic payment systems leads to the recognition of womeWs abilities and 
facilitates their access to jobs and grades traditionally viewed as men's territory. In 
Chapter Four I reviewed the main acadenlic explanations for wornews lower pay, and 
concluded that there are effectively two main schools of thought, both of which would 
anticipate a negative answer to this question. The 'preference theory, of Catherine 
Hakim attributes the segregation of women and men to the exercise of individual 
choice by the women (Hakim 1996a; 1998; 2002), and the 'theory of gendered 
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organisations' favoured by Joan Acker suggests that the superimposition ol 
payment systems on intrinsically gendered processes merely serves to recr, 
possibly even disguise, the gender imbalance (Acker 1990; 1992). 
Despite a substantial increase in the representation of women in management grade, 
since the 1970s, it is still significantly out of proportion with the numbers in the lower 
grades. This was the case in both companies, although greater progress had been 
made in New Bank, where the performance management system for non clerical 
workers was relatively unstructured, but forty five per cent of all managers were 
women. Global had well documented performance and competency system in 
operation, the results of which indicated that the proportion of women with the high 
level skills and performance was sufficient for women to be represented in the same 
proportions in all grades. Fifty eight percent of the two hundred and twenty five 
employees in the clerical and junior manager grades, A to D, who had achieved the 
two highest competency levels were women, but women accounted for only thirty 
eight per cent of the two hundred and forty two Grade E managers. The competency 
system is relatively new, so it is possible that women have not yet seen the benefit of 
their skills being demonstrably equal to those of their male colleagues. However, a 
comparison of the gender distribution in these two companies suggests that there is no 
evidence that the introduction of meritocratic payment systems facilitates the entry of 
women into previously male don-tinated grades. 
My analysis of the pay data did allow me to make some judgements as to tile reasons 
why women are still not being promoted as quickly as men, despite the availability of 
objective criteria for assessing candidates' technical skills. I found that there are 
essentially two reasons-, the jobs for which the majority of women are recruited have 
only limited direct promotion opportunities, and the hours that a substantial minority 
of women employees elect to work are not available beyond the clerical grades. I also 
-)und that where women have broken through the barriers, there is a tendency for the 
)s to become devalued. 
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'Women's work' 
Although women were in the majority in most jobs in the clerical grades, that majority 
was much larger in the departments where there was least opportunity for promotion 
within the same department. It was particularly large in the branch network, where 
the alternative promotion route of moving to a different department would involve 
either a house move or a long commute. The result was that only twenty five per cent 
of women working for Global, and thirty eight per cent of those in New Bank, could 
reasonably expect to be promoted out of the clerical grade, yet ninety per cent of the 
men who started in the clerical grades in both companies have the opportunity to 
progress to at least junior manager level. Clearly the recruitment process is responsible 
for this situation, but is it because women are the preferred candidates for the jobs with 
limited prospects, or because men do not apply for them? Neither of the companies 
was able to give me the gender breakdown of job applications, so my conclusion is 
based on extrinsic factors, particularly the wording of job advertisements and the state 
of the local labour market in the North East, and is therefore largely speculative. 
Despite the decline of the manufacturing industry in the North East, it is still tile 
largest employer of male labour. In 2002, twenty eight per cent of employed men 
worked in manufacturing, earning an average weekly wage of E346 (Unions North 
2002). Although this was below the average non-manual wage of 057, it was 
considerably higher than the : E198 earned by New Banks clerical men, and even tile 
E306 of their junior managers. The low pay was referred to in the focus group when 
David said that he would be too embarrassed to discuss his salary with his mates. In a 
region that is still overcoming the legacy of the macho male culture associated with 
heavy manufacturing industry, the additional embarrassment of low wages must need 
to be justified by the expectation of the higher rewards available for managers. For 
women in New Bank however, the average clerical salary was only E8 below tile 
average manual salary of E215 in the region, and the highest clerical salary was only 
E26 below the average for all non-manual women. The combination of relatively good 
pay with comfortable working conditions, in spacious modern offices, must make 
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clerical work in New Bank an attractive option for women whose alternative is the 
factory bench. 
The fact that the clerical jobs with little prospect of promotion to management are an 
attractive option for women in the North East, but not for men, does not preclude 
women being the preferred candidates for these jobs. An advertisement for vacancies 
in this category emphasises the flexibility of working hours and the generous holiday 
entitlement, describes the basic salary as 'good' and refers to the possibility of 
progressing up the career ladder of the clerical salary structure. A contemporary 
advertisement for a specialist 'senior voice analyst, is far more business like, including 
the salary range for the job, the actual holiday entitlement, and the provision of 
pension scheme, profit share scheme, staff restaurants and company gym. Flexibility is 
mentioned, but in the context of being able to work under pressure, and work life 
balance is the very last phrase in the advertisement. Although neither of these 
advertisements is overtly biased to one sex or the other, the first one is clearly aimed at 
people for whom working hours are a major consideration, and who would be unlikely 
to have the time to use the company gym in other words people with caring 
comnlitments, most of whom are women. The second advertisement leaves no doubt 
that the job holder would be expected to put the job first, to be more interested in the 
financial rewards than work life balance, yet be able to find the time to use tile gym. It 
does not rule out applications from women, but it is unlikely to attract those with 
young children to consider. 
Most of the jobs with poor promotion prospects are based in customer service 
environments, such as call centres and high street branches, and require some of the 
'soft' skills traditionally associated with women, such as communication and 
counselling. By pitching the salaries at a level that are attractive to women, but not to 
men, in a broad clerical band that incorporates its own career ladder, I believe that 
New Bank has succeeded in attracting their ideal employees. As Belt found, there is a 
common perception among call centre managers that women over forty and those with 
children were the ideal candidates to be call centre agents because it was felt they 
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would not be interested in promotion (Belt 2002). The ability to progress from clerk, 
through team leader to team manager helps to sublimate the aspirations of all but the 
most ambitious. It leaves the more financially rewarding promotions available for 
those who are willing and able to put their careers before the rest of their lives. 
The combination of New BanVs geographical location and its grading structure made 
the distinction between the two classes of recruit relatively easy to identify, however I 
believe that similar factors operate in most medium to large finance sector companies, 
especially where call centres and branches are located away from the major financial 
centres, often in green field sites. Whether or not they are 'interested' in promotion, 
women with domestic commitments experience practical difficulties in commuting 
long distance or moving house, and such restrictions are less likely to apply to men. 
Average salaries may be low compared to elsewhere in the organisations, but they are 
usually competitive with the local alternatives of shop or factory work. 
Working hours 
The New Bank job advertisement for customer service and telephone staff offered a 
choice of full-time, part-time, evenings, week-ends, temporary or permanent, and all 
with the possibility of flexi-time. Twenty five per cent of all women working in each 
organisation were part-time, and most of them were employed in the clerical grades 
(seventy nine per cent in Global and eighty eight per cent in New Bank). It was the 
acceptance of low paid, part-time jobs that Hakim claimed marked out the majority of 
women workers as 'drifters' or 'adaptives' with no commitment to company or career 
(Hakim 1996b; 1998; 2002). That interpretation was shared by the call-centre manager, 
who believed that women who chose to work part-time were effectively declaring that 
they had no further interest in pursuing a career. The data from the Global pay audit 
suggested a very different scenario, in which the majority of women who worked part- 
time were between the child-bearing ages of twenty five to thirty five, and that either 
side of that peak women were more likely to work full time. Some continue with 
reduced hours for the rest of their working lives, but for most it is simply an 
expedience, to help them manage at a period when their domestic workload is 
particularly heavy. 
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The age band twenty five to thirty five was also the peak period for workers taking the 
first step into management by becon-dng junior managers. As the union official for 
Global made a point of telling me- "if you haveWt got onto that rung by the time you're 
thirty, yoWre never going to", and although that statement was an exaggeration, it was 
true that there were very few junior managers in Global over the age of thirty five. 
None of this would matter if an accommodation was made for management jobs to be 
performed on a part-time basis, but as one Global focus group participant pointed out, 
even teams of part-time workers were managed by full time managers. Similarly, in 
New Bank Paul confirmed that there had never been any part-timers outside the 
clerical grade in his call centre. Approximately a quarter of all New Bank employees 
work in the customer service environment, such as call centres, where the staffing 
hierarchy is very flat. Ninety four per cent of the workers were in the clerical grade, 
and they comprised over sixty per cent of all clerical workers in the bank. The jobs do 
not take long to learn, and there are few or no department specific technical skills 
required for the few supervisors and managers, so there is a large pool of suitable 
candidates from which to select, and there is unlikely to be any difficulty in filling 
vacancies with full time staff. 
In the Risk department of New Bank the situation was somewhat different. Tile 
hierarchy takes the more traditional pyramid shape, with more people in the junior 
manager and manager grades combined than in the clerical grade. The bank's 'grow 
our own' policy means that a considerable amount of time and money is spent on 
training these members of staff, and they are therefore expected to progress througli 
the grades regardless of their sex. When an individual's circumstances have become 
such that a thirty five hour week is no longer convenient, Alan is willing to make tile 
necessary arrangements to accommodate part time working rather than lose valuable 
skilled staff. There are also part time managers in IT, another department in which 
employees need to be highly skilled. It seems paradoxical that none of the call centres 
in either company has part-time managers, even though they have a large contingent 
of part-time staff working in part-time teams. The only explanation that makes sense is 
that the management logic is based purely on econonlics, if there is no cost benefit 
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from employing part-time managers no effort will be made to facilitate part time 
working. If they are operating on the assumption that part-time workers are not 
interested in a career they will continue to advertise the vacancies as full time, and part 
timers will only apply when they are in a position to increase their hours. It is clear 
from the examples in Risk and IT that part-time work and ambition are not necessarily 
exclusive, and there is no reason why that should not be true in other departments. 
The failure of women to actively seek promotion when they are given no 
encouragement or opportunity can hardly be described as having a preference for low 
paid clerical work, but rather a pragmatic acceptance that there are no management 
jobs for part-timers. 
In one of my exploratory focus groups I encountered some strong feelings from female 
participants that part time workers lack commitment to the job. These comments were 
based simply on the fact that part-timers work their contractual hours, coming in and 
going home'on-time. Even though it was understood that most part-timers have time 
sensitive obligations before and after work, the perceived pressure on full-timers to 
participate in the 'long hours culture' caused resentment against those who were 
automatically excluded from it. There is no doubt that the 'long hours culture' is still 
prevalent in the industry generally, including in my two case study organisations. 
Work life balance policies are in place, but their implementation is at best erratic. I 
received reliable accounts of managers who denied the possibility of part-time work, of 
departments where flexible options were denied to male staff, and of employees who 
were convinced of the need to be seen arriving at the office early and leaving late. I 
have personal experience of mandatory weekly breakfast meetings and knowledge of 
two occasions when laptop computers were taken into the labour ward. This is no 
longer the culture of 'the jacket on the back of the chair' to create the impression of 
being a hard-worker. The extra hours are being worked for no extra pay in order to 
cope with the intensification of work that has affected many British workplaces since 
1980 (Green 2001). The situation is exacerbated by a desire to maximise the potential 
reward from performance related payment systems (Wharton & Blair-Loy 2002). 
Clerical workers are not exempt from the 'long hours culture', but almost every one 
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that I have spoken to believes that the stress on their supervisors and managers is 
significantly greater than their own. The prospect of even greater work related stress 
to add to the stresses and strains of home and family is another factor to be considered 
by a woman considering the pros and cons of promotion. While there are no role 
models of either sex working part-time or using flexible working to improve tile 
quality of their lives, it is a perception that is unlikely to change. 
In Chapter Two I described attempts by the government to limit the impact of tile 'long 
hours culture' by amendments to social and labour market policies and legislation. 
Measures include a limit on the average length of the working week, provisions for 
parental and paternity leave and a right to request flexible working. In practice there 
are two distinct categories of flexible working- the first allows employees to choose 
and adapt their work patterns to fit with the rest of their lives, and includes flexi-time, 
working thirty five hours in four days, reduced hours and an allotment of 
parental/carers leave over and above the legal n-dnimum; the other category is 
designed for the benefit of the employer and allows for work schedules to be decided 
at short notice in response to business 'peaks and troughs' (Coyle 2003). The second 
type is of no benefit to people with caring responsibilities who need to be able to plan 
for childcare, hospital visits and school sports days, but if the first version of flexibility 
were fully implemented throughout an organisation, more women might consider 
promotion to be a viable option. If the options are available, but men are, or feel that 
they are, discouraged from taking advantage of them, their use is likely to be seen as 
evidence that women who use them are an inferior class of worker needing special 
treatment in order to be able to perform their jobs. The worst-case scenario is that tile 
"long hours culture' is allowed to continue unchecked, and that eventually all but the 
most deterrnined of either sex will decide to opt for the relatively easy life of a clerical 
career, with its added attraction of still being able to attract premium rates of pay for 
approved overtime. Not choice, possibly pragmatism, but I believe that for most it is 
more likely to be resignation, or 'making the best of things' in recognition of 
circumstances beyond their control. 
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Ferninisation 
The alternative to 'preference'. discussed in Chapter Four, is Joan Acker's 'theory of 
gendered organisations' (Acker 1990). After explaining how even the best intentioned 
of apparently gender neutral policies and practices can be tainted by an underlying 
gender culture, I described the recent restructuring of employment in an American 
Bank. In a carefully monitored exercise the status of branch management was reduced, 
along with the associated pay and benefits, and a new, high status, sales job was 
developed. All jobs were advertised, and the gender balance of branch management 
switched from male to female, while most of the sales jobs went to men. This process 
of devaluation associated with ferninisation has been recorded since the expansion of 
clerical work at the end of the nineteenth century, but the recording has been an 
historical rather than contemporary exercise. It appears to have happened in the 
branch network of New Bank, and with the underwriters in Global, where there has 
been an influx of women into these previously male dominated jobs. In New Bank the 
women who are managing the branches are in a lower grade than the men they have 
replaced, and in Global, the differential between the pay scales of underwriters and 
general staff has been almost completely eroded. I also found evidence that women 
are beginning to move into the IT structures of both organisations, but as yet the pay 
scales remain well above those of the general staff. If I am right, the identification of 
this movement in its early stages has provided an opportunity to monitor the impact 
on wages and, if necessary, prevent the devaluation of the jobs. 
The economic explanation for the price of labour decreasing when women enter the 
market is that there is no longer a shortage of candidates for the positions, so it is not 
necessary to pay enhanced salaries to attract employees. The experience of the 
feminisation of clerical work has been for men to move away from those jobs that 
women move into (Guerriero Wilson 2001), so the pool of potential workers is unlikely 
to change much in size. Instead of the laws of supply and demand affecting the price 
of labour, there still seen-ts to be an assumption that if women can do the job, it requires 
little skill. This way, if demand outstrips the supply of women it can be met by 
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employing a different, and cheaper, class of men than those the women replaced, such 
as part-time students, or older men made redundant from other industries. 
An Evaluation of the Equal Pay Audit Process 
I identified the possibility of an incursion by women into the IT jobs because my 
analysis of the pay and personnel data supplied by the companies went well beyond 
the recommendations of the EOC in their Equal Pay Toot Kit. The third question this 
research was designed to answer was whether pay audits are capable of fulfilling the 
role set out for them. A recommendation by the Equal Pay Task Force that all 
employers should be obliged to perform pay audits was adopted in a diluted fashion 
by government, which decided to encourage rather than compel. The 'Pay Review 
Model' orEqual Pay Tool Kit' was produced as a guide to the process in July 2002. By 
the end of 2003 an EOC commissioned report on progress found that approximately 
fifty percent of employers still had no plans to conduct a review; of the fifteen per cent 
that had done so, only a quarter used the Tool Kit, although most followed a similar 
process. Only one fifth of these companies found that they had any significant pay 
gaps (Brett & Milsome 2004), and it is the reliability of that result that I want to 
challenge in the first part of my answer to this question. There are two elements to this 
part of the question: who is compared and what is significant? 
The reliability of the results 
The basis for comparison 
The most reliable basis for making comparisons is to use the results of a job evaluation 
exercise, although even these need to be reviewed for bias. A job evaluation system 
that is operated consistently across an organisation allows comparison of jobs with the 
same score but in different departments. In Global, I was not only able to compare the 
salaries of everyone on the same pay scale, but by calculating actual salary as a 
percentage of the target salary of the scale I could make reliable comparisons of 
employees whose jobs had the same job evaluation score, but for labour market 
reasons conunanded different salaries. These differences can be justified in terms of 
the Equal Pay Act, but nevertheless it is reasonable to assume that individuals would 
progress through those scales at similar rates, that is (for example) if it takes a male 
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underwriter four years to get to the target salary, but after the same period of time a 
female analyst with the same job score is only half way to her target, even though she 
may be on exactly the same salary, I would suggest that there is a potential equal pay 
issue. 
Without job evaluation, especially in a broad banded scale with multiple entry points 
such as that used for New BariVs clerical staff, that level of analysis is not possible. 
New Bank is one of the almost sixty per cent of private sector companies that do not 
have a job evaluation system in place (Milsome 2003). Of the companies that had 
conducted a pay review by the end of 2003, sixty per cent relied on job evaluation, and 
thirty per cent used a review of job titles (Brett & Milsome 2004). In Small and Medium 
Enterprises (with up to two hundred and fifty employees) this might be a realistic 
option, but when I attempted the exercise in New Bank, with over four thousand 
employees and two hundred and twenty two job descriptions, the task was at best 
daunting. Although I managed to condense these descriptions into eleven 
classifications across three grades, the process was intuitive rather than scientific, and 
introduced a significant element of doubt as to the reliability of inter-departmental 
analysis. 
There is still a majority of employers who have no intention to conduct pay reviews, 
and a similar proportion without a job evaluation scheme (Mlsome 2003; Neathey et al 
2003; Brett & Milsome 2004). Two thirds of those without job evaluation schemes in 
Milsome's survey had not considered equal value, so it is reasonable to conclude that a 
significant proportion of the employers who have not conducted pay reviews do not 
have a job evaluation scheme in place. Neathey et al considered a review of job titles to 
be an acceptable basis for a pay review, but they did not have the experience of trying 
to conduct one. Without the relative transparency associated with an analytical job 
evaluation scheme, the value of equal pay reviews is limited to inter-departmental 
reviews, a useful analysis but far short of the ideal. 
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New Bank has adopted a broad band for its clerical employees, and has only one grade 
each for junior managers, managers and senior managers. Partly for purposes of 
comparing the results in the two companies, but also to see what effect it would have 
on the analysis, I n-dn-dcked the New Bank system in Global, by combining the grades 
which comprised the New Bank scales. In this particular case, two out of the four 
"combined' grades had larger pay gaps than any in the original classification. I 
produced yet another set of results by comparing the salaries of all workers in the same 
grade regardless of which scale they were on. The different results produced by 
manipulating the data in this way demonstrated to me that even with a job evaluated 
system, the results of a pay audit can be manipulated. In particular they depend on 
where the cut off point in each pay grade occurs; If there is a job close to the cut off 
point, filled predon-dnantly by members of one sex, the size of the gender pay gap 
could vary significantly depending on whether it is placed at the top end of one grade 
or the bottom of the next. It was this potential for initial findings to be deceptive that 
prompted me to question what level of pay gap should be considered significant. 
How big is significant? 
According to the EOC, gaps of five per cent and above are significant, three per cent if 
the gap is consistent. These figures were almost certainly chosen by reference to the 
statistical usage of the word significance, When statisticians set a at 0.05 they are 
guarding against the likelihood of making a Type II error by deciding to retain a false 
null hypothesis (Pagano 2004). Statisticians are looking for trends, but the purpose of a 
pay audit is to identify potential locations of unequal pay, where further investigation 
n-dght reveal that just one employee in a large department is unfairly paid. In these 
circumstances I felt that it was more important to avoid making a Type I error, or 
rejecting a true null hypothesis. I decided that the only way to be sure was to look at 
every set of results except those with absolute parity. By looking at the range of actual 
salaries in each comparison as well as the average, and by producing scatter charts of 
salaries against length of service, I identified potential anomalies in more than forty 
groups of employees who would have been excluded from further analysis had I 
adhered strictly to the Tool Kit guidelines. 
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Most of the companies who contributed to Neathey et al's report, wl-dch had concluded 
their pay reviews and found pay gaps, were reluctant to discuss the size of those gaps, 
but twenty one of the thirty five claimed to have identified no gaps at all. In the 2003 
report of Brett and Milsome, sixty eight per cent of employers claimed they had found 
no unjustifiable gap. While I accept that there may be some organisations with total 
pay parity, it is implausible for that to be the case in such a large proportion of 
companies. It seems more likely that at least some of them have relied on the EOC 
recommendation that only gaps of five per cent and above should be considered 
significant. In view of my own experience this may well have meant that some 
genuine discrepancies were overlooked, and induced a sense of complacency that may 
not be justified. 
The limitations of pay audits 
The value of a pay audit is dependent on the quality of the data and, particularly in 
large organisations that have never before conducted an exercise of this nature, it 
would be surprising if there were no problems. In both Global and New Bank I 
encountered a number of obvious errors in the data, wl-dch I had to refer back to the 
employer before proceeding with the analysis. The biggest problem was that all 
employees were shown as having started their current job witl-dn the last two years. It 
turned out that in both cases this was a software error, and could not be resolved in 
time for my analysis, so I had to use length of time with the company as a proxy for 
experience, rather than length of time in the current job. 
A pay audit can only present a snapshot of the pay of women and men at the time of 
the audit. That pay will reflect a whole range of events during each persows career, 
which cannot practically be taken into consideration. For example, I had the details of 
every woman who had received maternity pay in the previous twelve months, but 
could not determine which women had taken maternity leave prior to that. I had no 
way of telling what salary people started on, unless they had less than one years' 
service, and I could not judge whether this year's outstanding performers were 
consistently outstanding, or whether they'd just been lucky this year, A single pay 
audit, however detailed the analysis, will reveal some instances of unequal or unfair 
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pay, and it n-dght give clues about the reasons, but it won't resolve inequality. It 
should be used as a tool to identify the underlying problems in areas where changes 
need to be made, and be repeated at regular intervals to ensure that those changes are 
having the desired effect. It is in danger of being used simply to identify potential 
equal pay cases, where the immediate problem can be resolved with money, but could 
return in a few years' time. just as formalisation of the recruitment process can 
actually disguise discrimination and bias rather than elin-dnate it Gewson and Mason 
1986b; Dickens 1998), so it could even be possible for pay audits to present a false 
impression of pay parity. This is not to say that the process is not valuable, simply that 
the value of pay audits is in identifying potential problem areas, and they should not 
be acceptable as stand alone evidence of pay equality. So long as audits are conducted 
regularly the quality of the available data will increase. It should be possible to make 
comparisons over the years, possibly even identify a cohort of women and men to track 
over a period of years, building up a picture of career changes, maternity leave, part 
time interludes and salary progression. 
Conclusion 
In the opening paragraphs of Chapter One I asked whether there could there be some 
characteristic of the sector that accounts for the disproportionate size of the gender pay 
gap in the finance sector. I have looked at the structure of the industry, discussed 
changing organisational priorities and considered the impact of external labour 
markets. The sector is by no means unique in its increasing globalisation, in its 
emphasis on profit over all other considerations or in its experimentation with 'new' 
payment systems. Instead I propose that the reason that the finance sector is at the top 
of the league for unequal pay, is that it is also at the top of the league for pay generally 
(ONS 2004b: Table E14). A relatively low status job in a bank, building society or 
insurance company is still a 'good job for a girl'. It still has a relatively high status, 
working conditions are comfortable and part-time or flexible work schedules can 
usually be accommodated. It is the best paid job available without professional 
training and, in theory at least, relevant training can be undertaken whilst employed. 
Employers in the sector have found that they can attract the quality of worker they 
need for customer service roles by offering slightly better salaries than are available for 
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those women in competing industries. What is more, while that advantage remains in 
effect, there is unlikely to be much in the local labour market that is more attractive, so 
that even with very limited promotion opportunities, this section of the workforce 
remains loyal. 
Nevertheless, I believe that I have identified some areas where improvements can be 
made to the prospects of those women who are trying to break through into the male 
strongholds, and earn the same salaries. There is nothing revolutionary in the next fe%v 
paragraphs. For the most part I am proposing that a greater effort is made to improve 
the use of structures and processes that already exist; for employers to be challenged to 
demonstrate that their commitment to equal opportunities is genuine, not simply the 
rhetoric that they currently appear to be. 
Promotion of Industry Wide Qualifications 
Wide differentials in entry level pay for experienced new entrants can only be 
eliminated if employers have reliable and objective criteria with which to assess the 
level of that experience. The exan-driations of the relevant professional bodies are still 
taken by some career oriented employees, and there are some occupations which are 
'regulated', meaning that the employees need a standardised qualification in a specific 
element of their job. Apart from these most training is in-house and job specific. 
Where competency systems have been developed, they may provide a basis for 
assessing existing employees for promotion, but they need to be aligned to an industry 
wide qualification scheme if they are to be of value for external recruitment. The FSSC 
has already embarked on a programme to "promote the development of an integrated 
national standards framework for financial services", which incorporates relevant 
general, vocationally related and occupational qualifications, covering all aspects and 
levels of work in the industry. My recommendation is that Unifi and Arnicus should 
encourage all employers in the industry to subscribe to this framework, and ensure 
that all employees have equal access to the necessary training. 
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Guidelines for preparing to integrate salary structures 
If my first recommendation was to be adopted, it would also facilitate the integration 
of payment systems following the mergers that are predicted to continue for some time 
(Walter 2004). A period of integration is hectic and stressful for most people in tile 
affected companies, so it is not surprising that some issues are overlooked. 
Unfortunately, until gender and race have been genuinely 'mainstreamed', equality is 
usually one of those issues. Trade unions produce negotiators' guides precisely to 
ensure that nothing gets overlooked at such times, and I therefore recommend that tile 
unions prepare such a guide detailing the ideal process for preparing to integrate two 
or more pay structures. It needs to incorporate a realistic comparison of jobs, not just 
the 'felt-fair' process described by the Global focus group participant, a pay review, 
and a detailed plan for dealing with pay protection, including a process for monitoring 
its implementation. 
Improving'work life balance' 
Both the Personnel Manager in New Bank and the Industrial Relations Manager in 
Global were in agreement that the 'long hours culture' is not and should not be 
necessary, yet part-time work and flexible working options are still confined, in 
practice, to the lower grades. It is not impossible for this sort of culture to be turned 
around, it happened in IBM Germany, following an intensive campaign by the Works 
Council, with the support of senior managers, but it cannot happen without high 
profile role models providing the evidence that it really is alright to go home on time. 
Ever since I first heard of the Ich Bessine Mich (I come to my senses) campaign at a 
Conference in 1997,1 have been trying to promote similar ideas in this country, so I 
realise that there is little chance of achieving anything on such a grand scale. However, 
what can be done, by both unions and employers, is to ensure that high profile, 
positive publicity is given to those managers who are working part-time, or managing 
not to work unpaid overtime. Furthermore the unions should make it clear that they 
will pursue grievances on behalf of members who are denied the opportunity to work 
part-time, job-share or take advantage of flexible working options just because they are 
employed in managerial roles. 
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Promote and extend Equal Pay Audits 
When I started this research I was confident that I would be recommending that the 
government mandate the conduct of Equal Pay Audits. Having conducted two, and 
realised the amount of commitment that is needed to perform a truly effective audit, I 
can see that mandating could actually be counter-productive. It is quite possible to do 
a basic audit, following the five steps of the Equal Pay Tool Kit, and produce a set of 
results that seem to say there is no problem. If the company recognises a trade union 
that prioritises equal pay, then they might be persuaded to look a little more closely at 
the figures, but there are many companies that do not recognise any trade union, and 
there are also trade unions that are not fully comrnitted to achieving equal pay. As a 
result these companies would be able to justify their assertions that they do not have an 
equal pay problem, and most potential claimants would be deterred. 
Instead I recommend that the policy remains one of encouragement, but that the 
guidelines are extended to incorporate a more detailed analysis of the horizontal pay 
gap, and the vertical pay gap. If audits are repeated on an annual basis it should even 
be possible to track a cohort of employees in order compare the actual progress of 
women and men, rather than making assumptions based on length of service. Most 
importantly of all, it needs to be made clear that an equal pay review is, ideally, a tool 
for monitoring the implementation of gender mainstrearning, not a substitute. 
Monitoring the feminisation of Information Technology 
A longitudinal cohort study provides the opportunity for further research in all 
elements of the employment relationship. The data from both of these audits suggests 
the possibility that women are beginning to break through into the male dominated IT 
specialisations, but that so far there has been no deterioration in the relevant levels of 
pay. I would therefore recommend that, if any employer can be persuaded to include 
such a cohort study, they pay particular attention to changes in the pay differentials, 
role and person specifications, recruitment practice and gender balance of IT jobs 
compared with other roles in the company. The process of intensive monitoring Nvould 
almost certainly slow down the process of devaluation, but it should still provide a 
valuable insight into how it actually comes about. 
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But what about the future? If the latest cost cutting exercise of several major banks and 
insurance companies proves successful, and is emulated across the sector, the gender 
pay gap might almost disappear. The outsourcing of routine and telephonic activities 
to "off-shore' establishments in the third world could result in a decimation in the 
number of women employed in the sector, and most of those who will be displaced 
will be among the lowest paid. If this were to happen a pay audit would reveal hugely 
improved statistics, but the displaced women will probably be earning even less 
money in other industrial sectors. Pay equity is far more complex than a simple 
comparison of the pay of women and men in the same companies, and will not be 
achieved merely by conducting, or even acting upon, equal pay audits, however 
exhaustive. 
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APPENDLX i. The New Payment Systems 
job Evaluation 
Job evaluation is a system for comparing jobs so that they can be placed in 
rank order according to their degree of difficulty or responsibility. Jobs have 
always been differentiated, but although standard systems were available 
from the 1950s, it was not until the late 1960s that their use became common in 
the UK (Hastings 2000). Although there are many variations, they all fall into 
one of two categories, sometimes described as quantitative and non- 
quantitative (Waine 1985 p 303), but more commonly as analytical and non- 
analytical (EOC 2000a). The main difference between the two types is in the 
degree of objectivity with which the exercise is undertaken, which will tend to 
be greater in the quantitative or analytical methods. 
Pay Structures 
Pay structures are the framework whereby an organisation groups different 
jobs, for the purpose of assigning pay rates or scales. There are five types of 
structure that commonly operate in the UK, namely grading, broad banding, 
job families, spot rates and pay spines. 
Grading systems 
In a traditional grading system jobs are grouped according to the skills they 
require. This has the advantage of facilitating different pay scales to reflect 
market forces, however, in a large organisation it could eventually result in an 
excessive number of different pay scales (IDS 2001). 
Broad-banding 
Put at its most simple, broad banding is "'the compression of a hierarchy of 
pay grades into a small number of wide bands" (Armstrong 2001a: 1). The 
most common reason for their introduction is to promote flexibility, in roles, 
working and pay, although they may also be used to "support strategies for 
organisational and cultural change 
---" 
(Armstrong 1996: 226-227). 
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The number of bands is typically four or five, but can be as extreme as a single 
salary band. Individuals are able to make progress through the band, without 
having to obtain a formal promotion. Line managers may have increased 
discretion to manage pay and careers within the bands, subject to budgetary 
lin-titations and general guidelines (Armstrong 2001a), however they are often 
introduced in conjunction with a competency framework, whereby progress is 
dependent on the acquisition of relevant skills (Hastings 2000). 
job Families 
Whereas broad banding is usually a means of reducing the hierarchical 
structure of an organisation, job families link jobs of a similar nature but retain 
"differentiating factors that distinguish the various levels of work" 
(Armstrong 1996 p 178). In other words each of the different jobs within a 
family is associated with a particular grade or band in a company-wide 
grading system, although as can be seen from figure AM adjacent positions 
are not necessarily in consecutive grades (IDS 2001). 
Figure Al-I 
- 
example of job family structure 
Example job Family: Collections 
Position Brief Outline Description Grade 
Regional 
manager 
Leadership of the overall professional collections 
function 
... 
9 
Department 
_manager 
Leadership of a specific collections function 
... 
7 
Team Leader Management of a team of specialists 
... 
5 
Collector Responsible for activities which minimise arrears 
... 
3 
Clerk To provide data input and support 
... 
2 
Source- IDS 2001 
Spot Rates 
Although spot rates are relatively new to the finance sector, they are a long 
established structure for manual workers. There is a single rate for each job, 
with no provision for increments. The rate may go up or down in accordance 
with whatever criteria is determined by management, and any additional 
payment for performance is likely to be separate from the base rate, for 
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example a performance bonus. Their use for non-manual staff has been 
described as giving management the maximum scope to pay what they 
want (Armstrong 1996: 201). 
Pay Spines 
A pay spine is an incremental system whereby a sequence of pay levels is 
arranged to provide annual progression. Although there may be more than 
one spine in an organisation, a single spine can range from the highest to the 
lowest paid jobs. This system is favoured by the public and voluntary sectors, 
but is rare in the private sector (CIPD 2003b). 
Pay progression 
The type of payment system that was the norm in the finance sector for most 
of the twentieth century was one of salary progression, featuring a scale for 
each grade, along which each worker progressed by incremental steps until 
either they were promoted, or reached an absolute maximum for the grade. 
These increments were paid in addition to and separately from any pay rise 
awarded to compensate for increases in the cost of living, which were the only 
type of increase received by the majority of manual workers other than by 
promotion. The method for calculating increments changed from age or 
length of service to merit in the early 1970s, but cost of living awards 
continued to be negotiated with the unions on an annual basis until the last 
decade of the twentieth century. 
The CIPD survey conducted in 2002 shows that employers now use a 
combination of criteria to manage pay progression. 'Cost of living' has been 
replaced by'market movement', the traditional service related increments and 
the strategic links with market rates and company profit also feature, but there 
is now a high dependency on 'contingent' pay, such as performance related 
and competency based systems (CIPD 2003b). 
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Performance Related Pay 
A survey by Select Recruitment Agency in 2000 (Personnel Today 2001) found 
sixty four per cent of companies operating a Perfon-nance Related Pay scheme 
in 2000 compared with thirty six per cent in 1999. Performance Related Pay 
can take many fon-ns, but is essentially either individual Performance Related 
Pay or Team Pay. 
Individual Performance Related Pay 
Perfomiance Related Pay is: 
"... a system in which a individual's increase in salary is solely or 
mainly dependent on his/her appraisal or merit rating. 
... 
an average 
performer receives an average increase, an above average performer 
receives an above average increase, while a below average performer 
receives less than the average, and a person whose work is 
unacceptable may receive no increase at all" 
(Swabe 1989: 17). 
This represents two significant changes to the incremental system that finance 
sector staff had enjoyed for some time. Not only would they now have only a 
single pay review each year, instead of the customary two, but there was now 
no guarantee that they would eventually reach the scale maximum. 
Performance is normally measured against a set of agreed objectives, and 
points awarded, which are then used to determine the distribution of a 'pot' of 
money allocated for the purpose. In some cases a matrix will be provided that 
plots the appraisal rating against current salary with the intention of 
restricting pay levels to maintain their relationship with the market rate. 
Team Pay 
Midland Bank (now HSBC) for many years rejected the individual 
performance related pay model for clerical staff as being "incompatible with 
team working" (Storey, Cressey, Morris, & Wilkinson 1997: 36), although it 
had been introduced for managers. Instead, members of a business unit, or 
team received an increase based on the performance of their team, and this 
was given the title of 'Lets Reward Success'. 
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Many finance sector employers also pay an annual profit share based on the 
overall performance of the organisation; this has occasionally been as high as 
15% of salary in the Bank of Scotland, although it can equally well be very 
small or non existent if profits are not sufficiently high. Since 1997 even the 
Co-operative Bank has introduced this system, despite it being seen by some 
critics as "incompatible with the ethos of the co-operative movement" (Storey, 
Cressey, Morris, & Wilkinson 1997: 36). 
Competence based pay 
Performance related pay rewards staff according to the outputs they acl-deve, 
usually measured against pre-designated objectives. Competence pay is 
designed to reward the acquisition of skills, or the 'inputs'. It is increasingly 
used in conjunction with performance measurement as part of the annual 
appraisal, and is only rarely used independently (CIPD 2003b). 
Where competencies are used to facilitate progression through a broad band 
the measurement process may be as formal and structured as the acquisition 
of qualifications such as NVQ/SVQý but where they are only a part of the 
appraisal process they may just involve a supervisor's assessment of a range 
of generic skills. 
Cafeteria Benefits 
Cafeteria benefit plans allow employees to choose from a variety of benefits 
and designate a set amount of money from their salary to pay for those they 
select. It can be used as a way of dealing with the conflict between parents 
and other employees over the provision of child care benefits. Critics point 
out that it creates a conflict for individual employees, who may be choosing 
between the immediate benefit of a creche, and future considerations such as 
pensions or insurance. 
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APPENDIX 2. Proposal document for pay audits 
ScoPe of the recommended review 
All employees should be included in the review process 
In addition to gender, analysis should include race and disability. 
I would also recommend the inclusion of age as a unit of analysis. 
Preparation 
I would require access to: 
Details of the pay and grading system(s) in operation 
Details of the job evaluation system 
Copies of any relevant collective agreements in force 
Information about any red or green circling arrangements that may still be affecting the 
pay of individuals, 
Data 
The following information would be required for every employee in the organization (the 
details may vary slightly depending on the pay and grading system in operation): 
Payroll number, or other unique id. 
Race 
Age or date of birth 
Professional/ vocational qualifications 
Job description 
Date appointed to current grade 
Number of hours contracted to work 
Last appraisal rating 
Basic pay for 12-month period 
Overtime hours for 12-month period 
Gender 
Whether registered disabled 
Academic qualifications (or highest 
qualification) 
Grade 
Date joined organisation. 
Department 
Shift details if other than a standard 9-5 or 
equivalent flexi-time 
Last performance related increment 
Overtime pay for 12-month period 
Bonus pay during 12-month period (a 
separate entry for every different type of 
bonus paid) 
Maternity pay during 12-month period 
Any employees contribution to a pension 
fund (total for 12-month period) 
Length of maternity leave during 12-month Total length of maternity leave during 
period employment 
Monetary value of any other benefits enjoyed during 12-month period (e. g. car, subsidised child 
care, health insurance etc. ) 
Data format 
The data will be required in spreadsheet format, preferably Microsoft Excel or Access. Multiple 
tables are acceptable, so long as each record in each table includes the payroll number. 
Data Analysis 
Data will be exported to Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) for detailed analysis. 
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